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FREDERICK S. DUNN

1893 · 1962

It is with deep sorrow that we announce the death on March 17 of Professor Frederick S. Dunn who, until his retirement in 1961, was Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University and Chairman of the Editorial Board of *World Politics*.

Professor Dunn was not only the founder of *World Politics*, a journal which is now in its fourteenth year and has contributed to the communication of academic knowledge resulting from researches on problems of international and related affairs. He also exerted a leading influence on the rigorous study of international relations and foreign policy. Indeed, the development of this branch of academic research in the United States owes much to the stimulus and guidance that Professor Dunn gave to it, beginning in the early 1930's, at a time when study in this field was at a markedly low level. It is for this reason that we have asked Professor William T. R. Fox of Columbia University to write an article on Professor Dunn's work. This paper will appear in our October 1962 issue.

KLAUS KNORR

Chairman of the Editorial Board

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THE POLISH INTELLIGENTSIA
Past and Present

By JAN SZCZEPAŃSKI

I

THE intelligentsia in Poland, as in all rapidly changing societies, is regarded as a leading social force and is observed with interest by sociologists, political scientists, and journalists. However, both in Poland and elsewhere the term "intelligentsia" has several connotations and refers to a variety of social groups and occupations, as does the term "intellectuals," which is sometimes used as an equivalent. In *Webster's International Dictionary* we find the following definition: "Intelligentsia.—Informed intellectual people; the educated or professional group, class, or party;—often derisive." The *Oxford Dictionary* defines the term as "That part of a nation that aspires to independent thinking." It seems to me that these two definitions represent the main trends in the use of this word. The Oxford definition is particularly interesting in this respect, as it accords with P. D. Boborykin's use of the term when he introduced it into the Russian language in 1860.[1] He used it to designate a special social group, born of specific Russian social, political, and cultural conditions. It comprised people who were educated in Western culture, and who were thereby alienated from the traditional culture of the Russian elite as well as from the popular culture of the masses. In the 1860's this group also included a certain number of educated people who, because of their lower-class origins, were excluded from participation in institutionalized social and political life.

It must be stressed that in this early period in Russia the term "intelligentsia" was used to designate people who were educated but did not occupy any officially recognized position. Aware of the backwardness of the established system of social and political institutions, this intelligentsia opposed the system and strove for its reform. But the political elite centered around the Tsar did not show any understanding of the need for reforms, nor did the masses of Russian society. The resulting isolation pushed this first group of intelligentsia to revolutionary activity. An attitude of political opposition and an inclination to revolution be-

[1] Almost every author writing about the origin of the term "intelligentsia" refers to Peter Boborykin as having originated it in one of his numerous works, but nobody has been able to give the exact reference. See James H. Billington, "The Intelligentsia and the Religion of Humanity," *American Historical Review*, LXV (July 1960), p. 811, note 10.

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came the distinctive marks of its members' way of thinking. Moreover, they considered all social, economic, and political issues as derivatives of basic philosophical problems, and thus regarded the creation of a *Weltanschauung* as their first preoccupation. They attempted to think independently and to create a system of ideas that, when accepted by the masses, would solve the burning problems of Russian society. The composition of this Russian intelligentsia changed with the subsequent transformation of Russian society, but these essential traits of the original group deeply influenced the thinking about it and about kindred groups in other countries, including the West, as is indicated by the Oxford definition cited above.[2]

In Poland developments followed other paths. Up to the end of the eighteenth century all professions had developed in Polish society largely in the same way as in Western societies. A system of secondary schools and the University of Cracow trained the civil servants, lawyers, teachers, physicians, army officers, etc., while authors, artists, and priests developed as in any other European society. The crisis of the partition of Poland toward the end of the century called forth a group of writers, political reformers, political theorists, and other ideological thinkers who sought eagerly for ways of saving the nation. The Enlightenment in Poland, the revival of cultural life, the reform of the school system, and the political reforms of 1791 were the work of this group of patriotic nobles, politicians, and other educated sectors of the society. Polish historians point out that these years of political and cultural revival created the basic patterns of activity for the intelligentsia in the nineteenth century, although the leading intellectual groups were not able to prevent the final fall of the Polish state in 1795.[3]

II

The partition of Poland changed fundamentally the trend in the development of the intelligentsia. It hampered the "normal" development of professions, of industry, commerce, education. Thus the Polish intelligentsia henceforth developed differently from the educated classes in

[2] See Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Russian Intellectuals," reprinted in George B. de Huszar, ed., *The Intellectuals*, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, pp. 41-50; George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, and his chapter on "The Intelligentsia and Russia," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 253-74; P. N. Miliukov, *Iz Istorii Russkoi Intelligentsii*, St. Petersburg, 1903; Arnost Blaha, *Sociology of the Intelligentsia*, Brno, 1937.

[3] W. Smoleński, *Przewrot umysłowy w Polsce* (The transformation of Polish cultural life), Warsaw, 1949; B. Leśnodorski, *Dzieło Sejmu czteroletniego* (The work of the Sejm, 1788-1792), Warsaw, 1951; Z. Dębicki, *Kryzys inteligencji polskiej* (The crisis of the Polish intelligentsia), Warsaw, 1918.

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Western countries, but also differently from the alienated groups in Russia. The most influential and important among the nation's educated people became those who took the ideological leadership in the effort to regain independence, who maintained the cultural and social forces necessary to this purpose, who kept alive the national traditions, developed the nation's values, educated the new generations for the struggle for national goals, maintained and developed the Polish language, literature, arts, and science, created new social and political ideas, searched for possibilities and analyzed the forces within the nation that might be decisive for the restoration of Poland.

This intelligentsia was thus not alienated culturally and socially, but deeply and actively involved in the life of the nation. When the term "intelligentsia" appeared in a Polish encyclopedia in 1863, it signified all people who applied education and knowledge to their activities—whether occupational, vocational, or avocational. But those considered the most important among them were the men of ideas, not the men of professional skill.

During the nineteenth century, the numbers of the intelligentsia increased considerably with the development of the capitalist economy and the transformation of the old semi-feudal conditions. During this century the class structure of the nation also changed: to the traditional classes of the aristocracy, the nobility, the urban middle class, and the peasants were added the intelligentsia and the working class. The intelligentsia derived chiefly from the nobility; the working class from the peasantry, the lower middle class, and various segments of the disintegrating feudal order. The enfranchisement of the peasants, industrialization and its consequences, the development of the school system, the growth of literacy, and the spread of journalism were the main factors in the rise of the intelligentsia. Its core was composed of the members of the nobility who, deprived of their estates, entered various intellectual occupations, seeking to retain their position in society by means of their education. They preserved the social and cultural patterns of life characteristic of the nobility, and created special social institutions to serve as barriers between themselves and the uneducated lower classes. Thus education was not only the way to a profession, but also to a higher social position. The ideal of the intelligentsia was not a competent professional man, but a "cultured man," participating widely in the nation's cultural heritage, a man with knowledge of history, literature, the arts, and good manners.[4]

[4] Jósef Chałasiński, *Przeszłość i przyszłość inteligencji polskiej* (Past and future of the Polish intelligentsia), Warsaw, 1958.

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Although the Polish intelligentsia played an important role in the nation's life in the nineteenth century, we have, strangely enough, only a few monographic studies of it. I shall cite here some data from two studies based on biographical investigations. The first is an analysis of the biographies of 860 men active in the years 1800-1900, chosen at random from the *Polish Biographical Dictionary* and other sources;[5] the second is an attempt to determine the social characteristics of 1,961 men of knowledge who were active in the years between 1800 and 1928, also based on an analysis of their biographies.[6] It must not be forgotten that the Polish territory was divided among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and that the intelligentsia developed differently in each country. The nineteenth century was also one of rapid change. Both samples, however, were chosen from all three annexed territories and cover the whole century.

Of the men in the first sample, about 60 per cent came from the aristocracy and nobility, 24 per cent from the intelligentsia, 8 per cent from the bourgeoisie, 4.5 per cent from the lower middle class, 2.5 per cent from the peasantry, and about 1 per cent from the working class. It must be borne in mind that in the nineteenth century the intelligentsia was still in the process of formation as a class and did not have a clearly crystallized sense of its distinctiveness. Many of its members regarded themselves as belonging to the traditional social classes. Thus most of them, the sons of professional men, considered themselves as sons of the nobility or the bourgeoisie—that is, the classes of their grandparents.

The political allegiance in this sample was also diversified, and no correspondence between class background and political ideology was discovered. Forty-six per cent held democratic and liberal views, and the views of 45.3 per cent were conservative and right-wing, while the remaining 8 or 9 per cent were socialists, populists, etc. This low percentage of radical ideologies is due to the fact that such ideologies appeared in Poland only in the late decades of the nineteenth century. The intelligentsia was thus politically divided. Its social and political engagement can be measured by its participation in conspiracies and armed struggles for liberation. From the materials available, it appears that 32 per cent participated in armed uprisings. This percentage may well have been considerably higher, for we have no pertinent informa-

[5] Jan Szczepański, "Z badań nad inteligencją polską XIX wieku" (An investigation of the Polish intelligentsia of the 19th century), *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, IV (1960), pp. 133-39.

[6] Jan Szczepański, "Materiały do charakterystyki ludzi polskiego swiata naukowego w XIX i początkach XX wieku" (Materials relating to the characteristics of the Polish men of knowledge in the 19th and early 20th century) (unpublished).

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tion about 37 per cent of the sample. The repression by the occupying powers during the nineteenth century was cruel. About 20 per cent of the sample were imprisoned or deported to forced labor camps, 15 per cent emigrated for political reasons, and about 22 per cent died abroad. It can be assumed that for the intelligentsia as a whole these figures were considerably higher.

Some verification of these findings is given us in the analysis of the second sample of men of knowledge. Here, 50.5 per cent were representatives of the humanities and social sciences, 22.8 per cent of mathematics and physical sciences, 18.6 per cent of medical sciences, 6.1 per cent of technological sciences, and 2 per cent were theologians. This sample is composed of men who carried on research in various fields of learning, regardless of their formal occupation. Because no Polish university existed in territories annexed by Germany, nor for a long period in territories occupied by Russia, the development of learning in Poland was sponsored by institutions and men supported by private means, under difficult conditions, and in spite of suppression. Only 47 per cent of this sample were professors and lecturers in Polish universities in the Habsburg monarchy, 4.9 per cent were professors in Russian universities, 3.9 per cent professors in Western countries (including the United States), 12.8 per cent were teachers, 7.8 per cent officials, 4.35 per cent priests, 3.2 per cent librarians, 2.8 per cent estate owners, and 2 per cent army officers.

Social background was ascertained for only 436 persons. Of these, 57.1 per cent were from the aristocracy and nobility, 23.4 per cent from the intelligentsia, 9.2 per cent from the bourgeoisie, 6.2 per cent from the lower middle class, 4.1 per cent from the peasant class.

These men of knowledge were also involved in social and political activities. Twenty per cent were leaders and chairmen of associations, organizations, and various institutions; 8.2 per cent were political leaders and served as government officials, members of parliament, senators, etc.; 8.6 per cent participated in armed uprisings. The percentage of activists was considerably higher among representatives of the social sciences. For instance, of 310 historians, 15.5 per cent participated in armed struggles; 38.5 per cent of the economists performed high political functions; and 29 per cent of the lawyers were also political leaders.

These data give us some picture of the Polish intelligentsia of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It was certainly a social stratum which, in spite of its diverse occupational composition, had a clear feeling of mission and responsibility. It deliberately worked for national aims, kept alive and developed the national culture, and at the same

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time contributed to the common heritage of Western culture. It seems clear that the importance of this Polish cultural presence in the world community was one of the reasons that Polish independence was included as the thirteenth point of Woodrow Wilson's program for post-war organization of Europe in 1918.

III

After 1918, when the Polish state again came into being, the social structure of Polish society and the relationship among the classes changed considerably. There were now six main social groupings. The landed gentry, still owning a good deal of the land and enjoying great traditional prestige, must be placed at the top of the social pyramid. Then came the upper middle class, which in Poland comprised the owners of large and medium-sized enterprises—industrial, commercial, and financial. These two were the ruling classes, in the Marxist sense of the term. The third stratum were the intelligentsia, by this time more numerous and more highly differentiated than in the nineteenth century. Below them were the petit bourgeoisie, the lower middle class consisting of owners of small enterprises of various kinds. Next came the peasants, themselves divided into clear-cut economic strata, and at the bottom the working class. Thus the intelligentsia was a stratum of non-manual workers, earning their living through intellectual, professional, and clerical activities, clearly separated from the lower classes by secondary and higher education, and connected to the upper classes by common patterns of social life.

In the new Polish state, governmental, economic, educational, and cultural institutions developed rapidly, and the size of the intelligentsia increased accordingly. In 1931 there were in Poland about 665,000 non-manual workers of various types, making up 2.1 per cent of the whole population and 24.6 per cent of all those employed in the national economy. In the period 1919-1938, about 140,000 persons graduated from the secondary schools of general education (*lycées*), and about 85,000 of these went on to get diplomas of higher education.[7] The number of graduates from secondary schools for vocational training was considerably higher, yet about 45 per cent of all non-manual workers in 1931 had no secondary-school diploma.[8]

[7] Estimate based on the following sources: *Mały rocznik statystyczny* (Small statistical yearbook), Warsaw, 1939; *Statystyka szkolnictwa* (School statistics), Warsaw, 1937-1938; M. Sobociński, *Podaż ludzi z wyższym wykształceniem* (Supply of university graduates), Warsaw, 1934.

[8] T. Bartnicki and T. Czajkowski, *Struktura zatrudnienia i zarobki pracowników umysłowych* (Structure of employment and salaries of mental workers), Warsaw, 1936.

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The main tendencies in the development of this stratum between the two world wars can be summarized briefly. First, an increase in number and a rapid proliferation in structure and function must be stressed. Not only did the number of those in the traditional occupations increase, but new governmental institutions and the emergence of new areas in the national economy and cultural life called forth new occupational categories of intelligentsia. The "creative intelligentsia"—scientists, scholars, men of letters, artists, and the like, who in Poland were called "intellectuals"—together with higher civil servants and the political elite, were clearly distinct from the lower officials and clerical workers. Differences in economic status, in social prestige, in level of education, and in connection with the ruling classes were the most marked factors in the stratification of the intelligentsia.

Secondly, we must note the changes in social composition of this stratum, into whose ranks began to infiltrate great numbers from the lower social classes. Thus in 1935, among the students in universities, 13.4 per cent came from the peasant and working classes, and 19.5 per cent from the lower middle class. This changing social composition had significant consequences in regard to cultural life, political allegiance, and ideological outlook.

The political activities of the intelligentsia had also changed, as compared with the nineteenth century. The creation of the Polish state and consequent political institutions had made possible the development of political parties. The economic crisis, unemployment among white-collar workers, the dictatorship of Pilsudski, and other factors favored the radicalization of political attitudes, leading to the development of both radical right-wing and leftist movements. The intelligentsia supplied the government with functionaries and the political parties with ideologists, journalists, propagandists, activists, etc.; it thus played a leading role in current political and ideological struggles. Yet in spite of far-reaching radicalization, the main core of this stratum remained loyal to a liberal ideology. As a final characteristic, we should note its increasing productivity in scientific, literary, and artistic fields. The period between the two wars brought about a great revival in these areas.[9]

[9] The problems of the social role and responsibility of this kind of intelligentsia were widely discussed in T. Hołówko, "Grzechy i omyłki polskiej inteligencji pracującej" (Sins and errors of the Polish toiling intelligentsia), *Droga* (1924), No. 5, pp. 1-14; A. Skwarczyński, "Zadania i przyszłość inteligencji pracującej" (Tasks and future of the toiling intelligentsia), *ibid.*, Nos. 6-7, pp. 1-5; K. Zakrzewski, "Zagadnienie inteligencji" (The problem of the intelligentsia), *ibid.* (1929), No. 4, pp. 333-43; A. Hertz, "Spór o inteligencję" (Dispute about the intelligentsia), *ibid.*, No. 10, pp. 846-55; B. Heidekorn, "Proletaryzacja inteligencji zawodowej" (Proletarization of the vocational intelligentsia), *ibid.* (1930), No. 1, pp. 68-74; A. Hertz, "Sprawa klerka" (The prob-

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IV

These processes were brutally halted by the war. The German invasion, the new partition of Poland, and the occupation of the eastern part of Poland by the Russians in 1941 brought about a complete suppression of the intelligentsia and very nearly its extermination. The official German policy in Poland destroyed the economic foundation of all Polish classes: the confiscation of real estate diminished the number of landed gentry, the confiscation of enterprises destroyed a large part of the upper middle class, and the extermination of the Jews combined with forced labor destroyed the lower middle class. About 2,400,000 Poles were sent to Germany as slave laborers—mostly peasants and workers, but also great numbers of the intelligentsia and lower middle classes. There is no reliable data as to the number of Poles deported to the eastern parts of the USSR.

The most cruel was the fate of the intelligentsia. In a deliberate attempt to destroy the very roots of Polish national life, the occupation forces set out to exterminate first of all the educated stratum, which could have provided the nation with resistance leadership. Thus the losses among the intelligentsia were enormous. For instance, of 2,460 university professors and assistants, 705 died during the war, the majority of these being killed; also lost were 848 secondary school teachers, 3,963 primary school teachers, 399 artists, and 660 authors and journalists, to mention only the principal categories. An incomplete list of losses gives the names of 4,400 people who had been occupied in cultural activities.[10] Total war losses among the educated classes can be roughly estimated at about 35 per cent. In addition, a considerable number of exiles and displaced persons did not return to the country after the war.

Thus in 1945 the Polish intelligentsia returned to its work decimated, deprived of all means of accomplishing its task, of its homes and its institutions. There were no Polish universities, no other institutions of

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lem of the clerk), *ibid.* (1933), No. 3, pp. 229-40; A. Hertz, "Inteligencja wobec mas" (The intelligentsia and the masses), in A. Skwarczyński, ed., *Pod znakiem odpowiedzialności i pracy*, Warsaw, 1933; Z. Łempicki, "Problemat inteligencji" (The problem of the intelligentsia), *Marcholt* (1935), No. 2; B. Zubrzycki and S. Salzman, "Dyskusja o inteligencji" (Discussion of the intelligentsia), *Sygnały* (1936), No. 18; A. Próchnik, "Problem inteligencji" (The problem of the intelligentsia), *ibid.* (1937), No. 27; A. Jałowiecki, "Gospodarująca inteligencja" (The managing intelligentsia), *Przegląd Współczesny* (1937), No. 10, pp. 20-35; Z. Łempicki, "Kryzys inteligencji a potrzeby życia" (The crisis of the intelligentsia and the needs of life), *Drogi Polski* (1937), No. 10.

[10] B. Olszewicz, *Lista strat kultury polskiej* (The losses of Polish culture), Wrocław, 1947.

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higher learning; the school system was destroyed, along with the whole economy of the nation. The country was in ruins. Warsaw was 85 per cent destroyed, as were most of the other cities, especially those in the Western territories, which, according to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, were given to Poland in recompense for the eastern provinces. More than 40 per cent of the national property was destroyed, 22 per cent of the entire population killed—proportionately the highest price paid by any of the nations that had participated in the war.

The vital forces of the intelligentsia were crushed, too. Those who were left were in poor physical condition, their health damaged by concentration camps, slave labor, participation in the resistance. Let us compare the productivity of the class in 1937 and in 1946. The number of scientific publications went down from 7,974 in 1937 to 426 in 1946; the number of literary works from 1,560 to 645; the number of works popularizing the sciences from 2,274 to 353.

V

Immediately after the expulsion of German troops by the Soviet Army, there began the work of reconstruction and reform, in which the intelligentsia was called upon to play an essential role. However, during this immediate postwar period, the structure and functions of the intelligentsia changed, too. These changes were brought about by several factors: the assumption of political power by the Communist Party and the introduction of new political and economic institutions that controlled the whole domain of national life according to a central plan; the land reform and nationalization of industry, commerce, transport, etc., which consequently changed the class structure of the nation; rapid industrialization, changes in the structure of the labor force, and the shift of population from the country to the towns; and the enlargement of the school system—first of all, of secondary vocational schools and institutions of higher education. No less important than these factors in changing Poland's national life was the shift of frontiers and the mass migration from the east to the west that occurred when, immediately after the war, in a ruined country with a ruined communications system, the Polish government had to transfer several million people.

By 1945 the entirely spontaneous process of the formation of a new intelligentsia had ended. Henceforth it was shaped also by the planned policy of the party, according to the Marxist theory of the intelligentsia. The purpose of the party was to create a body of scientific, artistic, and professional manpower that would fulfill the centrally established plans,

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participate in rebuilding the country, and mobilize social and psychic energies in the direction indicated by the party's political ideals. We can see now, after fifteen years of experience, that the traditional spontaneous forces remained operative as well, and that the real development went forward as the result of both processes.

Immediately after the war, there were in Poland only about 100,000 people with prewar secondary and higher education and about 250,000 with secondary vocational training. Thus the first task of party policy was the education of a new intelligentsia. It had to be educated as a people's intelligentsia, according to Marxist ideas, which means as educated manpower with vocational skills, originating from the toiling strata of the society, having the desired political attitudes, accepting the party's social and economic program, and identifying personal aims with the aims of the socialist system. The means of creating such an intelligentsia were fourfold: (1) Re-education of the prewar intelligentsia and acquisition of its support in the reconstruction of the economy and the administrative and educational system. This was achieved in wide degree as the intelligentsia, from various motives, engaged in these tasks. (2) Advancement of intelligent and politically active workers and peasants into the managerial ranks in industry and administration. By 1949 about 15,000 workers and peasants had been advanced to supervisory positions in factories and other institutions. (3) Creation of special educational institutions for workers and peasants at the secondary-school level to provide the vocational and political education necessary to realize the party's aims. The most important of these institutions were the technical schools for advanced workers, and the preparatory courses for institutions of higher education. The purpose of the former was to train technicians, both scientifically and politically, in order to supply the leading cadres for nationalized industry. The latter prepared the workers and peasants for entry into universities and other institutions of higher education. (4) Finally, there was the reform of the entire school system, in which children from peasants' and workers' families were assured more than 50 per cent of the places, and students were given ideological training with stress on vocational preparation. Table 1 compares the percentage of students majoring in various fields in all Polish institutions of higher education in 1935 and 1956.

As we can see, the changes in percentage of those studying in the various fields are considerable, but still greater changes occurred in the social background of the students. In the period 1945-1959 the secondary schools of general and vocational education turned out approximately 900,000 graduates, of whom about 200,000 subsequently grad-

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TABLE 1

	1935	1956
Technical colleges	11.4	36.3
Law	34.3	3.2
Medicine	16.7	13.4
Business and economics	8.2	12.3
Agriculture	6.6	11.2
Humanities and sciences	22.8*	16.7
Artistic and other	—	6.7

* Arts included

uated from institutions of higher learning. Of these 200,000, about one-third came from the working class and about one-fifth from the peasant class. This means that about 70,000 people with higher education have a working-class background and about 40,000 a peasant background, while about 210,000 graduates of secondary schools have a worker's background and 140,000 a peasant background. In 1934, in all institutions of higher education, only 13.4 per cent of the students had come from the working and peasant classes.

These data give us an idea of the extent of changes in the social composition of the new intelligentsia. But not only the planned educational and other party activities were responsible for these changes; the changes in the class structure of the nation itself influenced the intelligentsia in yet another way. As already mentioned, the basic reforms led to the disappearance of the estate owners and the bourgeoisie, and also changed the composition of the lower middle class. In 1944-1946, 9,327 estates were either parceled out and given to peasants or transformed into state farms. The families of the former owners went mainly into various non-manual jobs, profiting from their education. I cannot give any estimate of the numbers of those who turned at this time to professional or other white-collar occupations. As for the owners of greater and medium-sized enterprises, by 1947 the new government had nationalized 12,914 enterprises, and their owners likewise had for the most part become white-collar workers or established themselves as owners of small enterprises employing less than five hired workers or not using hired labor at all. As previously stated, the German occupation had destroyed the majority of these enterprises and turned the owners into slave workers. Yet by 1946 there were again about 400,000 such small enterprises, constituting the economic base of the lower middle class. After 1948 about 300,000 of these enterprises were nationalized and a portion of the former owners also became white-collar workers, but it is impossible to give the exact number.

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VI

As a consequence of all these factors, in 1957 there were employed in the Polish national economy about 2,100,000 white-collar workers. This constituted 8.1 per cent of the whole population and about 34 per cent of those gainfully employed in the nationalized sector of the economy. This stratum, called the "intelligentsia," is highly differentiated and stratified. Let us take a look at its internal structure.[11]

The whole stratum of non-manual workers can be divided into three major sociological categories: first, the creative intelligentsia—that is, the people who create the nation's representative culture; second, the leaders and organizers of social, civic, and technical activities; third, the experts, professionals, teachers, and all others who apply scientific knowledge to the solution of practical, vocational problems. Each of these sociological categories embraces several vocational categories. Let us enumerate them and estimate their numbers.

In Poland in 1957, the category of the creative intelligentsia consisted of: (a) scientific workers (the word "scientific" is used here in the broad sense of the German *wissenschaftlich*), of whom there were in all institutions of higher education and research institutes about 25,000 with various degrees, from full professors to assistants, and about 13,000 technical assistants; (b) about 800 creative writers (novelists, poets, playwrights, critics, translators); (c) about 6,000 artists (painters, sculptors, and designers); (d) about 4,500 architects; (e) about 2,700 actors and directors (theater and movie); (f) about 3,400 composers, musicians, and singers; and (g) about 3,000 journalists of all kinds, employed by daily newspapers, periodicals, radio, and television. The total in this category was thus approximately 60,000.

In the second category—the leaders and organizers of social, civic, and technical activities—were the following occupations: (a) engineers and technicians working in industry, communications, and other services, numbering about 225,000 (roughly 12,000 of these were employed in research institutions); (b) about 9,000 judges, barristers, solicitors, and public prosecutors; (c) directors of nationalized enterprises, managers and directors of governmental institutions, managers of public institutions and organizations—occupations that were continually increasing in number; and (d) workers in the political party apparatus, experts and officials employed in economic and social planning, officers in the army, and police. (These last-named occupations constituted the most powerful

[11] Jan Szczepański, "Struktura inteligencji w Polsce" (The structure of the intelligentsia in Poland), *Kultura i Społeczenstwo*, IV (1960), pp. 19-48.

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groups. The available occupational statistics, based on criteria different from mine, do not permit an estimate of the number of people thus employed.) (e) Finally, there were about 43,000 workers employed in planning and organizing the cultural life of the population—the managers of cultural institutions and workers employed in the cultural activities of trade unions and local governmental institutions. This sociological category, taken as a whole, played a very important role in public life.

The third category embraced all those who apply a body of knowledge acquired through education to their vocational tasks. Here we find: (a) about 83,000 physicians and other qualified personnel in the health services; (b) teachers of kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools, numbering about 180,000 persons; (c) about 8,000 workers in publishing houses, who by the nature of their jobs are almost tantamount to scientific workers; and (d) priests of all denominations, sometimes fulfilling the social functions of leaders and constituting a rather caste-like community. (In Poland in 1957 there were 14,714 Roman Catholic priests and 27,000 monks and nuns. The number of clergy of other denominations was rather small.) (e) Finally, in agriculture were employed about 99,000 white-collar workers of all levels of education, and in commerce about 397,000, most of whom, although having the legal status of "mental workers," lacked any specialized secondary education. It should be added that of the entire 2,100,000 white-collar workers, about 60 per cent had not graduated from secondary schools, and that this group comprises the main core of lower officials and clerical employees who are included in the intelligentsia.

On the basis of the preceding breakdown, we can try to provide some answers to more general sociological questions. The structure and functions of the Polish intelligentsia have undergone a process of transformation and the term that once designated an intellectual and artistic elite is now used to designate all those who have the legal status of "mental workers" and constitute a third toiling stratum of socialist society. The functions of creating philosophical and political ideas, shaping public opinion, and establishing value criteria are now taken over by the political party. But the creative intelligentsia, or at least some of its categories, still have an effect on intellectual and artistic values that serve as symbols and factors contributing to national coherence and continuity and to a sense of national identification; this is the basis of the social prestige of the class.

The increase in its numbers and progressive differentiation have loosened internal ties within the stratum. The present-day intelligentsia as defined above has no common institutions, no common economic

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interests, and no common ideology or social consciousness. The process of institutionalization advances along occupational lines. Economic interests and economic strivings, ways of getting ahead, differ according to occupation. The intelligentsia as a whole has no political representation. Its members can be found in all of the Polish political parties. Some occupational groups of creative intelligentsia that traditionally exercised political leadership and public influence still maintain a feeling of responsibility and national mission, but their real influence is not at all commensurate with their ambitions. These groups are an unorganized social force rather than a political force.

The new group of political leaders who form the very core of the people's intelligentsia and occupy leading positions in the power apparatus, industry, and the mass organizations provide the national leadership. They are to some degree interpenetrated by traditional intellectuals, but the latter have rather limited influence on political decisions.

The prestige of the creative intelligentsia is still very high in the popular mind, as some studies have revealed. The development of science, the arts, and scholarship is regarded as essential to the achievement of the socialist order. Thus the development of institutions of higher education, research institutes, and cultural institutions is felt to be an important governmental task. Science is a significant factor in economic and military strength. The arts increase international prestige. These considerations play a certain role in determining the social position of the creative intelligentsia, and give them some independence of action, although all institutions (except the Roman Catholic Church and other religious institutions) are controlled by the government. Such independence is not possessed, however, by the mass of white-collar workers living on government salaries. By the very nature of their work, they can advance to better positions and better pay only through loyal service—as in any bureaucratic organization in any society.[12]

If in its first fifteen years not all the objectives of the Communist Party's program for the creation of a new people's intelligentsia have been achieved, the changes that have taken place are nevertheless profound. The most important are the professionalization of the intelligentsia, its close connection with other classes, the reduction of traditional barriers between the intelligentsia and the lower classes, and the

[12] See Jan Szczepański, ed., *Z badań klasy robotniczej i inteligencji* (Research on the working class and the intelligentsia), Łódź, 1958, and *Wykształcenie a pozycja społeczna inteligencji* (The education and social position of the intelligentsia), Vol. I, Łódź, 1959; Vol. II, Łódź, 1960.

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internal disintegration of the whole stratum. The increase in its numbers, the specialization and institutionalization of its occupations, and its shifting status in the division of labor all pose new problems and create new situations in which the traditional pattern is losing its validity. Moreover, changes in the technology of industrial work also have effected rapid changes in the working class. Thus the relative social position of those in non-manual occupations is influenced by developments in other social classes. No longer do the traditional virtues of the intelligentsia constitute the only factors in its social role; rather its role is determined by the totality of transformation in an industrial society and the economic and political division of the contemporary world.

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Note ideas of managing risk + domination

NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN EUROPE

By T. C. SCHELLING

DISCUSSION of troop requirements and weaponry for NATO is much concerned with the *battlefield consequences* of different troop strengths and nuclear doctrines. But the battlefield criterion is only one criterion, and when nuclears are introduced it is secondary. The idea that European armament should be designed for resisting Soviet invasion, and is to be judged by its ability to contain an attack, is based on the notion that limited war is a tactical operation. It is not.

What that notion overlooks is that a main consequence of limited war, and a main purpose for engaging in it, is *to raise the risk of general war*. Limited war does this whether it is intended to or not. The danger is not just that each side, one after the other, will raise the level or extend the scope until the violence is increased beyond all bounds. More important in the present era of strategic weapons is that so-called "accidental" ("inadvertent" or "unpremeditated") war may occur in ways that are unpredicted, for reasons not fully comprehended, through processes not entirely under control.

This point is fundamental to deterrence of anything other than all-out attack on ourselves. And it is fundamental to the strategy of limited war. The danger of sudden war—of unpremeditated war—is a real danger and one that obsesses the strategic commands on both sides. This danger is enhanced in a crisis, particularly one involving military activity. It is enhanced partly because of the sheer preoccupation with it. And it is enhanced because alarms and incidents will be more frequent, and those who interpret alarms will be readier to act on them.

If we ask, then, the consequences of a Soviet attack, or of war in Europe initiated in any fashion, an important part of the answer—probably the most important—is that until the situation is tranquilized, the risk of general war will have been greatly increased and so will the awareness of this risk.

This is also, to a large extent, the purpose of being prepared to fight a local war in Western Europe. The Soviets' anticipation of the risks involved in a large-scale attack must include the danger that general war will result. If they underestimate the scale and duration of resistance, and do attack, the *purpose* of resisting is to confront them, day after day, with an appreciation that life is risky, and that pursuit of the original objective is not worth the risk.

This is distantly—but only distantly—related to the notion that we

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deter an attack limited to Europe by the announced threat of all-out war. It is different because the danger of war does not depend solely on whether the United States would coolly resolve to launch general war in response to a limited attack in Europe. The credibility of a massive American response is often depreciated: even in the event of the threatened loss of Europe the United States would not, it is sometimes said, respond to the *fait accompli* of a Soviet attack on Europe with anything as "suicidal" as general war. But that is a simple-minded notion of what makes general war credible. What can make it exceedingly credible to the Russians—and perhaps to the Chinese in the Straits of Formosa—is that *the triggering of general war can occur whether we intend it or not.*

General war does not depend on our coolly deciding to retaliate punitively for the invasion of Western Europe after careful consideration of the material and spiritual arguments pro and con. General war can result because we or the Soviets launch it in the mistaken belief that it is already on, or in the mistaken or correct belief that, if we do not start it instantly, the other side will. It does not depend on fortitude: it can result from anticipation of the worse consequences of a war that, because of tardiness, the enemy initiates.

And the fear of war that deters the Soviets from an attack on Europe includes the fear of a general war that they initiate. Even if they were confident that they could act first, they would still have to consider the wisdom of an action that might, through forces substantially outside their control, oblige them to start general war.

The Russians should be much more deterred than it is fashionable to estimate—deterred because they cannot be confident that even the lack of resolution sometimes attributed to the United States could guarantee that general war would not result.

This is different from the usual trip-wire analogy. The term "trip-wire" suggests that the Russians can see that beyond a certain point they *automatically* trigger a disproportionate response on our side. That kind of trip-wire we obviously do not have. What we have is more like a succession of imperfect booby traps. In the event of war in Europe, every day there is some probability that general war will be triggered; nobody knows quite when, or how, or whose mistakes or communication failures will contribute to the process, what configuration of false alarms will provoke it, what series of actions by the strategic forces of both sides will confirm the very suspicions that motivate them—and lead to a bold, or a reluctant, or a disorganized initiation of general war. The longer the limited war lasts and the greater the vio-

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lence, the greater is the probability of general war. Even if the initial attack is not deterred by this danger, the threat continues. The risk is there, in heightened form, every day that the military activity goes on.

If nuclear weapons are introduced, the sensed danger of general war will rise strikingly. Both sides will be conscious of this increased danger. This is partly a matter of sheer expectation; everybody is going to be more tense, and for good reason, once nuclears are introduced. And national leaders will know that they are close to general war if only because nuclear weapons signal and dramatize this very danger—a danger that is self-aggravating in that the more the danger is recognized, the more likely are the decisions that cause war to occur.

This argument is neither for nor against nuclears, but for recognizing that this consequence of their use equals in importance—and probably far transcends—their tactical battlefield accomplishments. But before going into the matter of nuclear weapons, consider the role of limited conventional war initiated by the West.

"Suppose an armored column were sent to Berlin in the event that ground access were denied, or suppose, once a transport squeeze on Berlin became intolerable, troops were sent in to claim and hold a corridor; suppose actions were taken that, whether intended to or not, generated some likelihood of an East German uprising. How do we analyze the nature of the pressure on the Russians? I think the answer is in large part that they are confronted with the risk of a war that both sides badly want not to occur, but that both sides may not be able to prevent. A rationale for direct action, even on a scale that by itself might accomplish little, could be the deliberate creation of a risk that we share with the Russians, providing them with the option either to terminate the risk by acting or to withdraw to meet our objectives. . . .

"It is worth noting that this interpretation suggests that the threat of limited war may be potent even when there is little expectation that we would win it."[1]

It is our sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control, and the enemy's similar inability, that can intimidate the enemy. If we were in complete control of the consequences and knew what would and what would not precipitate war—a war that we started or a war that the enemy started—we could make no threat that did not depend on our ultimate willingness to *choose* general war.

This is not an argument that we can always win this kind of war of

[1] T. C. Schelling, "The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance," in *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 198-99.

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nerve. It is a reminder that between the alternatives of unsuccessful local resistance on the one extreme, and the fruitless, terrifying, and probably unacceptable and incredible threat of general thermonuclear war on the other, there is the strategy of risky behavior, of deliberately creating a risk that we share with the Russians, a risk that is credible precisely because its consequences are not entirely within our own and the Soviets' control.

The Introduction of Nuclear Weapons

The introduction of nuclear weapons raises two issues here. One is the actual danger of general war; the other is the role of this danger in our strategy. On the danger itself, one has to guess how likely it is that a sizable nuclear war in Europe can persist, and for how long, without triggering general war. The danger appears great enough to make it unrealistic to expect a tactical nuclear war to "run its course." Either the nuclears wholly change the bargaining environment, the appreciation of risks, and the immediate objectives, and bring about some termination, truce, tranquilization, withdrawal, or pause; or else the local war very likely becomes swamped in a much bigger war. If these are the likely alternatives, we should not take too seriously a nuclear local-war plan that goes to great lengths to carry the thing to its bitter end. There is a high probability that the war either will go *down* by an order of magnitude or go *up* by an order of magnitude, rather than run the tactical nuclear course that was planned for it.

More important is how we control, utilize, and react to a sudden increase in the sensed danger of general war. It will be so important to manage this risk properly that the battlefield consequences of nuclear weapons may be of minor importance. The hour-by-hour *tactical* course of the war may not even be worth the attention of the top strategic leadership.

One can question whether we ought to use nuclears deliberately to raise the risk of general war. But unless we are willing to do this, we should not introduce nuclears. This is so much of what nuclears do that to focus our planning attention on the battlefield may be to ignore what should be getting our main attention (and what would, in the event, get it). Once nuclears are introduced, it is *not the same war* any longer. The tactical objectives and considerations that governed the original war are no longer controlling. It is now a war of nuclear bargaining and demonstration.

If we wish to convey that we are making very restricted use of nuclears for well-defined tactical purposes, and decide to hit only troop

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concentrations in particular locations, our primary concern should be whether we get this message across rather than whether we actually destroy the troops. If we wish to convey that the war is getting out of hand, that it will shortly become locally very destructive in spite of efforts to confine it to military targets, we should pick military targets that cause destruction commensurate with the notion we want to convey. Whether we destroy a rail junction or a regiment of troops is less important than whether we detonate some nuclears, whether we hit or miss cities, and whether we provide a clear-cut or confused picture to the enemy. In a nuclear exchange, even if it nominally involves only the use of "tactical" weapons against tactically important targets, there will be a conscious negotiating process between two very threatening enemies who are worried that the war will get out of hand. The life expectancy of the local war may be so short that neither side is primarily concerned with what happens on the ground within the next day or two. What each side is doing with its *strategic* forces would be the main preoccupation. It is the strategic forces in the background that provide the risks and the sense of danger; it is they whose disposition will preoccupy the national leadership as much as anything that is going on in Europe itself. It is the strategic forces whose minute-by-minute behavior on each side will be the main intelligence preoccupation of the other side.

Limited and localized nuclear war is not, therefore, a "tactical" war. However few the nuclears used, and however selectively they are used, their purpose should not be "tactical" because their consequences will not be tactical. With nuclears, it has become more than ever a war of risks and threats at the highest strategic level. It is a war of nuclear bargaining.

Inferences for NATO Planning

First, nuclear weapons should not be evaluated mainly in terms of what they could do on the battlefield; the decision to introduce them, the way to use them, the targets to use them on, the scale on which to use them, the timing with which to use them, and the communications to accompany their use should not be determined (or not mainly determined) by how they affect the tactical course of the local war. Much more important is what they do to the expectation of general war, and what rules or patterns or expectations about local use are created. It is much more a war of dares and challenges, of nerve, of threats and brinkmanship, once the nuclear threshold is passed. This is because the danger of general war, and the awareness of that danger, is lifted an order

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of magnitude by the psychological and military consequences of nuclear explosion.

Second, as a corollary we should not think that the value or likely success of NATO armed forces depends solely, or even mainly, on whether they can *win* a local war. Particularly if nuclears are introduced, the war may never run its course. Even without the introduction of nuclears, a main function of resistance forces is to create and prolong a genuine sense of danger, of the potentiality of general war. This is not a danger that we create for the Russians and avoid ourselves; it is a danger we share with them. But it is this deterrent and intimidation function that deserves *at least* as much attention as the tactical military potentialities of the troops.

Third, forces that might seem to be quite "inadequate" by ordinary tactical standards can serve a purpose, particularly if they can threaten to keep the situation in turmoil for some period of time. The important thing is to preclude a quick, clean Soviet victory that quiets things down in short order.

Fourth, the deployment and equipment of nuclear-armed NATO troops, including the questions of which nationalities have nuclear weapons and which services have them, are affected by the purpose and function and character of nuclear and local war. If what is required is a skillful and well-controlled bargaining use of nuclears in the event the decision is taken to go above that threshold, and if the main purpose of nuclears is not to help the troops on the battlefield, it is much less necessary to decentralize nuclear weapons and decisions to local commanders. The strategy will need tight centralized control; it may not require the kind of close battlefield support that is often taken to justify distribution of small nuclears to the troops; and nuclears probably could be reserved to some special nuclear forces.

It may be important to communicate to the Russians what we are doing and not doing with respect to nuclears. So it may be worth while to have the nuclear-armed forces physically distinct from the conventional forces, rather than to have a dual capability distributed throughout the troops. We may want to be able to engage in large-scale conventional resistance with conspicuous withholding of nuclears; we may want to engage in a conspicuous deployment of nuclears in readiness for their use; and we will certainly wish to keep tight centralized control over the use of nuclears and to give nobody an opportunity or an incentive to coerce our decision on nuclears by getting into a position where only nuclears can save him.

Fifth, if the main consequence of nuclear weapons, and the purpose

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of introducing them, is to create and signal a heightened risk of general war, our plans should reflect that purpose. We should plan—in the event of resort to nuclear weapons—for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not just of tactical target destruction. Destroying a target may be incidental to the message that the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership. Targets should be picked with a view to what the Soviet leadership perceives about the character of the war and about our intent, not for tactical importance. A target near or inside the USSR, for example, is important because it is near or inside the USSR, not because of its tactical contribution to the European battlefield. A target in a city is important because a city is destroyed, not because it is a local supply or communication center. The difference between one weapon, a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand is not in the number of targets destroyed but in the Soviet (and American) perception of risks, intent, precedent, and implied "proposal" for the conduct or termination of war.

Extra targets destroyed by additional weapons are not a local military "bonus"; they are noise that may drown the message. They are a "proposal" that must be responded to. And they are an added catalyst to general war. This is an argument for a selective and threatening use of nuclears rather than large-scale tactical use. (It is an argument for large-scale tactical use only if such use creates the level of risk we wish to create.) Success in the use of nuclears will be measured not by the targets destroyed but by how well we manage the level of risk. The Soviets must be persuaded that the war is getting out of hand but is not yet beyond the point of no return.

Sixth, we have to expect the Soviets to pursue their own policy of exploiting the risk of war. We cannot expect the Soviets to acquiesce in our unilateral nuclear demonstration. We have to be prepared to interpret and to respond to a Soviet nuclear "counterproposal." Finding a way to terminate will be as important as choosing how to initiate such an exchange. (We should not take wholly for granted that the initiation would be ours.)

Finally, the emphasis of this article is that the use of nuclear weapons *would* create exceptional danger. This is not an argument in favor of their use; it is an argument for recognizing that danger as the central feature of their use.

Harassment and Reprisal

What has been argued above—that the sensed danger of general war will rise in a crisis, and that managing the sense of danger is a main

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criterion of our military action—is dramatically true of nuclear policy but not unique to it. Local and regional military actions are not the only means of manipulating the risk of war, or the only actions for which this risk should be a guiding consideration.

Many kinds of harassment—blockade, sea war, overflight, and so on—are of similar potential character. "Metastasis" of local war to other areas is a related possibility. A particular development that may be almost inevitable in a limited nuclear war is limited nuclear reprisal and harassment.

Limited reprisal would be particularly relevant to an era of "strategic stability"—a time when the danger of explosion into general war is much reduced. But elements of this strategy are almost sure to be present in any limited nuclear conflict.

Limited Reprisal

So far the argument has taken for granted the importance of preemption, of being the one to initiate general war if general war occurs. It is assumed that each side is not only preoccupied with the possibility of pre-emptive attack but is aware of the other's preoccupation with it. It is not certain that this state of affairs will last forever. The situation would be different, and the consequences for NATO strategy would be different, if there were no great advantage in having the initiative in general war. If strategic forces were not very vulnerable or dependent on warning and quick response for their own protection, were capable of controlled reaction, and had the means of communication and the doctrine that would make this possible, and if each side were aware that this was the situation on the other side, the urge to pre-empt would be greatly reduced. The possibility of war by accident, by false alarm, by some unauthorized action or communication failure would be much reduced. Most of the possibilities of inadvertent or unpremeditated war are functions of haste. Slow down the responses; reduce each side's expectation that the other would be motivated to attack; design better and more flexible control over forces; and reduce the dependence on fallible warning systems—and the likelihood of general war is reduced, and so is the expectation of it. The tendency for local war, even local nuclear war, to trigger general war would be reduced; both sides' awareness of this would reduce the importance of the argument of this article. This still does not restore the battlefield criterion for NATO doctrine, planning, and weaponry; there are still alternatives that may dominate the purely "tactical" use of nuclears.

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An important alternative, and a likely one if the pre-emptive urge is tranquilized, is limited reprisal. Limited reprisal is rarely mentioned any more. A decade ago, when people were less afraid of counter-retaliation, it was sometimes suggested that we might "take out" a city or two in case of misbehavior. This was "massive" punishment by ordinary standards, though less massive than the all-out kind of war that later dominated discussion.

The threat of massive all-at-once retaliation, premeditated or pre-emptive, loses some credibility with the loss of hope on either side that a skillful all-out strike might blunt the return strike, and with the loss of the pre-emptive sensitivity to false alarm. But limited reprisal, to put pressure on the enemy, would acquire increased credibility with the reduction of vulnerability of both sides' strategic forces. It would be more credible for the same reason that all kinds of limited war might become less inhibited as the urge to pre-empt and the fear of pre-emption disappeared, and along with it the fear of inadvertent war. The risk in less-than-massive retaliation would be less because the fear of an all-out strike in return would be less. There would be reduced likelihood that limited retaliation would be mistaken for the first step in initiation of an all-out war.

This is not to argue that limited retaliation—entailing the risk, if not the certainty, of limited counterretaliation—would not lead to total destruction, slowly or by inflation to greater and greater reprisals. A war of endurance might bleed both sides to death. It would not be as explosive as the corresponding process in a world in which pre-emption matters.

Limited reprisal, probably in a manner that maintains the pretense of tactical operations, would very likely be resorted to in the event of an important limited war that one side was in danger of losing badly. If it were asked at present what we would do if we were badly losing a sizable limited war in Central Europe, few would answer that we would lob a few nuclear weapons into the USSR to put pressure on the Russians. The usual reason this is not suggested is the response, "But that would mean all-out war." It could. But if done under circumstances when there is no good reason to conduct large-scale punitive war fast, rather than slowly, it probably would not mean total war. (If done in a way that did not create the impression that general war were on, it certainly would not "necessarily" provoke general war, even in the era of "strategic instability.") In the desperate circumstances in which we were about to lose Western Europe, if there were no prospect of militarily winning an all-out war against the Soviet Union, and if there

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were little reason to suppose that the Soviets could expect to win militarily an all-out war against us, some kind of limited punitive warfare would almost certainly suggest itself.

It is noteworthy that the possibility of limited punitive warfare may exercise some deterrence, even though one would not necessarily win the "war of endurance" that he might engage in. This is a war that both sides can lose. If the war of limited retaliation tapers off to a draw, the pain and damage may well exceed the gains and losses of the limited war that brought it about.

Limited reprisal—limited strategic blows—may seem an implausible mode of behavior. Deliberately subjecting each other to nuclear reprisals in a measured way just does not seem realistic. But "unfamiliar" is a better term than "unrealistic." Massive retaliation and large-scale limited war seem realistic only because we have thought about them and talked about them; wars of limited reprisal have not been discussed enough to become familiar, and do not seem as "realistic" as some of the equally unrealistic things that so far exist only in our imaginations.

Limited nuclear exchanges may suddenly look very realistic to a decision-maker who is confronted with the two familiar and "realistic" alternatives—massive obliterative war, and large-scale local defeat. The option of changing the character of the war will suddenly appear obvious. The idea that one should stick to the local rules and lose massively, when he could shift the war to another basis, may be what then looks unreasonable.

But there is a more convincing way to make the case. It is that this kind of war would grow naturally out of the other—the more "tactical" —kind. Imagine the limited introduction of nuclear weapons, for tactical purposes, in Central Europe. It would be hard not to notice that a by-product of the tactical use of nuclears was substantial civilian pain and damage and the fear of more. Particularly if one uses nuclears to reach a little behind the lines (to destroy rail centers, ports, or air bases), there will be destruction of population centers that will not go unnoticed. Whether intended or not, such damage and the fear of more will be important considerations in each side's willingness to continue. Even if not intended, this kind of "pressure" will be an important part of what one is doing in the nominally tactical use of nuclear weapons.

But certainly in target selection one will notice that particular targets involve more of this collateral damage than others. If tactically one side is doing well, it may bend over backwards to keep the war tactically limited by picking targets that minimize collateral damage. But if the

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other side is doing badly, it is certain to recognize that, in the guise of tactical warfare, it can do an enormous amount of punitive damage. And if one side hits a few tactical targets that involve disproportionate civilian damage, the other is almost certain to pick a few such targets in return just to show what the consequences are. It is unlikely that when both sides are exchanging sizable punitive blows, as by-products of a tactical campaign, they will persist in ignoring the main consequence of their military action.

This kind of thing would likely continue in the guise of tactical warfare. Graduated reprisal into the Soviet homeland (or into the West) would probably take the form of picking nominal targets that were "tactical" or "strategic" in the strictly military sense. But the motivation would become more and more that of subjecting the other side to unbearable punitive pressures. The fact that the other can do it, too, would not dissuade this motivation. If the pressure becomes unbearable for both sides, the thing may be terminated and a result negotiated that does not reflect the local tactical superiority that one side originally possessed.

This has some implications for the size and character of NATO forces. If the introduction of nuclears locally and tactically is likely to evolve quickly into an open or disguised war of limited reprisal, and if the latter is likely to dominate the situation, it is not essential to win a tactical campaign.

More important, the *purpose* of introducing nuclears in a tactical war that we would otherwise lose is not just, or mainly, to redress the balance on the battlefield. It is to make the war too painful to continue. Even a limited tactical use of nuclears would be so designed as to maximize the pressure on the other side to call off the war. This pressure is less likely to be the pressure of combat casualties and material losses on the fighting front than the pressure of an expanding exchange of limited nuclear punitive blows. These punitive blows, furthermore, though they might seem exceedingly slow compared with pre-emptive attack in the unstable case, could be fast compared with the pace of tactical warfare. What happens on the battlefield may be of moderate interest compared with the conduct of the nuclear exchange itself. The original theater and tactics no longer define either the character or the locale of the war that has evolved.

It should be emphasized that this behavior is not deterred by the fear of general war in the situation postulated. If the fear of explosion into general war is strong, then the significant mechanism is that discussed earlier—the intimidating pressure imposed by actions that manifestly

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entail some risk of general war. Here we are discussing what happens to the character of large-scale limited war when there is no potent inhibition exercised by the fear of triggering general war. The suggestion is that the limited local war, if very asymmetrical in its apparent outcome, is likely to expand into a war of reprisal, even if the pretense is maintained that it is a tactical campaign. (Of course, the deliberate-risk strategy and the limited reprisal strategy may blend in any actual case. The distinction between an unstable and a stable deterrence of general war has been sharpened here for purpose of exposition.)

It is to be hoped that the Soviets will recognize what a dreadful thing it would be to establish a precedent for this kind of nuclear intimidation. There are many kinds of war that we and the Soviets do not engage in now that, once engaged in, may no longer have tradition against them and no longer be inhibited. Assassination is one; civilian reprisal (through nuclear, bacteriological, or any other kind of weapon) is another. It would seem likely that the Soviets recognize that, if they force us to introduce nuclears tactically, the thing may grow into an exchange of reprisals. It is to be hoped that they will be deterred.

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TOMORROW'S MILITARY MATRIX

By S. F. GIFFIN*

A CHARACTERISTIC of warfare is that it has changed with the arrival of new weapons and concepts to produce a series of distinct pasts, each of which in its time proved surprising in terms of the past once removed. Although critics have generally been able to observe that the generals were prepared for the last war, they might with greater insight have noted that the generals were prepared not just for the last war, but for all the past wars, and hence were seldom at a loss except on encountering foes better equipped than themselves. Cortez was prepared for Montezuma; Montezuma, up against new notions and gadgets, was not prepared for him.

As warfare has had a series of pasts, it may yet have a series of futures. Normally, it is impractical to try to foresee the nature of warfare more than a single technological and conceptual stage ahead, and then only in part. But these are not normal times. Rather, the pace of events and technology is introducing change at a rate so fast that at least one recent "future" for warfare has been foreclosed without tests. A war involving an exchange of fission weapons, without either the use or the threat of fusion weapons, might once have occurred but now cannot occur: it has joined warfare's long series of pasts.

Looking dispassionately to the next future of warfare—a future certainly close enough to be affected by current decisions—it seems likely that both the United States and the Soviet Union will come to possess effective and invulnerable long-range thermonuclear strike forces. "Effective and invulnerable" means that each strike force as a whole can survive any attack with a capability for retaliating on a disastrous scale, or will be credited with such a capability. As Albert Wohlstetter has pointed out in *Foreign Affairs*,[1] to attain such forces will be difficult, complex, and expensive, but nevertheless possible, throughout the next future of warfare here envisaged. This may prove to be a prolonged future, for in order to bring it to an end there must be remarkable scientific and technological breakthroughs, probably in the direction of achieving almost totally effective defenses against missile attack, breakthroughs that are

* The author wishes to thank his colleagues of the Special Studies Group, Institute for Defense Analyses, for their very helpful criticism of this article.

[1] In "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country," he says: ". . . even for the United States, getting a responsible deterrent to Russian attack is far from easy. It is vital and feasible, but hard." (XXXIX, April 1961, p. 362.) See also his "Delicate Balance of Terror," *ibid.*, XXXVII (January 1959), pp. 211-34.

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not now in sight. When such defenses come to exist, we shall have arrived at a future for warfare next but one, with which this essay does not attempt to deal.

The military matrix of the near future, the form within which all forms of warfare must be confined, ought to be determined, as always, by the most crushing form of violence that can be applied with control. To the extent that rationality, or the requirement of keeping violence under control, will apply to relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, this military matrix ought to fall well within one whose outside dimensions were formed by the prospect that either could invite a thermonuclear exchange. This is not to say that either power, if pushed to the point where its basic values must be lost, might not rationally conclude that thermonuclear death was preferable to "dishonor." It is only to say that neither adversary could rationally press an advantage to the point where such a choice had to be considered.

But rationality does not always apply in the case of belligerents or potential belligerents, and indeed even the concept of rationality undergoes metamorphosis in times of international stress. The question whether warfare between the great nuclear powers could stop short of the thermonuclear exchange is therefore an open one. However, the evident fact that such an exchange would be irrational must tend to undermine the credibility of policies and plans based upon the thesis that certain hostile acts, short of thermonuclear attack, will rationally—even inevitably—result in an escalation to the thermonuclear exchange.

The situation that is likely to emerge from the possession by both the United States and the Soviet Union of effective and invulnerable strike forces thus seems charged with interesting problems for policy. At least a few of these can perhaps be discerned in advance.

As a first consideration, inasmuch as neither of the great nuclear powers may rationally be brought to the point where it might employ its strike force against the other, it would appear that both would display a high tolerance for all joint forms of conflict below the level of the visceral thermonuclear exchange. These could range from minor, fringe contacts between American and Russian troops to full-fledged major war, on someone else's territory, that might include the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Premier Khrushchev has publicly (but not necessarily genuinely) ruled out, on the basis that it would escalate to the thermonuclear exchange, any limited war between the Soviet Union and the United States under current circumstances. If he is rational, this *diktat* would have to yield in the changed circumstances here suggested.

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Could this mean that we would have to match Soviet forces man for man? Not if we think in terms of another World War II, because the thermonuclear stalemate could restore, to an extent, American freedom to mobilize unmolested behind the Atlantic and Pacific moats. If we think in terms of a "tactical" use of nuclear weapons, however, we may conclude that our potential enemy would employ this fire power to best effect against ports and landing beaches at the far end of our ocean supply lines. In this event, whether we had forces in being or had to mobilize them to support a land battle overseas might make little difference: the deployment and support of sizable forces overseas could prove virtually impossible.

The exploitation of a capability for full mobilization only after the outbreak of hostilities would, of course, in any event turn again on a favorable situation for American sea power and the possession of reasonable holding strength by America's allies. A favorable situation for American sea power ought to be possible for the future as much as for the past. With respect to our allies, the problem may prove more difficult.

The thermonuclear deterrent could be extended by neither the Soviet Union nor the United States to cover allies, except perhaps indirectly,[2] and this would have to be fully and widely understood. When we cannot rationally contemplate the visceral exchange, we can hardly tell our friends that we will for their sake accept the unacceptable. However, the situation, as postulated, would leave the United States and the Soviet Union free, so far as purely military restraints are concerned, to threaten or employ nuclear attack against any nation except each other. If the Soviets should threaten bombardment of Western Europe with nuclear rockets, we could threaten a similar fate for military targets in Eastern Europe, or North Korea, or, if we thought this would deter rather than delight the Soviets, Communist China. It is conceivable, although politically improbable, that thermonuclear considerations might thereby be largely removed from the calculations of *alliance* military planners on both sides. But also, whenever the Soviet leaders were tempted to display total ruthlessness toward friends of the United States, they would have to keep in the back of their minds the thought that the United States *might* either react with irrationality or suddenly discover the new means of active defense that would end the impasse—sobering

[2] But Bonn would remain more important to us than, say, Attu. As a rational matter, we should probably not react with our full thermonuclear power unless convinced that the enemy had attacked our national *élan vital* or threatened extinction of our basic values.

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thoughts for us, too, in certain reverse circumstances. In the new situation, there might be good reason for the West European members of NATO to provide themselves with a genuine shield of conventional forces—something they could readily do, given any overriding conviction of necessity.

The position with regard to Japan, and Middle Eastern and South Asian allies of the United States, might resemble that for NATO, inasmuch as the confrontation would or could be between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Southeast Asia, we might anticipate that Communist China would be the principal adversary, and this could present us with advantages at a time when the Communist Chinese were not covered by a Soviet nuclear umbrella.

Discounting token capabilities she may soon exhibit, suppose Communist China emerges as a nuclear power? She would presumably do so within the mesh of relationships, nuclear and otherwise, that includes the military matrix here postulated for the near future. In this future there are only two great nuclear powers, powers possessing very expensive and very complicated, but invulnerable, strike forces. Membership in this select company could be achieved only by the control of enormous resources, including geography, hardly becoming available to other powers for some years to come. In the process of acquiring an invulnerable strike force, every Nth country would be helplessly vulnerable to nuclear attack from either of the powers already disposing of invulnerable strike forces.

It may prove instructive to consider the case of France. The French thesis seems to run somewhat as follows: France must prepare itself to depend on no nuclear deterrent but a national one, which need not be large because any threat of Soviet tanks, at that future time when France has nuclear delivery means, can be parried by a French threat to destroy a few Soviet cities.

Taking this doubtful thesis at face value, we may imagine a colloquy in the new situation. Khrushchev threatens to cross the Elbe, sweep through West Germany, and attack France with conventional forces. De Gaulle, who now possesses means for delivering a few nuclear weapons on Russia, makes his nuclear counterthreat. Khrushchev replies by using selective air or missile attack to demolish the small French nuclear attack capability, which could hardly be protected with sufficient warning to permit its escape in view of the short ranges involved. If the United States then knocks out several military targets in Eastern Europe, as would be technically feasible if politically improbable,

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this should provide little consolation for the French. Far better, perhaps, to be prepared on an alliance basis with conventional forces, backed by small tactical nuclear weapons, for the deterrence or containment of invasion.

It would appear that Nth countries, including Communist China, will acquire and maintain relatively small capabilities for strategic nuclear warfare only at considerable peril, and might be well advised to reconsider. This may apply to coalitions as well: if NATO is to emerge with a separate and distinct invulnerable strike force in the period when the Soviet Union possesses such a force, it had better do so suddenly and convincingly, for the peril could otherwise be great. The requirements of invulnerability make it questionable that this sudden thrust to strategic nuclear maturity would prove possible except through the mitosis of a swollen United States capability. Even then, the problem of presenting a credibly unified front might involve insuperable difficulties.

It seems possible (if unlikely) that, in the future we are considering, the two great nuclear powers could prevent the proliferation of nuclear arsenals by compelling each nation befriended (though not fully protected) by the other to abstain from progress toward nuclear weapon systems through the threat of knocking out elements of such systems unless they were dismantled. Nations befriended by neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would of course be doubly vulnerable. It should not be necessary to carry out many threats of this nature. (Our own moral and political distaste for such tactics might conceivably yield if, for example, Cuba began to point even primitive nuclear weapons at Miami.) Respectability might be achieved for this procedure by draping it in a mantle of arms control.

In any event, the danger that nuclear attack from an unknown source would act as a catalyst to produce a nuclear exchange between the two giants should be much diminished. With their strike forces invulnerable, neither would need to react in a matter of minutes, as is the requirement when the strike forces are vulnerable to missile attack. The command and control problem, although remaining difficult, would thus be considerably reduced in size. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union should be able to collaborate, if only tacitly, in maintaining an effective surveillance of potential nuclear threats other than each other's (which might lose invulnerability if subject to surveillance), and hence largely eliminate the possibility of catalytic thermonuclear war. Fully eliminating this possibility would require averting, through

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arms control or coercion, the threat that third powers might launch nuclear strikes from the high seas that would thus be difficult or impossible to identify.

As a final consideration, it might prove desirable for the United States and the Soviet Union to find the means of demonstrating to each other that they had achieved invulnerability for their very effective strike forces, when this had in fact been achieved. As Clemenceau might say, the thermonuclear peace would be too important to be left to the spies.

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CHARITY, TRUSTEESHIP, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA

A Study of a Political Ideology*

By PHYLLIS J. ROLNICK

DURING the Indian Independence struggle, Mahatma Gandhi devised a shrewd ideological version of the concept of social trusteeship, rooted firmly in the strong religio-social traditions of India. Gandhian trusteeship was criticized, but for the most part it functioned effectively to gain and hold for the Independence movement the support of several sectors of India's highly segmented society. Significantly, moreover, many of those who most vehemently criticized Gandhian trusteeship have expressed their acceptance of this idea since Independence.

In order to comprehend why trusteeship has so effectively functioned in the context of Indian society, it is necessary to understand the nature of that society, and the contemporary strength of its traditional beliefs and behavior patterns. After discussing these factors in Part I of this article, one will perhaps be better able to analyze the meaning of trusteeship; the functions it has served for its various groups of supporters; and how its espousal is related to social change and to acceptance of such ideas as "socialism," "equality," and "social revolution."

I. Background

Indian society is characterized by extremes of wealth and poverty. Socio-economic inequality is and has been for centuries one of India's most conspicuous problems. Poverty is not hidden away in tiny ghettoes of large cities, or in crevices of mountain ranges. It is present almost everywhere—as is its counterpart, wealth. Mud huts next to modern upper-class duplexes are a common feature of Indian cities; beggars squat at taxi stands; scantily clad sweepers bathe under public taps near the capital's fashionable shopping district. These extremes are even more accentuated because thus far so small a percentage of the population belongs to the "middle" classes.

* This article is largely based on information gathered during the writer's stay in India, 1959-1960, under a Ford Foundation fellowship. The writer, of course, bears sole responsibility for opinions expressed herein.

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The caste system, which can be closely correlated with the economic structure of the country, reinforces the hierarchical, comparatively static nature of the society. Admittedly, legislation and changing attitudes toward the institution itself are eroding, gradually, the caste system; but even more resistant to change has been the superstructure of attitudes, values, and behavior patterns that have maintained the traditional, organically conceived Indian society. Inherent in this concept of society is a web of reciprocal relationships, not the least important of which have been those based on the concept of the giving and receiving of charity.

A. ANCIENT THOUGHT

Western commentators on Indian thought have frequently suggested that the concept of charity, insofar as it exists in India, is part of the legacy of Christian precepts bestowed by the West.[1] This view, however, represents an erroneous perception not only of ancient Indian moral precepts, but of the patterns of behavior that have emerged from them. The concept of charity is an essential aspect of an Indian's religious *dharma* (duty). There is much documentary and archeological evidence to indicate that in ancient times persons who had accumulated wealth gained merit by contributing a portion of it to a temple, or by building a temple or a well or a dam for the benefit of the community. The great epic, *Mahabharata,* in a discussion of the aims of life, laid special emphasis upon *artha* (wealth).[2] It held that only the charitable distribution of wealth could enable men to fulfill their *dharma.* It also suggested that such distribution of wealth was one of the main duties of a king, inasmuch as he possessed the power to utilize wealth in the most beneficial way.[3]

Just as the religious classics enjoined the king, wealthy individuals, and also guilds to establish and support charitable institutions, so too

[1] See, e.g., Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development,* Boston, 1957, pp. 45, 209, 241, 250ff.; and André Siegfried, "L'Occident et le Monde," *La Revue de Paris,* October 1958, p. 11. The view is also indirectly evident in the tone of those Britishers who, in describing their undertaking of the white man's burden, insinuate that the burden of Indian poverty would not have been undertaken by the Indians themselves.

[2] Ancient Hindu scriptures (such as "Santiparvan," *Mahabharata,* VII, Pratap Chandra Roy, ed., Calcutta, Datta Bose, p. 131; and *The Laws of Manu, Sacred Books of the East,* XXV, F. Max Muller, ed., Oxford, Clarendon, 1886, pp. 70-71) considered *artha, kama* (desire, emotional pursuits), and *dharma* (morality) the "triple aggregate," the three chief aims of life on earth. A fourth, *moksha* (release from the birth cycle), was considered the ultimate goal of an individual.

[3] "Santiparvan," pp. 306-7. The practice of charity and the role of the king were emphasized also in Buddhist works. See, e.g., A. P. de Zoysa, *Indian Culture in the Days of the Buddha,* Colombo, M. D. Gunasena, 1955, p. 98.

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they emphasized the practice of almsgiving by individuals directly to other individuals. There were essentially two categories of recipients. One category comprised Brahman priests; persons in the first stage of life, i.e., *brahmachari*'s (students); and those in the last two stages of life, *vanaprastha*'s (forest-dwellers) and *sanyasi*'s (ascetics).[4] It was the *dharma* of such persons to maintain themselves by begging for alms; moreover they were to be honored for so doing.[5]

The second category comprised those at the lowest levels of the social structure: the untouchables and Sudras, the deformed and the diseased. It was the *dharma* of untouchables and Sudras to serve the upper classes; in return they could claim—without any loss of self-respect—dependence on their patrons for cast-off clothing, food leavings, and the like. The deformed and diseased who, owing to no fault of their own, could perform no function in the society, were also entitled, through scriptural prescription, to beg for alms.[6]

It was the *grihastya*, the householder engaged in pursuing wealth, whose *dharma* was to give alms. Indeed, Manu claimed that the *grihastya* stage of life was the "most excellent" inasmuch as "men of the three [other] orders are daily supported by the householder. . . ."[7] The ancient law books emphasized the merit that was due those who gave charity to worthy Brahmans, students, and ascetics; but no less important were their prescriptions for giving alms to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.[8]

The concept of *dharma* in Indian thought is inextricably related to the concept of *karma*, which states that by performing well the *dharma*

[4] The ideal Hindu life is divided into four successive stages: *brahmacharia, grihastya* (householder), *vanaprastha* (when there is partial retirement from worldly pursuits), and the *sanyasi* stage (when there is complete retirement).

[5] With regard to *brahmachari*'s, for instance, P. V. Kane in *History of Dharmasastra* (II, Pt. 1, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941, p. 311) observes that "even in modern times many brahmana students (not only those who study the Veda from orthodox teachers but even those learning English) begged for their daily food." He also refers to the injunction in the *Laws of Manu* directing that if for seven days continuously a *brahmachari* who was not ill did not beg for food, he had to undergo the same penance as though he had had sexual relations.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 120.

[7] *Laws of Manu*, p. 89. This statement is particularly interesting inasmuch as it is usually believed that asceticism, not worldly pursuits, is most valued in Hindu philosophy. For revealing commentary on this, see Louis Dumont, "World Renunciation in Indian Religions," *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (The Hague), IV (April 1960), pp. 33-62.

[8] One well-defined form of charity was *nitya*, referring to gifts that were to be made "daily." A specific duty of householders was observance of *vaisvadeva*, the daily "offering of cooked foods to all gods," described in detail in Kane, *op.cit.*, II, Pt. 2, pp. 741ff. For this rite, the *Laws of Manu* instructs householders to give food to all types of gods and spirits, as well as to "dogs, outcasts, kandalas (Svapak), those afflicted with diseases that are punishments of former sins, crows, and insects" (*op.cit.*, p. 92).

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appropriate to one's caste and stage of life, an individual determines for himself a higher position in his next life. Thus, instead of encouraging change and upward mobility within one lifetime, and instead of encouraging a demand for "rights," traditional Hinduism has fostered a strong spirit of *acceptance* of both one's duties and one's place in the social structure.[9] It is as important for the wealthy to fulfill their *dharma* of giving alms as it is for poor untouchables to fulfill their *dharma* of accepting alms: the next birth of members of all socio-economic groups depends on how well they fulfill their respective duties.

B. CHARITY IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

The belief that one earns merit through giving alms is not an outmoded aspect of ancient Indian religion. It is still customary for a rich man to will much of his wealth to religious institutions, orphanages, and the like. There continue to be prescribed ceremonial acts of giving, perhaps with regional variations, but generally similar throughout India. Orphaned children may sing prayers at a house of mourning, after which they receive food and perhaps money and clothing. Brahmans are feted when a death occurs in a family. On religious holidays not only servants but beggars who come to the gate receive more than the usual gift. And after the marriage ceremony, when the newly wed couple ride off to the bridegroom's home, swarms of the neighborhood poor scramble after coins that are tossed back by the departing pair. Similarly, upon recovery from illness, thanks to God are expressed not only through temple offerings but through gifts to ascetics and the needy.

There is also little indication of any significant change in attitudes toward—or on the part of—beggars. Admittedly there are laws against begging in municipalities like Delhi and Bombay, and in eight states.[10] Generally, however, begging has persisted, owing to lack of enforce-

[9] Furthermore, although castes were arranged in a vertical social hierarchy, they were considered equal insofar as each performed an essential function in the organic society. In Kalidas' famous play of about the 3rd or 4th century, *Sakoontala* (Monier-Williams, tr., London, Routledge, 1898, p. 136), a poor fisherman tells the police:

> The father's occupation, though despised
> By others, casts no shame upon the son,
> And he should not forsake it. Is the priest
> Who kills the animal for sacrifice
> Therefore deemed cruel? Sure a low-born man
> May, though a fisherman, be tender-hearted.

[10] West Bengal, Madras, Maharashtra, Gujerat, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Mysore, and Kerala (*Hindustan*, July 7, 1961, p. 8). Over half of all Indian states have decided, in theory, to establish institutions to house beggars: Andhra, Bihar, Maharashtra, Jummu and Kashmir, Kerala, Madya Pradesh, Mysore, Madras, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Note that West Bengal and Gujerat prohibit begging but have agreed to no provisions for institutionalizing beggars.

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ment of such laws and to continuation of traditional attitudes toward the practice.

These traditional attitudes, including acceptance of one's position as a recipient of alms, are discussed in a study of six hundred beggars interviewed in Delhi.[11] Only a little over a third of them, when asked what their attitude toward begging was, replied that they did not like to engage in it.[12] Again, less than a third expressed willingness to give up begging even conditionally.[13]

Furthermore, begging as a *religious* act not only continues to be justified; it is glorified. It is significant that three-fourths of the religious mendicants interviewed in the Delhi study said they would be unwilling to give up begging, compared with only 20 per cent of the able-bodied, non-religious beggars.[14] The Gandhian rural reconstruction movement, both before Independence and now under Vinoba Bhave, has also given renewed vigor to this practice. Youths who join the rural social work corps take pride in begging for their daily rations.[15]

Traditional attitudes toward charity continue not only among the recipients but also among the givers. A few "moderns" may brush away beggars disdainfully, but most Indians consider it their duty to give to those who ask.[16] Even among those who believe that a beggar should work rather than beg, there persists the feeling that a beggar cannot be turned away without receiving something.[17] Storekeepers keep piles of

[11] *The Beggar Problem in Metropolitan Delhi*, Delhi, Delhi School of Social Work, 1959.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89. See also *Hindustan*, July 8, 1961, p. 3: touring poorhouses where former Delhi beggars were institutionalized, reporters were besieged by the complaints of inmates who wanted to go back to begging.

[14] *Beggar Problem in Metropolitan Delhi*, p. 90. Also note that only 3 per cent of the religious beggars gave no reply to this question, compared with 21 per cent of the able-bodied, non-religious beggars.

[15] See, e.g., Hari Krishan Mahtab's novel on the Gandhian movement, *Azadi ke Sipahi* (in Hindi), Delhi, Ajanta Pocket Books, 1960, pp. 48-49. One of the central characters, a landlord's son, on his first day at Gandhi's ashram feels a bit "shy going out, sack on shoulders, to beg for alms." But when he reflects that in such a poor country nobody could feel very happy earning a livelihood, "then even his shyness went away." (This and all other references to Hindi-language sources in this article have been translated by the writer.)

[16] The preference of most Delhi beggars for shopping areas, and the fact that 56 per cent of those surveyed begged between 8 a.m. and noon, are interpreted in *Beggar Problem in Metropolitan Delhi* to mean that the beggars "count on the possibility that the shopkeepers would give alms during these hours in order to start their day with a prayer or blessing to their credit. Another possibility seemed to be that there are usually more temple-goers in the morning who would give alms with a view to do good" (p. 55).

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 152: "Most of the givers, barring those few who give a coin to a beggar just to avoid a momentary nuisance, disregard the fact that the idolisation of giving for its own sake has the consequence of making the recipient work-shy." Several times

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coins on counters overlooking the streets; when beggars approach, these coins are tossed down to them. The amount of money distributed in this way by merchants in a city as large as Poona might well, if pooled, provide enough capital for a factory capable of employing those who are now beggars.[18] But as M. L. Dantwala, Socialist and professor of economics at Bombay University, readily admitted, the merchants themselves would probably object to such a move, which would deprive them of the satisfaction and merit earned through giving charity.[19]

This view was confirmed rather pointedly in a discussion of the Delhi anti-begging law that appeared in the Hindi-language daily, *Hindustan*.[20] After reviewing the usual arguments bearing on the difficulty of enforcing this law, the columnist blandly observed that all a beggar need do is sit in a temple and, without uttering a single word, he will receive alms; if the police do apprehend him, all he need say is that he is waiting to take *prasad*.[21] Obviously, to deprive the man of this opportunity would be to deprive both the potential giver and the receiver of religious merit. Moreover, a significant socio-political corollary to this view is bluntly stated in the final paragraphs of the column:

> Two days ago an eminent soul said to me: "To give charity is not merely a part of the Hindu religion, but of Islam, Buddhism, Jainism, and Christianity, i.e., of all religions. That government which places a hindrance in the way of it [charity], interferes with religion. And in India such an act is against the constitution."
>
> This very gentleman also said to me: "If the government, by this anti-begging law, causes any individual to save one *paisa* [which would have come out] of his pocket, then it cheats him out of one hundred *paisa*'s obtainable by this *paisa* in the next world. How will he receive the advantage of having his acts of charity performed in this birth multiplied a hundred times in the next birth? Speak up, what is the answer to this?"
>
> I am now indeed thinking, what answer should you give to this.

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the writer witnessed able-bodied beggars come to the gate of an enlightened, middle-class Indian woman, who would ask them to do some work for her—dishes or clothes-washing—for which she would give money. The beggars invariably replied that it was in their stars to beg, not to work; the alms would then be given anyway.

[18] Such a suggestion has actually been formulated for Delhi in *ibid.*, pp. 151-52.

[19] Interview with the writer, March 1960.

[20] See the regularly featured column, "Satra-tatra-savatra," *Hindustan*, March 14, 1961, pp. 4-5. The law, passed early in 1961 in Delhi, is based on the Bombay law making begging in the municipality a punishable offense.

[21] *Prasad* is an offering of food, often sweets, brought to a temple for the deity by a worshiper. It is often distributed by a priest among the worshipers, who then eat some of it and give the rest to mendicants, children, relatives, servants and, in some households, even to animals. By this action both giver and receiver are blessed, and to refuse to accept *prasad*—even to refuse to eat it—is an act highly insulting to the one who offers it.

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It appears evident that not only do traditional attitudes persist with regard to begging *per se*, an institution that no longer receives much legal approval; they persist with regard to the more general problem of acceptance of one's place and traditional role in the social hierarchy.[22] Religion continues to provide a rationale to make life bearable for those at the bottom of the scale, and guiltless for those at the top. As one Indian politician and thinker has put it, Hinduism teaches the poor to endure everything quietly, to be "content" with their poverty, for the fruits of their contentment will be gained in the next birth or in paradise. But it does not teach the rich to be content; it condones their pursuit of wealth, as long as a part of it is given to charity.[23] Doubtless, with urbanization and increasing opportunities for upward mobility, there will come a breakdown in such attitudes. But it appears evident that the process will be very slow.[24]

II. Trusteeship as a Political Ideology

A. The Independence Struggle

Through religious ideas such as *karma* and *dharma*, and through a web of reciprocal relationships, including heavy emphasis on the giving and acceptance of charity, Indian culture, like that of other organically conceived societies, has provided its own supports for a static social structure. By the turn of the present century, however, new ideas had begun to disturb significantly the thoughts of a small but important section of the Indian population. Among these ideas, socialism—in its many different forms, but all calling for an egalitarian as opposed to a hierarchical society—had penetrating effect. Thus one finds that in the early 1920's a Communist Party was formed, and later Socialist parties; trade union movements were launched, and to a lesser extent peasant movements—all to give greater impetus to such ideas as "social revolution" and "class struggle."

At the same time, however, many politically aware Indians acknowledged that, no matter what their vision of a changed society, there could be little hope of achieving it until Indians sat in the seats of govern-

[22] See, e.g., a speech by the Forest Minister before the Uttar Pradesh Safai Mazdoor Sangh Conference (an organization of sweepers—untouchables whose functions still include sweeping streets, collecting cow dung, cleaning latrines), *National Herald*, May 12, 1961, p. 2. It was the *humility* of the sweepers to which the Minister paid flowery tribute, and he thanked them for serving society as a mother serves.

[23] Sampurnanand, *Samajvad* (in Hindi), Benares, Kashi Vidyapith, 2004, pp. 25, 36-37; this book was published in the early 1940's.

[24] For an example of efforts made in this direction by a league of young untouchables in Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh), to the distress of the older members of their community, see *National Herald*, May 22, 1961, p. 7.

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mental authority. The leaders of the Independence movement—mostly from the small middle class—realized it was unwise to alienate the propertied classes whose backing was needed to achieve this immediate goal. The Independence movement appeared to need an ideology that could meet at least two important conditions: it had to cater to the views of those who held a stake in Indian society as it was then structured and who publicly endorsed the traditional social values; and at the same time it had to reconcile itself in some way to those demands for "equality" and "change" and "social revolution" that were permeating the fabric of Indian society.

The Gandhian concept of trusteeship seems admirably to have bridged this gap between the traditional and the new Socialist view of the Indian social structure. It is irrelevant to question what Gandhi "really" meant by trusteeship; more important—and more feasible—is an examination of how this concept functioned for different groups at different times. For Gandhi's writings have lent themselves to being quoted directly by supporters of unlimited—and often mutually contradictory—causes. This has certainly been true of his trusteeship concept.

On some occasions, Gandhi spoke of trusteeship as meaning that all persons would live at one economic level; and that the rich, voluntarily limiting their possessions and standard of living, would *give up* their wealth for the good of the community. He also spoke of the poor, through non-violent techniques, persuading the rich to give up their wealth. And he suggested that when Panchayat Raj (Rule of the Village Council) was established, even the capitalists and the zamindars would have to obey the will of "the people."[25] In fact, at times Gandhi suggested that, if need be, the government might step in to make the rich realize their obligations. This emphasis on the rich giving up their wealth (and, by implication, their class position) provided Gandhi with a rationalization for declaring that he was an even truer Socialist than those who claimed that label for themselves.[26]

Taking Gandhi's works as a whole, however, and viewing trusteeship in the light of its primary function on the political scene, there emerges an ideal which is quite different from that of an egalitarian society. For Gandhi affirmed not only that it was *not possible* to abolish class distinc-

[25] M. K. Gandhi, *Towards Non-violent Socialism*, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1957, p. 140.

[26] There are innumerable pamphlets containing selections from Gandhi's writings, each devoted to a specific topic. It is interesting that in the several pamphlets devoted to Gandhi as a Socialist, his trusteeship concept receives a prominent place. See, e.g., Gandhi, *op.cit.*; M. K. Gandhi, *Socialism of My Conception*, Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1957; K. G. Mashruwala, *Gandhi and Marx*, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1956.

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tions, but also that it was *not desirable* to do so. He told a delegation of Indian Communists who had come to him: "If you want capital to be extinct, if you want to abolish moneyed men or the capitalists, you will never succeed. . . ."[27] He also told a delegation of zamindars: "My object is to reach your hearts and convert you so that you may hold all your private property in trust for your tenants and use it primarily for their welfare. . . . But supposing that there is an attempt unjustly to deprive you of your property, you will find me fighting on your side. . . ."[28]

The ideology's utility for the Independence movement is not difficult to perceive. Few of Gandhi's critics would deny that, insofar as the movement had mass support, Gandhi was largely responsible for it. He and his workers made constant excursions into the rural areas, addressing villagers gathered in hinterland mango groves. There he emphasized trusteeship in its most utopian form. And through that hint of egalitarianism, with rich and poor living as one, Gandhi provided the chiliasm sometimes identified as the element within Marxism that so successfully has attracted the non-political rural masses.[29] Gandhi gave the poor reason to believe that a better day would be coming for themselves —if not immediately, certainly after they had lent support to the Independence movement and it had achieved its goal.

At the same time, however, inherent in the trusteeship concept was a defense, if not a glorification, of poverty. Gandhi thereby reinforced the traditional idea that there was no shame in having been born poor.[30] And he suggested thereby that there was no reason for the poor to feel discontented or to hate or attack the rich. This point was all the more effective—and Gandhi's hold over the rural peasantry all the stronger —when he and his workers appeared to descend to the level of the poverty-stricken. Thus, Gandhi rode in a railroad car marked "Third Class"; stayed in the huts of untouchables; and had the workers of his ashrams (many of whom came from relatively wealthy families) go out and beg for their food and adopt the rural poor's style of living.

Gandhi also attracted to himself and the Independence movement the moneyed and landed classes. Admittedly, some members of these groups participated in the movement realizing that their own self-interest might thus be furthered. An Indian industrialist, for example, might give full-throated support to cries of *swadeshi* (implying boycott

[27] Gandhi, *Towards Non-violent Socialism*, p. 159.
[28] Quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, Boston, 1958, p. 325.
[29] This interpretation of the Marxist ideology is reiterated throughout Adam Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, New York, 1960.
[30] Similarly, he called the untouchables *harijan*'s ("children of God").

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of foreign goods) and *swaraj* (self-government), out of an awareness that if the colonial power left, the main obstacle to his reaching the "top" of the social, economic, and political structure would be removed. Gandhi, however, not only legitimized the status of the wealthy; he elevated their role, as long as they considered themselves trustees; and he elevated the function of their major asset, wealth, in the nationalist struggle. Furthermore, by emphasizing that the rich, through the promptings of their own heart, should give to the poor, he merely restated the traditional concept of charity to which members of this class adhered. At the same time, the existing class structure was given respectability *despite* cries for more equality in Indian society. According to this interpretation of trusteeship, there was no wealthy class *ipso facto*; rather, wealth belonged to society as a whole, and it just happened that some persons were in charge of the use of that wealth for the whole society—i.e., they were trustees.

Gandhi also reinforced the security of the propertied classes by his attitude toward the poor. A rising level of expectations and demands—with concomitant resentment against the rich by the poor—often comes as a corollary to revolution; such tendencies were alleviated by Gandhi, however, when he told the poor to "love" the trustees of "their" wealth, and urged that one class not be antagonistic toward another. Furthermore, Gandhi laid the burden of giving to the poor upon the rich, and discouraged the poor from showing impatience or taking any action bordering on violence.[31]

Thus, on the one hand, by stressing a utopian concept of trusteeship, Gandhi gained the support of the masses; he also thereby gained the devoted service of middle-class youths who, inspired with idealism, left their colleges and joined the Gandhian ashrams. On the other hand, inasmuch as the concept was amenable to a different interpretation, he could claim the allegiance not only of landlords, but of the country's leading industrialists. These industrialists—like Birla, Tata, and Bajaj—while zealously pursuing their own business interests, also expressed earnest credence in Gandhism, and some have even written books that stand as epitaphs to the man.[32]

[31] This was Gandhi's main emphasis, although he did state that the poor could attempt, through non-violent methods, to persuade the rich to act as trustees for them. But the poor were not to take things into their own hands. He stated categorically, for instance, that sweepers were not to go on strike, no matter how bad their situation was. Instead, "it is up to all citizens to raise their voice *on behalf of them*." Gandhi, *Towards Non-violent Socialism*, pp. 107-12 *passim* (italics added).

[32] E.g., G. D. Birla, *In the Shadow of the Mahatma: A Personal Memoir*, Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1953. According to T. K. N. Unnithan (*Gandhi in Free India: A Socio-economic Study*, Groningen, Netherlands, J. B. Wolters, 1956, p. 87n), Jamnalal

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Despite all this, however, there were individuals—mostly Socialists who had been influenced by Marxian thought—who severely criticized Gandhi's trusteeship idea. They "unmasked" it, as it were, and emphasized the concept's fundamental incompatibility with the egalitarian society that Independence was supposedly to bring.

Nehru was perhaps one of the most vehement in his criticism. His argument centered around three main points.[33] He saw nothing new in Gandhi's idea. Rather, he noted that all religions seemed to call on the rich to be charitable; and that this religious attitude was bound up with the ancient world, where the only escape from misery was hope of a world to come. Secondly, he asked, "Is it reasonable to . . . give unchecked power and wealth to an individual and to expect him to use it entirely for the public good?" Even Plato's philosopher-kings could not be expected to measure up to this standard. Nehru observed that although there might be "isolated individuals" who were charitable to such an extent, it was "absurd" to build whole theories about them: for the most part there were "only frail human beings who cannot help thinking that their own personal good . . . is identical with the public good." Thirdly, Nehru noted that it was paradoxical for Gandhi to be passionately concerned about the downtrodden and yet support the relics of the old order that had created their misery. Many contemporary zamindars had formerly been moneylenders who had taken their land unjustly from indebted landholders; yet, argued Nehru, these were the persons being asked by Gandhi to be trustees for others.

Members of the Congress Socialist Party also criticized Gandhi and his ideas. Among the *raisons d'être* for this group was their conviction that Congress should have a greater mass base among the peasants; and that the peasants as well as labor should be organized and drawn into the movement on the basis of their class interests—which obviously were not those of the upper classes. During the 1930's, in the pages of their journal, *Congress Socialist*, they argued that it was unrealistic to talk about changing the hearts of the rich if basic economic relationships remained the same. Sampurnanand, then a member of the Congress Socialist Party, sarcastically drew what he felt were the social implications of the Gandhian trusteeship concept: "How can you describe the ideal Vaishya, the multimillionaire, symbol of the doctrine of trustee-

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Bajaj was the person whom Gandhi regarded as closest to his ideal of a "trustee." Referred to by Gandhi as his adopted son, Bajaj saw no conflict in being a leader of the machine-run textile industry and first president of Gandhi's All India [hand] Spinners Association.

[33] See, e.g., Nehru, *op.cit.*, pp. 320-23 *passim* and p. 143.

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ship, if there is no beggar to walk happily away with some of the copper which the great man dutifully distributes each morning? Mahatmaji has said that, in his Ram Rajya, the rights of the Prince and of the Pauper will be equally ensured . . . but then you cannot ensure the Pauper's rights unless the Pauper exists. Socialism aims at abolishing pauperism and is, therefore, manifestly taboo."[34]

But despite the apparent causticness of these criticisms, the effect was largely lost. Theoretically Gandhi and the Socialists might be at odds, but practically it was realized that the *primary* task even of the Congress Socialist Party was the Independence struggle, inasmuch as socialism could emerge only in a free India. The Socialists believed that the best strategy toward that end was to co-operate with the Indian National Congress of which they were a part; and to refrain from attacking Gandhi too often, as it was he who appeared indispensable for holding together the movement and for bringing about the final overthrow of the colonial power. Thus, although the Socialists did talk in terms of "class struggle" and successfully organized peasants and workers, it was Gandhi's idea of trusteeship that provided the stronger theme of the Independence movement ideology.

B. POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA

The utility of the trusteeship concept has grown even greater since Independence. In fact, today it is easier to identify those groups that do not include the concept in their ideology. Obviously, the Communist Party of India—despite its present policy of co-operation with the ruling Congress Party—verbally still adheres to the theory of class struggle and therefore will not advocate the trusteeship idea. It is also apparent that the Jan Sangh, a communal Hindu party, feels only indifference to the concept. Although the trusteeship idea was often used by Gandhi to convince the socialistically inclined that he was as Socialist as they, the Jan Sangh—wanting to avoid the Socialist label—holds that while the

[34] Sampurnanand, "Why I Am Not a Congress Socialist," *Congress Socialist*, December 26, 1936, p. 23. Even after he had left the Congress Socialists and had become prominent in Congress politics, Sampurnanand wrote in *Samajvad* that despite all the "sweet words" of assent to Gandhi, the most that happened under trusteeship was that a few more crumbs of bread and a little more sympathy were given to the poor; wealth still remained the property of the rich, as it had through the ages (*op.cit.*, pp. 41ff.).

Jayaprakash Narayan was particularly strong in his criticism of trusteeship; see esp. *Why Socialism?* Benares, All India Congress Socialist Party, 1936, pp. 79ff. Even as late as 1939, M. R. Masani, then a leading member of the Congress Socialist Party, posed the question of whether Gandhi really advocated collective ownership—which would justify his claim to being a Socialist—or still held to his theory of trusteeship—which would mean he thereby rationalized the right to private property. See Masani's "Gandhiji and Collective Ownership," *Congress Socialist*, January 8, 1939, p. 1.

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concept is certainly in line with Hindu tradition, it is as appropriate in a non-Socialist as in a Socialist economy.[35]

Interestingly enough, the trusteeship idea is a major theme in the ideologies of two political groups whose orientations are totally different: Vinoba Bhave's Sarvodaya movement, and the right-wing Swatantra Party.

The Sarvodaya group,[36] in one of its interpretations of trusteeship, emphasizes the concept of sacrifice and voluntary relinquishment of wealth and property. Dada Darmadikhari, an acknowledged theoretician of the movement, has specifically denied that trusteeship means that as long as an individual considers his wealth to be society's, he may accumulate it without limit.[37] Rather, he discusses trusteeship in terms of two aspects. One is transitional, directed to the "have's" of society: through a "change of heart," a sense of sacrifice, and as self-purification, they must abandon all their acquisitions. The second aspect would have permanent application, directed not only to those who hold wealth but to those who labor: it is not enough that the means of production and the fruits of labor be in the hands of the producers; instead, both the skills of laborers and the fruits of labor in addition to the means of production must be thought of as belonging to society as a whole.

Some utopian elements of this interpretation of trusteeship have actually been translated into practice. For example, leaders of the Sarvodaya movement, including the former Socialist leader, Jayaprakash Narayan, have emphasized the distinction between the terms *nauker* (one who serves for wages—e.g., a government civil servant or business employee) and *sevak* (one who serves without wages—e.g., a voluntary social worker). A worker in the movement is urged to give up all his possessions and become totally dependent on society for his needs. (Can this mean, in practice, anyone else but the trustees of wealth?) And in areas served by the movement—whether a city or a remote village—each household is supposed to deposit coins regularly in its own pot, which is then periodically emptied by the Sarvodaya workers.

[35] Deenanath Upadhyaya (General Secretary of All India Jan Sangh since 1953), "Another Path," *Seminar*, No. 17 (January 1961), p. 41.

[36] Despite its claim to being a revolutionary movement, the Sarvodaya group actually has made little dent in the traditional socio-economic structure. Because, however, this is the group that wears Gandhi's mantle most conspicuously, government officials and leaders of the major political parties (including the Communists) pay it at least verbal respect and often attend the annual Sarvodaya conferences. Rajendra Prasad, President of India, has announced that after his approaching retirement he will devote the rest of his life to the movement.

[37] Dada Darmadikhari, *Sarvodaya-Darshan* (in Hindi), Benares, Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh, 1958, pp. 269ff. This book appears to this writer the most scholarly exposition of Sarvodaya philosophy available.

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But difficulties arise in this regard even for the most service-minded and idealistic. For example, one middle-aged Sarvodaya worker, a former state head of the Praja Socialist Party who left the party with Narayan, told this writer that he had given up "everything" to devote his life to the movement. But he also admitted that he had "friends" (who fortunately had not followed his lead) who put aside a little money for him each month, and kept their house open to him when he was in their town. This evidently enabled him to take trips and keep up former contacts. But there are other difficulties as well. In a country where young people of almost all social classes are in fear of unemployment and suffer general insecurity, and where an individual is responsible for supporting not merely a nuclear family but usually a joint family, to volunteer as a *sevak* may involve much more than purely personal sacrifice.[38]

It might also be recalled that in a society as highly structured as the Indian, differences in styles of living, educational facilities, and income are extreme. In such circumstances, it is much more difficult for a few, usually middle-class, individuals to live in voluntary poverty in a centuries-old, poverty-stricken village than for a large group of equally inspired individuals to live together on a Russian collective farm or in an Israeli kibbutz. As a matter of fact, the Sarvodaya movement has sent several delegations to Israel to study the collectives; but most of these "Israel-returnees" (as they are known to the movement) admit that the nature of the problems in the two countries is radically different.[39]

In construing Gandhi's trusteeship concept in its most utopian sense, the Sarvodaya movement has not only spread the idea that individuals should give up whatever they possess and become *sevak*'s. It has also attempted to put into practice an egalitarian society through the notion of *gramdan*. A *gramdan* village comprises a group of families in a geographically defined area (not necessarily corresponding to the Indian government's definition of a village). They own and cultivate their land co-operatively, and conduct together such community projects as schools and co-operative stores.[40]

[38] One may recall from Rajendra Prasad's autobiography that his first idealistic desire to join a voluntary social-work organization was vetoed by his family, who required that he earn money for their support; in that instance, the young Prasad responded to his family's need.

[39] Jayaprakash Narayan endorsed this view in conversations with the writer in April 1960. He did mention, however, that some of these returnees had been discussing the feasibility of themselves banding together and forming a collective.

[40] For a factual report on the operation of specific *gramdan* villages in Bihar, see *Bihar-me Gramdan Andolan* (in Hindi), Patna, Bihar Sarvodaya Mandal Prakashan, 1959.

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There are isolated dots on the vast subcontinent where a relative degree of success has been achieved—especially, it appears, when landless laborers or a community of untouchables have been given the opportunity to farm donated land together. But the difficulties are obvious: the widespread apathy of the peasant and his resistance to change; the lack of expertise among the movement's personnel; reluctance of Sarvodaya leaders to accept government aid; non-coordination of *gramdan* projects (in line with Sarvodaya policy of decentralization); and, not least of all, the difficulty of convincing persons to join such projects in the first place. These problems cannot be discussed here; but for an indication of how deep-seated resistance to such an idea may be, one can note the view of a landholding villager who had refused to participate in the *gramdan* village established in his area. Asked why, he told this writer that such a project was basically against religion—for did not God create everyone unequal?

The above account may appear to give disproportionate attention to this movement; but some understanding of it is necessary in view of the praise it has received from the highest political platforms and because it is the only evidence of an attempt in contemporary India to interpret and apply the Gandhian trusteeship concept in its most utopian sense. These efforts become even more interesting when it is realized that at one and the same time this group advocates another, significantly different interpretation of the trusteeship concept—an interpretation, in fact, that is far more reconcilable with the traditional concept of an organic, hierarchical society. For Sarvodaya leaders view *bhoodan* (gift of a part of one's land) and *sampattidan* (gift of one's wealth) as partial gifts, the giving of which may bring about the "change of heart" that would make full *gramdan* possible. They appear unaware, however, that by reinforcing traditional attitudes and practices, they may be making the desired transition even more difficult.[41] And as if to make the full cycle in the interpretation of the trusteeship concept, Vinoba Bhave himself evidently sees no contradiction in his philosophy when he continually emphasizes that the rich should be to the poor as a father to his children.[42]

[41] Even these leaders have admitted, however, in regard to *sampattidan*, that "unfortunately its true import has been missed, and it has been identified with the ordinary Chanda (contribution)." (*Proceedings of the Seminars held at Rajghat and Bombay to discuss Gandhian Approach to Industry, Trade and Labour*, Wardha, Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh, n.d., p. 5.) When villagers were asked why they contributed land as *bhoodan*, many told this writer that they did so because Bhave was a religious or holy man. A Muslim landlord typified another common response: he observed in what direction the wind was blowing, and then followed in that direction.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 12. R. P. Masani (an industrialist and writer who also lends support to the

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The second group for whom trusteeship is a major ideological theme is the Swatantra Party, whose appeals are directed mainly to the landed interests, businessmen, and princes.[43] The party ideology regards the traditional master-servant relationship, based on familistic ties, as an example of the ideal trusteeship relationship.[44] K. M. Munshi notes that although Gandhi stressed voluntary restrictions of wants, "at the same time he did not rule out for the owner a standard of living higher than that of the poor, if it was necessary to keep himself fit to discharge his duties faithfully."[45]

Swatantra Party's attitude toward the state is based on its interpretation of the Gandhian trusteeship idea. In the Party's Programme it is stated that "While there should be a constant movement upwards and downwards as a result of free will, State compulsion towards levelling tends to atrophy the spirit of enterprise at one end and to freeze that of compassion at the other. The Party, therefore, adheres to the principle of Trusteeship enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi. It stands for a system of free enterprise restrained as well as enriched and reinforced by a sense of social obligation."[46] Similarly, while emphasizing the spiritual basis of trusteeship, and the need for the individual to exercise his own sense of compassion and charity, the government's taxation policy is severely criticized for being "oppressive, expropriatory and coercive" because it "squeezes out the spirit of trusteeship."[47] It is interesting that,

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Sarvodaya movement), in *The Role of Wealth in Society* (Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1956), enthusiastically endorses Andrew Carnegie's philosophy of wealth, and suggests that the best example of application of that theory is the work of Bhave's Sarvodaya movement.

[43] This party, founded only after the second general elections, displayed spectacular success in the general elections held in February 1962. The Swatantra Party is now the third-ranking party in the Lok Sabha, coming very close to the second-ranking Communist Party of India, with respect to both number of seats won and percentage of votes polled. (See *Times of India*, March 8, 1962, p. 9.) It also has emerged as the official opposition in four states: Rajasthan, Gujerat, Bihar, and Orissa. Its national leadership, whose former affiliations and ideological stands vary tremendously, includes such comparatively well-known names as C. R. Rajagopachari, K. M. Munshi, N. G. Ranga, and M. R. Masani.

[44] K. M. Munshi, in *Reconstruction of Society Through Trusteeship* (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1960, p. 17), even draws attention to what he considers the inspiring relationship of the late Maharana of Udaipur with his hundreds of retainers, whom he looked upon as members of his own family.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

[46] "The Programme of the Swatantra Party," reproduced in *Maral*, IIA (May 1960), p. 80.

[47] Munshi, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-39 *passim*. He states that the aim of a taxation policy should be not "to raise money for officially conducted 'welfare' schemes, but to recreate conditions in which money would be diverted by individual volition to trusts for the welfare of the community." And in a country where tax-evasion is rampant, Munshi derides the government's "evader-hunting" as "idiotic self-righteousness."

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coming from diametrically opposed angles, both the Swatantra Party and the Sarvodaya movement adhere to the principle of "that government is best which governs least"; and to the policy that the rich must not be coerced to part with their riches—rather, they should, through a change in their own hearts, recognize their responsibilities.

In addition to the Sarvodaya and Swatantra supporters, there are erstwhile critics of trusteeship who, since Independence, have significantly shifted their view. Most right-wing Congressmen have never criticized the trusteeship doctrine; but those members of the Congress Party who have prided themselves on their Socialist leanings, and who, during the Independence movement, condemned the trusteeship concept as being contradictory to socialism, since Independence have explicitly endorsed the Gandhian concept. Not least among them is Prime Minister Nehru himself. He still admits that socialism is part of his philosophy, but declares that his views have changed on such subjects as class struggle and trusteeship. He feels that although "class struggle is there always," the Gandhian approach can, somehow, remove it.[48]

Similarly Mr. Sampurnanand, whose vituperative attacks on trusteeship (launched both when he was a member of the Congress Socialist Party, and as a member of the Congress Party in the 1940's) are quoted above, has completely reversed his stand and now expresses credence in the idea. He has recently inquired, insofar as capitalist and laborer are concerned, "Why think of conflict at all?" He states that they are both "active members of a cooperative venture" and that "this is what Mahatmaji meant when he asked capitalists to look upon themselves as trustees on behalf of society."[49]

One might also note that the new journal, *Socialist Congressman*—organ of the left-wing "ginger group" of the Congress Party, and presumably representative of the Socialist ideology of the Congress—tends to equate Gandhism with socialism. Thus, for example, one issue features an English translation of a new poem by the noted Hindi poet, R. D. Sinha Dinkar, who also happens to be a Congress M.P. In this poem, criticism that Socialists once made of Gandhi's trusteeship concept is directly refuted, especially in the two lines:

[48] If this appears a vague explanation of a quite radical shift of viewpoint, it is just as vague as Nehru's entire taped answer to a question on his view of trusteeship. The only clear point is that, whereas at one stage of his life he criticized the concept, he now endorses it. See R. K. Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1960, pp. 76-80.

[49] Sampurnanand, *Indian Socialism*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1961, p. 16.

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No! No! Gandhi is no watchman of the Capitalist;
Nor an umbrella of steel to shelter your hoarded
wealth from the showers of Marx.[50]

It is not only the Congress Socialists, however, who have changed their positions; members of the Praja Socialist Party have also joined in the acclaim for Gandhi's trusteeship concept. An obvious example is M. R. Masani, who left the party to become one of the leaders of the Swatantra Party.[51] Similarly, one-time Marxist Jayaprakash Narayan, now a leader of the Sarvodaya movement, specifically has repudiated his former views on trusteeship.[52]

Of course there have always been some members of the Praja Socialist Party who have been closer to Gandhi, for instance, than to Marx. Thus it is not surprising that M. L. Dantwala, one of the original members of the Socialist Party, as early as the 1940's reassessed the trusteeship concept and gave to it his own approving interpretation.[53] What is more significant, however, is the fact that Professor Mukut Beharilal, M.P. —even today one of the more Marxist-inclined theoreticians of the Praja Socialist Party, who also serves on the party's National Executive—has recently criticized the Swatantra Party's interpretation of trusteeship *not* because the concept is inherently wrong, but because the interpretation is at odds with what he feels Gandhi really meant by trusteeship.[54]

It should be obvious from the above that in the pre-Independence period there were vehement Socialist critics of Gandhi's trusteeship con-

[50] R. D. Sinha Dinkar, "No! No! Gandhi is no Watchman of the Capitalist," *Socialist Congressman*, 1 (May 15, 1961), p. 10. Note also the indignant outburst of this journal (May 1, 1961, p. 3) in regard to a recent criticism of Gandhi by G. D. Birla.

[51] Actually, as early as 1944 Masani was having second thoughts on trusteeship. See the ambiguity of his views in *Socialism Reconsidered*, Bombay, Padma Publications, 1944, pp. 64-67. In this book he at one point criticizes the concept, and then a paragraph later notes its value as a "transition technique."

[52] E.g., Jayaprakash Narayan, *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, Benares, Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh, 1959, p. 45. Even at the time of the merger of the Socialist Party and the Gandhian-oriented Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (1952), Narayan, still a member of the former, justified Gandhi's idea of trusteeship. His views are quoted in Ahmed Fatmi, *Praja Socialist Party: Ek Vishleshan* (in Hindi), Patna, Bihar Praja Socialist Party, 1953, pp. 87-88. This book sheds interesting light on ideological problems involved in the merger, and on the Gandhian content of Socialist ideology.

[53] M. L. Dantwala, *Gandhism Reconsidered*, Bombay, Padma Publications, rev. ed., 1945, pp. 46ff.

[54] Mukut Beharilal, "Planned Economy & Socialism, II," *Janata*, June 11, 1961, p. 3. He suggests that Gandhi's concept "involves transformation of ownership into a trust in favour of the community in general and workers of the industry in particular. Gandhiji believed in the economy of welfare based on the principle of mutuality and equality and wished to foster cooperation instead of competition with a view to promoting ethical transformation of the economic life and moral elevation of man." For similar criticism of what he calls "capitalists' trusteeship" and a defense of "Gandhian trusteeship," see his *Sarvodaya and Democratic Socialism*, Benares, Praja Socialist Publications, n.d., pp. 12-17.

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cept who voluntarily tempered their criticisms. Since that time, however, the critics themselves have undergone (to use the Gandhian phrase) a "change of heart": the concept of trusteeship is now viewed not only as inherently good, but useful as well.

What are the reasons for this? In the first place, at least insofar as the Congress Party is concerned, one cannot overlook its class basis. In the name of equality and socialism the Congress government has taken steps whose professed aim is to transform the social structure: e.g., ceilings on land holdings, zamindari abolition, and establishment of various types of co-operatives. It is, however, instructive to note that Ajit Prasad Jain, a Congressman who until recently was Union Minister for Food and Agriculture, has posed the question of whether the increase in India's national income has "gone to reduce the inequality of wealth or of incomes among the Indian citizens." And his answer is rather pessimistic: "There is a natural tendency for new industrial units to go to men who have experience and resources, and the spectacular increase in the investments owned or controlled by a few top Indian capitalists of late has given the impression that the inequalities, instead of being reduced, are increasing. This is a matter of serious concern. Land reforms have reduced inequalities in the countryside to the extent they have been implemented, but extreme poverty and excessive affluence continue to characterise our economy."[55] Thus, although Socialist Congressmen can point to legislation as well as rhetoric with a Socialist tinge, they have to admit that there has been little effective action.

Inasmuch as the propertied classes form the backbone of the Congress, and the large industrialists as well as the majority of princes still belong to the Congress Party, this could hardly be otherwise. Evasion of land reform laws as well as of taxes is widespread, and ex-rulers of the Indian states continue to receive privy purses. Nonetheless, realizing that the support of such classes is still needed if Congress is simply to

[55] Ajit Prasad Jain, "Indian Socialism," *Seminar*, No. 17 (January 1961), p. 38. See also a review of the findings of the follow-up study of the All India Rural Credit Survey, *Economic Weekly*, June 24, 1961, pp. 931-33. The follow-up survey (sponsored by the government) found that the first 30 per cent of families arranged in descending order of holdings held from 50 to 72 per cent of the cultivated area of the districts; the 30 per cent at the other end of the scale held no more than 14 per cent and in some districts 4 per cent of the cultivated land. It was also found that the debt per acre was heavier among the last 30 per cent, and that it was the first 30 per cent who made the most use of credit co-operatives. *Economic Weekly* (which claims no label, Socialist or otherwise), concludes that "As long as the extreme inequalities in land holdings persist, nothing very revolutionary can be brought about by cooperatives." For similar evidence, see the case study of "successful" co-operatives in Government of India, Planning Commission, Programme Evaluation Organisation, *Seventh Evaluation Report on Community Development and Some Allied Fields*, Delhi, 1960, pp. 128-35.

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remain in power, even the Socialists in Congress are cautious about alienating them. The financial support and administrative skills of the propertied and industrial classes are also considered important for achieving governmental goals of economic development (although there is some doubt about how consistently this view is held within Congress).

A second reason for Congress' backing of the trusteeship ideology is that even the Socialist members have learned, through their exercise of governmental power, that they can cope with only so many problems at one time. To encourage class struggle within the country, to raise expectations of the most depressed classes before these expectations can be met, is, to these Congressmen, an invitation to anarchy. Such reasoning is prompted largely by the fact that India has a shortage economy. Although the government gives token recognition to the plight of the "rural masses" through community development programs, in fact little effort is exerted to bring about any revolutionary change in the rural structure.

A prominent member of the Congress Party "ginger group" has suggested to this writer that this has been a conscious policy on the part of the Congress government. Congress reasons that, by holding back the level of demands and expectations of the still largely politically unconscious rural poor, it can stave off a serious social upheaval; meanwhile, it can concentrate on industrializing the country and, incidentally, at least partially deal with the very insistent demands of a growing (refrigerator-conscious) middle class.[56] It is to be noted that, paradoxically, in view of Congress' professed goal of furthering equality, this policy appears to have led to a widening rather than a lessening of the gap between rural and urban populations. Through rural (Gandhian) basic education schemes and the like, the rural masses are being kept "down on the farm" inasmuch as they are not given the type of education that provides entrée to the perhaps more lucrative professions and white-collar positions.[57] Thus those in the hinterland who wish to rise on the social scale first must have enough money to afford an urban education.

[56] May it suffice here to note what the Congress ideology is. To discuss the fact that this may be an economically unsound argument, that the level of food production may be suffering from this policy, resulting in the expenditure of foreign exchange for food instead of machinery, unfortunately lies outside the scope of this article.

[57] The newspapers also appear to be serving this purpose. For example, if one compares Hindi- and English-language newspapers, one finds the former tend to reinforce the traditional religious outlook and values; English-language newspapers, on the other hand, even those emanating from the same office as a Hindi-language counterpart, play down religious holidays and practices, and play up more modern (and often this is synonymous with Western) interests, attitudes, and political ideas.

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A third reason for support of the trusteeship idea springs from the sacredness of the name of Gandhi. It is, perhaps, the reason why groups as different as the Swatantra, Praja Socialist, and Congress parties can echo a belief in Gandhian trusteeship; and why all, including the Communists, pay tribute to Vinoba, Gandhi's spiritual heir. When Gandhi was alive, the Socialists could heap venom on his name and ideas; the history of the Independence movement is full of examples of clashes between them and Gandhi. But Gandhi has since died a martyr's death, and it is politically unwise for any group to refrain from repeatedly acknowledging his greatness.[58] Politicians feel compelled to make ample references to his name in their election speeches. And each group espousing the trusteeship idea feels compelled to claim that its interpretation—which doubtless differs widely from that of other groups—is the only truly Gandhian interpretation.

Finally, the ideology of trusteeship is found to be of such great utility because it is easily reconcilable with the traditional values and concepts of society. As was indicated in Part I of this article, the old values persist in contemporary India and traditional social patterns are still a vital part of Indian culture. To ignore these patterns and values is to jeopardize one's chances of gaining popular support. This much even the adherents of the Sarvodaya movement have come to realize; and thus they find they gain more success by appealing to the traditional philanthropic attitudes of the rich than by persistently pursuing one goal—an egalitarian society in which the rich would no longer exist.

This dichotomous interpretation of the trusteeship concept, however, is perhaps illustrative of a more basic distinction in approaches to social change: the distinction between philanthropy and solidarity. The solidarity or Socialist approach implies that equality can come about only if the social structure is radically changed; and that this can happen only if there have been changes in the economic structure. This theory is based on the assumption that the "have's" in society will never undergo such a "change of heart" that they will give away enough of their wealth to affect the poor significantly and thereby jeopardize their own position in the socio-economic structure. The philanthropic or charitable approach, on the other hand, does not tend to upset the social structure. Inequalities—even extreme inequalities—tend to persist, for the

[58] A rare satirization of Gandhi's version of utopia has recently been written by Krishan Chander—"Azadi ke Pachas Sal Bad" ("Fifty Years After Freedom"), published in his collection of satirical essays, *Ghunghat-me Gori Jale* (in Hindi), Delhi, Hind Pocket Books, n.d. It is significant that Chander is one of India's most popular vernacular writers, whose works are read not only by the elite but by the newly literate and tradition-oriented public as well.

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institution of charity could not continue unless there were poor who were dependent recipients of this charity, and comparatively rich who had surplus to give.

And here perhaps lies a key to understanding the utility value of Gandhian trusteeship. For trusteeship can be construed as Socialist, with all wealth—theoretically at least—the property of a classless society. But more important is the realization that trusteeship is reconcilable and, indeed, reinforces the traditional concept of charity and thereby the viability of the old social structure. Most Indian politicians—including Socialists in and out of Congress—are aware that the largest segments of their society even today endorse the maintenance of a relatively static hierarchical social structure, and the traditional institutions of begging and charity which support that structure. Therefore they can effectively employ the trusteeship concept to gain for themselves popular support.

This understanding of the implications of trusteeship is perhaps useful for both those who are disturbed and those who are enthusiastic about India's claim to socialism. Those who have become frightened by the use that Indian politicians make of Socialist and Communist jargon may take comfort in the fact that if the Indian government continues along its present path, there is little likelihood of any radical change in the social structure, or of ready relinquishment by persons who have an economic stake in Indian society (and who also have declared their stake in Congress).

On the other hand, those who feel disturbed about the depths of poverty still so visible in India, and about the slow pace of change, might legitimately pose the question: If, for whatever reasons, trusteeship has become an inherent part of Indian Socialist ideology (and if, as the current Programme of the Communist Party suggests, even the Communists, at least for the present, largely support Congress policy), from whence will come the impetus for the more radical socio-economic change needed in India?

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THE NEO-DESTOUR PARTY OF TUNISIA

A Structure for Democracy?

By CLEMENT HENRY MOORE*

TUNISIA, of all the countries in the Arab world today, seems to offer the most promising prospects for constitutional democracy. A Tunisian nation already exists, both as a historic political entity and as a people mobilized by a coherent political movement during twenty years of opposition to French domination. President Habib Bourguiba, the creator of the Neo-Destour Party, is not only the Leader needed to incarnate a new nation and decide its direction; he is also the great Educator of the public. The ideas that he communicates in his frequent and readily understood speeches are the Western political concepts and methods that the Neo-Destour assimilated more profoundly during its long struggle than any other successful Arab liberation movement. "Bourguibism" is the vision of a modern open society that respects both individual liberties and social justice. During six years of independence, despite the Algerian problem on its western frontier, Tunisia has displayed remarkable political stability. Its new Constitution, patterned on the American presidential system, has created a strong executive balanced by a National Assembly, both simultaneously elected by universal suffrage. The society seems relatively homogeneous, for the nationalist movement displaced not only a colonial oligarchy but a traditional land-owning, governing, and religious aristocracy. All self-conscious sectors of the society have demonstrated their awareness of the need to maintain national cohesion for the sake of economic development.

The most significant factor for the future of democracy, however, may be the internal functioning of the dominant party. The Neo-Destour is the only mass party of its kind in the Arab world. Unlike Nasser's National Union, it was not manufactured by a government but was the genuine emanation of a new nation responding to a colonial situation. It was originally designed in 1934 to oppose French domination more effectively than the Destour Party[1] it replaced, by appealing to

* The author is doing research in Tunisia for a doctoral dissertation on the Neo-Destour Party, with the aid of a grant from the Ford Foundation; the views expressed in this article are, of course, his own and not the Foundation's. They are the product mainly of extensive interviews with party officials, especially at regional and local levels.

[1] The Destour, or Liberal Constitutional, Party was founded in 1920. Its main goal, a Tunisian Constitution, is the meaning of "Destour" in Arabic. The best histories of

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the masses as well as to the educated Tunisian elite. Though willing at times to operate within the system of a reformed French Protectorate, the Neo-Destour was never given the opportunity until 1954 to contest general elections or to exercise effective government responsibilities. For intervals adding up to almost ten years out of these two decades of opposition, most of its leaders were in prison, and only clandestine action was possible. During the rest of the time, however, public party activities were more or less tolerated, and the Neo-Destour was able to acquire an articulated structure.

Having succeeded since 1954 in capturing the state apparatus, the party has placed its leaders and cadres in all key positions. It tolerates the existence of two opposition parties, but one, the Communist Party, with limited activities, has little influence, while the other, the original Destour Party from which Bourguiba broke in 1933, has no activities. In the course of the independence struggle the Neo-Destour created or infiltrated a number of organizations that today group workers (UGTT), artisans and shopkeepers (UTIC), farmers (UNAT), students (UGET), youth (Neo-Destour Youth), and scouts.[2] These, together with a women's organization (UNFT) created after independence, have organizational autonomy but do not constitute independent centers of political power. Potentially the most effective sources of political opposition, UGTT and UGET are curbed both by a genuinely felt need for national unity and by the existence within them of numbers of Destour cadres more likely in crisis to obey party discipline. Outside the party there are no representative structures whose deliberations might either

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the Tunisian nationalist movement are F. Garas, *Bourguiba et la naissance d'une nation*, Paris, 1956, and Ch.-A. Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en marche*, Paris, 1953.

[2] The Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) was created in January 1945 with Neo-Destour support, to provide a purely Tunisian alternative to the French Communist-dominated CGT. What is now called the Union Tunisienne des Industriels et Commerçants (UTIC) was created by the Neo-Destour in early 1946 to support the nationalist cause and to counter a similar Communist front organization. The Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens (UNAT) was created only in 1956, but virtually all of its cadres came from the Union Générale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens, established at the same time as UTIC for similar reasons. The older organization was dissolved after some of its top leaders followed Salah Ben Youssef in 1955-1956 (see text below). The Union Générale des Etudiants de Tunisie (UGET) was founded clandestinely in 1953 by Neo-Destour students in France. The Neo-Destour Youth dates back to 1936. Some of the many Tunisian scout movements were heavily infiltrated by the Neo-Destour for many years; all have since independence been combined into one organization controlled by the party. The Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes (UNFT) was founded with Bourguiba's personal blessing and support in 1957. These organizations may all be treated to a varying extent as ancillary organizations of the Neo-Destour. Their structures, which complement that of the party, help to maintain national cohesion, while providing democratically elected organs for political education and leadership training. Unfortunately, for lack of space they cannot be treated in this article.

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overrule or give rise to important policy decisions. The National Assembly, which consists only of deputies nominated by the Neo-Destour, cannot play such a role as yet, for its deliberations are limited and take place largely within closed commissions. Tunisia's many new municipal councils, while offering a training ground for civic responsibility, have been allowed to function properly only when their elected members were local Neo-Destour candidates. Of course Tunisia has periodic elections under its new Constitution, but it has become increasingly difficult for non-Communist Independents, who might stand some chance of election, to be candidates. Hence in Tunisia today the Neo-Destour has a monopoly of political power. Bourguiba shows no intention of allowing the party gradually to induce external competition and to relinquish its political monopoly within the foreseeable future. Rather "its mission, intimately bound up with the life of the people, is permanent."[3]

Though a well-organized political party with a mass following, the Neo-Destour is neither a constitutional mass party nor a totalitarian party. The categories of Western political scientists, devised for the study of political parties in more mature political systems, cannot adequately explain Tunisia's dominant party. The Neo-Destour resembles the Congress Party of India, the CPP of Ghana, and various territorial offshoots of the RDA in French-speaking Black Africa more than it resembles European political parties. Political scientists have not yet devised a generally accepted model to characterize these newer but highly structured parties.[4] However, they may be called "national" parties, and they have a number of traits in common. They all originated as elite and then as mass parties in reaction to a colonial situation. Their leaders assimilated the political culture of the colonial power, which to a greater or lesser extent constituted the ground rules of the conflict between the two. Since mass parties and universal suffrage conditioned politics in the metropolitan country, the nationalist elite had to organize similar parties, which in the West had required centuries of political evolution. During the colonial period, these parties were patterned upon metropolitan parties, usually ambiguously those of the constitutional and totalitarian Left. Indeed, the situation confronting the Left in the mother country had something in common with the colonial situation confronting the nationalists. Both found it possible to work within the capitalist

[3] Speech by Bourguiba delivered on October 2, 1958, at an assembly of Neo-Destour cadres. See Secretariat of State for Information, *Les Congrès du Néo-Destour*, Tunis, 1959, p. 93.

[4] For a documented discussion of the problem, see my article, "The National Party: A Tentative Model," *Public Policy* (Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration), x (1960), pp. 239-67.

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or colonial system at times, but not always. But even when the nationalists were divided into two groups, they usually managed to stay within the same party for the sake of national unity. Doctrinal conflicts rarely exacerbated tactical disagreements.

Attaining independence before it had effectively mobilized and educated the most backward sectors of the society, the national party became preponderant. Its problems no longer resembled those of Socialist or Communist parties in the metropolitan country, because it no longer faced the opposition of a colonial oligarchy. Despite the absence of a generally accepted model, however, it is crucial for an evaluation of the prospects of democracy in Tunisia and a number of other new nations that the nature of the national party be clearly apprehended. These parties are not like constitutional mass parties simply because—except for the Congress Party in India—they have no effective constitutional opposition.

But it would be an even more serious mistake to confuse a party like the Neo-Destour with totalitarian parties.[5] Bourguibism is the antithesis of a totalitarian ideology, for Bourguiba recognizes that no neat doctrine or intellectual system can do full justice to the complex realities of Tunisian society. Bourguiba has confidence in Tunisia's historic destiny, but his belief in history is a youthful liberal faith unhampered by any dogma determining its outcome. He believes in reason, but only for arriving at pragmatic open solutions of his society's problems. He is a determined modernizer both of the Tunisian society and of the Tunisian economy, but his reformist zeal is curbed by a respect for the individual and his democratic liberties. He realizes that his ultimate goal of maximizing individual liberties and dignity can be achieved only through structural reforms that may in the short run curtail these liberties, but he is trying to use common sense and flexible formulas to cushion inevitable tensions as much as possible. Reason, he believes, should persuade rather than force recalcitrant sectors of the society to co-operate in the building of a new nation. The new nation for Bourguiba is a group of living individuals, not an intellectual abstraction. Bourguiba has faith in reason, but it is not a totalitarian faith because it is governed by common sense and liberal values.[6]

[5] It will be seen that structurally the Neo-Destour somewhat resembles Communist parties. But relative emphasis upon party structure and neglect of ideologies, as exemplified by Maurice Duverger's *Political Parties* (London, 1955) and Robert Rézette's *Partis politiques marocains* (Paris, 1955), can be misleading, especially with regard to national parties, whose structures remain fluid.

[6] No detailed theoretical study of Bourguibism exists. But, for a discussion of some of Bourguiba's key ideas, see Roger Stephane, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba* (Paris, 1958), where the term "Bourguibism" was popularized, and Gabriel Ardant, *La Tunisie*

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The mission of the Neo-Destour, according to its 1959 Covenant,[7] is the apparent paradox of maintaining its political monopoly, in order to preserve Tunisian independence and to modernize the economy and the society, while "working for the consolidation of a truly democratic life in which responsibilities are limited and which guarantees for individuals the enjoyment of their rights and public liberties." But the paradox, which is that of other preponderant national parties, is perhaps more apparent than real. Unlike totalitarian parties, which rule by force, the Neo-Destour is genuinely representative, for it embodies the new nation through an elite, formed by French education and united by years of resistance to French domination, that seems committed to the radical modernization of Tunisian society. National consensus has been illustrated in a number of daring innovations, such as the abolition of polygamy; the guarantee of personal and civil liberties for women; educational reform that promises eventual bilingual schooling for all children by modern French rather than traditional methods; and a massive campaign against economic backwardness and poverty, now to be spearheaded by a new super-ministry for economic planning.

Meanwhile the party is still trying to consolidate a national community in which some sectors lag behind others in political maturity. The fulfillment of this task is the essential precondition of any viable constitutional democracy in the future. It must be remembered that successful Western democracies have functioned only in the context of pre-existing national communities sharing broad purposes and agreed procedures for discovering the means of achieving these purposes. When with the rise of extremist parties these purposes and procedures were sometimes forgotten, the democracies were imperiled. By maintaining its political monopoly within the foreseeable future, the Neo-Destour may be able firmly to implant common national purposes and procedures in the minds of all Tunisian citizens, so that they acquire a coherent political culture. But this task of political education, especially when coupled with the other prime task of economic development,

d'aujourd'hui et de demain (Paris, 1961). The best source is the collection of Bourguiba's weekly speeches since 1956, available at the Tunisian Secretariat of State for Information. For his speeches and writings before independence, see Habib Bourguiba, *La Tunisie et la France*, Paris, 1954.

[7] Political Bureau of the Neo-Destour Party, *The Covenant and Internal Statutes of the Neo-Destour*, passed by the Sixth Congress, Tunis, 1959 (published only in Arabic). I have rendered a free translation from the Arabic. In this article, political terms, whenever ambiguous, have been translated in light of the French terms that inspired their use. The internal statutes of the party passed at the Congress of 1955, along with the more rudimentary statutes of 1934 and 1937, are contained in the appendix of *Les Congrès du Néo-Destour, op.cit.*

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requires a political mechanism that can also maintain the cohesion of a growing elite. The national party appears capable of fulfilling these functions more effectively and more democratically than either a totalitarian party or an authoritarian clique composed, for instance, of army officers or of a land-owning oligarchy masked by a parliamentary system.

It must be admitted from the outset, however, that national parties like the Neo-Destour do not in their internal functioning live up to all the norms of liberal democracy. Since 1955, when the Neo-Destour took responsibility for a compromise agreement with France that did not meet all nationalist aspirations, the party has become even less democratic than it used to be in the heat of anti-colonialist combat. The former Secretary-General of the party, Salah Ben Youssef, launched a campaign against the agreement with France that by early 1956 almost developed into civil war. Though Bourguiba, with the aid of faithful political lieutenants and the UGTT, finally eliminated the Youssefist threat, the experience conclusively demonstrated that Tunisia was not ready for democratic competition even within the party. In late 1956 Bourguiba thought that Ahmed Ben Salah, then leader of the UGTT, wanted to use his trade union as the organizational base for a labor party that might challenge Neo-Destour political control. He accordingly encouraged a split within the union that eliminated Ben Salah and seriously weakened the UGTT. Though Ben Salah was subsequently appointed minister and today is in charge of Tunisia's economic planning and finance ministries, the UGTT remains firmly under Neo-Destour control. The Ben Youssef and Ben Salah stories have set the tone for prudent uniformity in Tunisian political life.

Echoing this tone, the Neo-Destour was internally overhauled in late 1958. Previously modeled on mass parties of the French Left, the Neo-Destour had consisted of cells freely elected at the local level, supervised by federations annually elected by the cells, and headed by a national congress, an interim national council, and an executive, the Political Bureau, elected by the congress. In late 1958 the federations were replaced by a smaller number of provincial offices headed by officials appointed by the Political Bureau. These party officials, called Commissioners, are not subject to criticism from the cells as the federal executives used to be at the annual federal congresses. Instead of representing the cells, the Commissioners govern them. In a sense the Neo-Destour, previously closer in structure to the French Socialist Party (SFIO), was made to resemble a Communist party, in which officials in charge of intermediate executive bodies, though in appearance elected

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(unanimously) at regional congresses, are in fact appointed by the central secretariat.

Bourguiba gave a number of reasons in defense of this basic change in party structure. He explained that decentralization had been necessary during the many years of clandestine activity, when national leaders were in prison. Though originally founded primarily to execute the directives of the Political Bureau, the federations had become independent centers of power when the Political Bureau could not effectively operate. During the period following independence, however, he came to feel that "We need a strong power which does not dissipate in multiple ramifications. We need cohesion and discipline to increase efficiency."[8] Furthermore, "It is indispensable that the party adapt its organization to the administrative armature of the country, so that the two structures can re-enforce one another and evolve harmoniously." The federations, rather than paralleling the new administrative structure staffed by Governors and Delegates, had been based upon the personal influence of "certain militants." "Especially those who claimed a glorious past of struggle and sacrifice have paralyzed the activity of the administration by their constant interventions." Even before the reorganization of the party, the Political Bureau had been obliged in some provinces—and notably in Tunis—to dissolve the federations.

In reality the political maturity of the party's cadres had declined disastrously after independence, for two reasons. With victory in sight by late 1954, the party was swamped with new recruits. From a membership estimated at 106,000 before July 1954,[9] the Neo-Destour had acquired roughly 325,000 members by the time of its Fifth Congress in November 1955,[10] and supposedly numbered 600,000 by 1957.[11] During these years the best cadres of the party were being drained off into government jobs, where they could no longer devote the same amount of time to party activities. Cells multiplied, but lacked competent leadership. The Neo-Destour take-over of the government created problems of patronage that the federations could not always handle properly but

[8] This and the following quotations are from Bourguiba's speech of October 2, 1958, *op.cit.*

[9] La Documentation Tunisienne, *Tunisie 58*, p. 22, quoted in Keith Callard's highly informative article, "The Republic of Bourguiba," *International Journal*, XVI (Winter 1960-61), p. 34.

[10] Neo-Destour Party, *The National Congress of Sfax*, Arabic edn. [Tunis, n.d.], p. 58.

[11] The unlikely figure of 600,000 was given in *Tunisie 58*. Today the party claims between 250,000 and 300,000 adherents, out of an adult male population of less than a million (women in the party are still rare, except in some cities). But these figures, swollen by new recruits in some of the politically underdeveloped areas of Tunisia, may mask increasing apathy in some old party strongholds.

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that explained why provincial administration was sometimes "paralyzed." Arguments were sometimes bitter between members of federations and Neo-Destour government officials, nor was it always clear who governed, for was it not the party that had brought independence? Conflicts were often exacerbated by family, village, and sometimes tribal rivalries. The cumulative impact of all these factors motivated the reorganization of the party in late 1958.

Authoritarian trends in Tunisia since independence, moreover, are not surprising in light of the fundamental domestic problems, compounded by a delicate international situation, that the political system has had to handle. It would be naïve to expect the Neo-Destour, or any other ruling national party, to be internally democratic to the extent that two or more clearly defined groups would compete for power in periodic elections at successive levels within the party. The Tunisian elite is homogeneous, and for the time being is neither in need of such competition nor sufficiently large to provide a responsible alternative leadership. But the Neo-Destour may be paving the way for fuller Tunisian democracy in the future to the extent that (1) it encourages rational discussion of national and local problems; (2) it communicates to the public its democratic values and national problems; (3) it maintains its representative character by balancing the interests of the elite and continuing to stimulate the enthusiasm of the masses; (4) it encourages wide practical participation in local politics; (5) it maintains a democratic style of elections and free criticism of authority. Negatively, too, the Neo-Destour will not have precluded a democratic future to the extent that it avoids taking a totalitarian shape. The functioning of the various organs of the Neo-Destour will be examined with these criteria in mind.[12]

THE CELLS

Neo-Destour cells are quite unlike Communist cells. They assemble less often and contain a larger number of members. General assemblies or information meetings usually occur at no more than three-month intervals. They lack the secrecy of Communist cell meetings, and are sometimes even open to the general public. Any Tunisian can be a cell member if he is not a member of another party, if he is committed to respect the principles of the party, if he executes its decisions and pays his dues.[13] The most important prerequisite for membership—respect

[12] Apart from meager newspaper reports, the only solid documentary description of the party's present structure lies in its published internal statutes. These will not be individually cited in what follows.

[13] The 1959 statutes omit the previous requirement that new members take an oath.

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for the principles of the party—does not imply the sort of conversion required by totalitarian parties, for the Neo-Destour's principles are flexible and undogmatic. Some of the party's 1,000 cells have had as many as 3,000 members, while most cells outside Tunis average between 100 and 400 members. The cell committee, a collectively responsible executive of from 8 to 12 cell officers elected at the annual cell assembly,[14] may meet as often as once a week and carry on many activities, especially in the cities. But, unlike dedicated Communists, they cannot claim a local monopoly of ideological purity and devotion. Furthermore, the Neo-Destour cell is permitted free formal and informal contacts with other cells, whereas horizontal contacts of Communist cells are kept to a fully controlled minimum. Clearly "cell" is a somewhat misleading term for the Neo-Destour to apply to what are in fact more akin to the "sections" or branches of constitutional mass parties like the SFIO.

As a result of the reorganization of the party in 1958, the Political Bureau through its Commissioners exerts significant power over the cells. Candidates for cell elections must be approved by the Political Bureau, while previously anybody could be a candidate as long as he had been a party member for at least two years.[15] The Political Bureau may suspend or dissolve any cell committee guilty of an infraction of the party's Covenant or internal statutes. The Political Bureau then delegates responsibility to an appointed commission of cell members until the convening of a general assembly of the cell, within a period in theory not to exceed six months. Before 1958, the federations could dissolve cell committees with the approval or tacit silence of the Political Bureau, but new cell elections had to be prepared within two weeks, not six months. Today even the six-month deadline is not always respected. Nor is the principle of collective responsibility always followed by the Political Bureau, which has sometimes, under the rather flexible rules of party discipline,[16] simply removed individual trouble-makers who

In practice the prospective member today, at least in Tunis, needs two sponsors who are members of the party to present his name to the cell committee. The $3 annual dues are not always paid in full.

[14] The elected officers choose among themselves a President, a Secretary-General, an Assistant Secretary-General, a Treasurer, an Assistant Treasurer, an Orientation officer, a Youth officer, and a Social Revival officer. The Orientation officer is responsible for party propaganda within the cell's district. The Youth officer carries out the program of the Neo-Destour Youth. The Social Revival officer watches over the interests of the general public in everything from garbage collection to the building of a new mosque.

[15] But the Political Bureau does not exercise its new privilege indiscriminately. The representative of the Political Bureau who presides over the cell's general assembly may be asked to explain why a candidate was not approved.

[16] A party member or official may be punished by a warning, suspension, or expulsion from the party, if proved guilty of any of the following broad charges: (1) prejudicing

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were misusing their cell positions. Cell committees are generally suspended or dissolved for one of two reasons: either they have been paralyzed by internal dissension, usually a function of local family rivalries, or they have been too inactive and apathetic in the execution of normal party duties. Suspended or dissolved cell committees are not an uncommon phenomenon in Tunisia today. They reflect less an overly authoritarian Political Bureau, however, than a simple lack of responsible party cadres. Within limits defined by the party's internal statutes, cell elections are genuinely democratic and follow fixed procedures understood by most members.[17]

The Political Bureau may also determine the number of cells and delimit their territorial competence. Since 1958 efforts to make the party structure parallel the country's new administrative structure have necessitated the reduction of the number of cells from 1,500 to 1,000. In theory, the party now has one cell for each *cheikhat*, the government's lowest administrative division. Since these divisions are purely geographic in all parts of the country, newly regrouped cells have sometimes embraced disparate tribal fractions. Currently, however, the Political Bureau is trying to increase the number of cells in some provinces, where the necessary cadres are to be found, in order to stimulate more local initiative. There has been only one case of what appears to be outright political gerrymandering.[18]

Though the Political Bureau supervises all cell activities, local initia-

interests of the party and departing from its political principles; (2) action susceptible of endangering the party or supporting one of its enemies; (3) breaking the party Covenant or internal statutes, or affecting the dignity of the party; (4) public expression of hostility toward the party or toward one of its organs. In practice the Political Bureau has a potentially formidable disciplinary arsenal, but it is a deterrent rarely employed.

[17] A few weeks before the general assembly, candidates submit their applications through the cell committee to the Political Bureau. Though the list of candidates is divulged only at the assembly, the cell members know in advance who is running for election, because prospective candidates are usually approved. At the assembly all members who have been in the party for at least nine months are electors, if they have paid a reasonable portion of their annual dues. They vote for as many candidates from the list as there are offices to fill. There are almost always substantially more candidates than offices. Voting patterns are irregular; cell elections are never blind plebiscites.

[18] In Kairouan, after serious incidents on January 17, 1961, when a large crowd chanting religious slogans marched upon the Governor's office and residence to protest the transfer of a religious instructor. A re-enforced National Guard was needed to combat the mob, and a small number of people were actually killed. The incident revealed growing tension between the traditional aristocracy of the Kairouan *medina* and the governing authorities who are spearheading social revolution in the area. On February 13 and 14 the Commissioner held meetings of cell officers to explain his decision to increase the number of cells in the *medina* to 13, a surprisingly large number. On February 23 he held a meeting of party cadres to designate the new cell officers. See *Al 'Amal* (the official Neo-Destour daily newspaper), March 5, 1961, p. 3.

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tive is encouraged. The most recent national congress, in March 1959, passed a resolution calling for each cell to organize a local project to re-enforce Tunisia's economic and social development. The application of this resolution has of course necessitated close co-operation between the cells and higher party officials, especially when government support was needed. But most ideas came from the cells. Cells also enjoy direct contacts with local government officials. Since 1957 many elected municipal councils have been set up in villages and towns, and they are composed largely of cell officers. Often, too, the *cheikh*, though appointed by the government, will have been the former cell president. Furthermore, the Governor's Delegate, who is the *cheikh*'s superior in the administrative hierarchy, usually tries to keep on friendly terms with the cell committee, for the popular support which it represents is essential to the success of many government projects.[19] Patronage is managed through higher party levels, but cell demands and advice receive serious consideration. Local grievances voiced by the cell committee are aired either in meetings with higher party officials or in meetings grouping both party and government representatives. Consultation is constant, though the cell has few fixed prerogatives. Hierarchies lack rigidity, for virtually all provincial officials, whether in the party or in the government, are either Neo-Destour militants or former militants, brothers in the same cause.

Cell meetings, however, rarely discuss national policies. The frequent cell committee meetings, which are not public, seem to be concerned exclusively with the administration of the cell or the discussion of local problems. General meetings, held in theory once every three months, are rarely forums for the airing of national issues, though attempts to treat them thus are made from time to time by patient party officials. The annual cell assembly is almost invariably confined to a discussion, sometimes sparked by lively but orderly criticism, of the committee's activities during the year.[20] The Orientation officer, in charge of propaganda, receives the party line on national and international issues from the Political Bureau. He transmits it, sometimes through an effective

[19] In theory, the provincial governmental and party structures are distinct hierarchies, with horizontal contacts only between the Governor and the Party Commissioner. In principle, the Governor's Delegates have no contact with the party apparatus. But as one delegate told me in the presence of cell officers whom I was interviewing, "We always work together in our different domains. I consult the cell about my problems, and the cell may consult me about its problems." In practice, too, Delegates are often in contact with higher party officials.

[20] But an exception to this rule that occurred in the assembly of the venerable cell grouping the artisans and businessmen of the *souks* of Tunis was related to me with pride by a higher party official.

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network of trusted militants, but it is never criticized formally in cell meetings. Party communications from above bring to mind the Neo-Destour's independence struggle; they are *mots d'ordre*, to be obeyed like the commands that launched demonstrations against colonialism. The only role permitted to cell members as such in the elaboration of national policy is their ritual agreement at assemblies to send a telegram to President Bourguiba expressing full support for all his policies at home and abroad.

The Neo-Destour cell, in short, unlike the SFIO section, is more a vehicle for the mobilization and education of the masses than a forum for discussing national issues or for proposing national policies. It is not quite democratically elected because the Political Bureau must endorse candidates, and elected officers can be easily removed by their superiors. But in reality, as in all voluntary organizations, there seems to be relatively little turnover of officers. The alternative to the Political Bureau's tutelage would not necessarily be more democratic. Intensified personality and family clashes might threaten the unity of the party, but they would not produce coherent policy alternatives emanating from the cells. Furthermore, the Political Bureau, by the diplomacy of its Commissioners, is in a position to teach diverse cell factions to tolerate one another. While the party structure allows for little cell initiative, party leaders, armed with their unambiguous powers, can afford to encourage the coherent practical initiatives that cells do take. Cell officers acquire the practical arts of democratic leadership, while their activities may in the long run be educating the public in their responsibilities as citizens.

THE PROVINCIAL OFFICES

The substitution of appointed Commissioners for elected federation officers may not be as serious a blow as it seemed to internal democratic growth. Though elected, the old federations were essentially executive arms of the Political Bureau. Furthermore, democratic elections, far from stimulating mobility and the rise of new militants, had acted as a brake. By returning the same old militants to power over the political machines that they had created, the federations encouraged the perpetuation of a parochial leadership more apt to rest on the laurels of independence than to confront the new economic and social problems that independence had brought.

The Commissioners, on the other hand, are able to stimulate new blood by co-opting younger militants for their co-ordinating committees and subcommittees that assist them in working with the cells.

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Young school teachers and former students of French universities have thus been brought into the party apparatus, more often as unpaid militants than as paid officials. The school teachers are especially important, if the party is to take on new life by mobilizing the country for economic development. Yet, working in villages and towns where they were not born, these teachers often cannot be elected to cell committees, for most indigenous members consider them "strangers" even if they are natives of a neighboring village.

Armed with the confidence that the Political Bureau displays in him, the Commissioner is often able to obtain more for the cells under his supervision than might a democratically elected official.[21] In political power the Commissioner of a province ranks second only to the Governor. In constant contact with both cell leaders and the Governor, the Commissioner is able to communicate to the latter the popular demands of the former. Schools, dispensaries, public works, and patronage are accorded priority, when technically feasible, in areas where cells have built up the most political pressure. The Commissioner in large part determines these priorities, in consultation with the Governor. The parallel structure of government and party has at times resulted in serious friction between Governor and Commissioner. But knowledge of the smooth working relationship between the Secretary of the Interior (who is Assistant Secretary-General of the party) and the Political Bureau has generally induced close co-operation. In the two cases since 1959 when friction became unbearable, both Governor and Commissioner were shifted. On the other hand, weak Commissioners whose choice was influenced by the Governor concerned have not lasted.

Though party statutes make no mention of any substitute for the annual federal congresses, provincial offices have developed the practice of holding regular assemblies of party cadres, roughly once every two months. These meetings are typically chaired by a member of the Political Bureau, and include the members of the co-ordinating committee, the cell officers, and some militants especially invited by the Commissioner. While there is no voting, the assembly may discuss substantive political issues. Procedure is flexible. After an opening speech by the member of the Political Bureau, scores of questions on all topics are

[21] Though appointed, the Commissioner and his co-ordinating committee must effectively collaborate with the cells. In a sense they must be more representative than the Governor and his Delegates. During Ramadan in Sousse, for instance, the party officials never dared to smoke or eat in public during the daytime, because public opinion, attached to Ramadan and reflected in the cells, would not have approved. On the other hand, Tunisian government policy since 1960 has been to discourage observance of the month-long fast, and most high government officials in Sousse had no hesitation about smoking in public.

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addressed to him from the floor. There is no attempt to draw any line between a point of information and a substantive grievance. Especially in Tunis, where the cadres are politically sophisticated, such meetings can provide lucid debate on national problems. Constructive criticisms and suggestions to the Political Bureau are encouraged, and discussion can be rational, because party leaders claim no ideological monopoly. When criticized by young intellectuals of the party for lacking a "doctrine," Bourguiba is reported to have told them to go think one out and tell him about it.

While the provincial offices are formally not as "democratic" as the federations used to be, it is not certain that they cannot more effectively educate party cadres in the pursuit of democracy. By being an effective link not only between cells and the Political Bureau but between cells and the governing authorities, the Commissioner is in a position to give the cells lessons in practical responsibility. While pushing for the satisfaction of justified demands, he also explains to cells why some demands cannot be met. He assures a measure of mobility within the party and stimulates the discussion of basic government policies. Though no structures for debate exist formally at the provincial level, the informal meetings of cadres can be equally educational. Fortunately for prospects of democracy in Tunisia, the Commissioners seem to view their task as one of education toward this goal as well as simple administration of a growing party bureaucracy.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

Those who defended the reorganization of the party at the 1959 Congress pointed to the National Council as compensating for the loss of the federations. It was argued that the cells, which would henceforth directly elect a large majority of the National Council's membership, were substantially strengthened.[22]

Before independence the National Council, like its SFIO counterpart, was in fact able at times to exert important influence. Bourguiba used it as a lever upon some of his more moderate colleagues on the Political Bureau in 1938, when he was not the unquestioned Supreme

[22] The Director of the Political Bureau even pointed out at the 1959 Congress that cells could and should, in light of the party reorganization, give delegates specific mandates for National Council and Congress sessions. See *Le Petit Matin* (Tunis), March 5, 1959. The National Council is now theoretically composed of the members of the Political Bureau, the Commissioners, and one cell delegate for every 5,000 members. Previously the National Council had consisted of the members of the Political Bureau, one delegate from each federal executive, and an equal number of members elected by the Congress. These elections were hotly contested in 1955, where 172 candidates ran for 32 seats! See *La Presse* (Tunis), November 20, 1955.

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Combatant which he later became. Between 1949 and 1951 the Council met frequently, and served in 1954 and early 1955 as a substitute for the Congress, which could not be convened after 1952 when the party was forced underground. Especially in 1938 and 1951, the National Council decided important tactical shifts in Neo-Destour relations with France.[23] Even after 1955, when the Council no longer met every three months as the internal statutes of the party dictated, the Political Bureau needed its agreement to a number of decisions.

After the 1959 Congress the National Council did not meet at all,[24] nor was any attempt made in the succeeding two years even to organize the election of its members by the cells. The Political Bureau's procrastination and violation of the party statutes that it itself designed had no readily observable cause. Privately party officials indicated simply that no important problems had arisen that the Political Bureau might usefully put before this body. Clearly they interpreted it as being more a public forum through which party energies might be mobilized than a deliberative body that must meet regularly to check the activities of the Political Bureau. But its failure to meet regularly seems paradoxical in light of the serious efforts undertaken by the Political Bureau and its Commissioners to stimulate discussion in cadres' conferences. The fifty-odd militants whom the cells would elect would not seriously embarrass the Political Bureau in regular Council meetings, while discussions would inject a more democratic atmosphere into the party, and perhaps help to counter some signs of apathy and bureaucratization. A National Council composed of politically sophisticated Destourians might yet give the party a much-needed forum for structured debate on substantive national issues.

THE POLITICAL BUREAU

The Political Bureau, elected by the Party Congress, has always been the party's supreme executive organ. Statutory membership was increased in 1959 from eleven to fifteen, thus ratifying a change that the National Council had already accepted in 1957. The executive powers that the federations once held are now, somewhat increased, in the hands of the Political Bureau and the Commissioners whom it appoints. But since independence the Political Bureau superficially appears to have

[23] See Hedi Nouira, "Le Néo-Destour," *Politique Etrangère*, XIX (July 1954), pp. 317-34.

[24] On November 17, 1961, the Director of the Neo-Destour announced that the National Council would meet sometime in February 1962 to discuss Tunisia's Three-Year Plan, which is designed to be an almost revolutionary innovation in Tunisia's social and economic life.

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concentrated deliberative as well as executive powers. When Party Congresses are not in session, the Political Bureau is the party's only deliberative authority, since the National Council has lost its former importance.

Yet the Political Bureau is clearly not a form of collective leadership, despite the fiction of its collective responsibility. Elected by acclamation at Party Congresses, Bourguiba is more than a first among equals on the Bureau. The inspirational Leader, Bourguiba is also a sufficiently astute politician as not to allow any single lieutenant to become either a potential rival or an obvious successor. The Political Bureau is in practice little more than one of Bourguiba's innumerable vehicles of consultation. However, it meets regularly, once a week when Bourguiba is in town, and contains many of his principal collaborators.[25]

Apart from Bourguiba, the Political Bureau consists of five ministers, including the three most powerful (the Secretary-General of the party, who is Secretary of the Presidency; the Assistant Secretary-General, who is Secretary of the Interior; and Ahmed Ben Salah), the Governor of the Central Bank (another virtual minister), three Ambassadors, the President of the National Assembly, two trade union leaders of the UGTT, a business leader from UTIC, and the Director of the Political Bureau, who as a student was one of the founders of UGET. The last four members are especially significant for assuring that the diverse interests of the Tunisian elite be taken into consideration in all important policy decisions, thus maintaining the party's broadly representative character. Though hardly a cabinet in the British sense, in time of crisis the Political Bureau meets before Bourguiba presides over his infrequently assembled Cabinet of Ministers. The Political Bureau discusses all political problems, ranging from foreign affairs to internal economic or religious issues. Its deliberations are secret and informal, usually taking place over Bourguiba's dinner table. However, the Political Bureau is collectively less important than it might be, because of Bourguiba's presidential style of leadership and because its three ambassadorial members, based overseas, are rarely available, while at least two others are symbols at best. The Neo-Destour Party, as an organization, does not make important decisions for a government servile to its will. Rather, as at the provincial level, party and government co-

[25] In a somewhat unorthodox manner, the Political Bureau decided on November 17, 1961, after expelling one of its members from the party (Masmoudi), to co-opt Ahmed Ben Salah in his place. This decision had the salutary effect of making the Bureau's composition accord with political realities, for since January 1961 Ben Salah had become a virtual super-minister, second in some respects only to Bourguiba. Especially in the all-important economic field, the Political Bureau's discussions may therefore acquire more significance, and Ben Salah, too, may more effectively mobilize the party apparatus for his economic planning by being unequivocably a part of it.

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exist; neither is a dominating center of power. In practice, this means that the technicians in the administration can sometimes overrule the politicians.

But many internal party decisions emanate from four or five key members in the name of the Political Bureau. These decisions do not always affect merely the routine administration of the party. The reorganization of the party, for instance, occurred several months before the Congress had passed corresponding internal statutes. The Political Bureau may sometimes even ignore the statutes, as in its failure to convene a National Council. A speech by Bourguiba calling for a new tactical shift may provide almost the same measure of legitimacy to a decision of the Political Bureau as a Congress could provide. However, far-reaching changes in party policy usually require at least the retroactive political support, if not initiative, that only some larger body can give.

The party bureaucracy, managed for the Political Bureau by its Director, has grown since independence, though not in alarming proportions. Not including the staff of the party newspaper, the work gang "animators,"[26] janitors, and chauffeurs, the bureaucracy has less than one hundred full-time officials and secretaries, spread out over Tunisia's thirteen provinces. Of course, the number would be much larger if it included the many militants holding patronage jobs in public or semi-public organizations who devote much of their time to the party. But bureaucracy is kept to a minimum, and party posts, often demanding a 70-hour week, are hardly sinecures. Aside from the Director and his Commissioners, who constitute the core of the system, the heads of the three central services for youth, orientation, and social revival keep in regular contact through the Commissioners' offices with the cell officers concerned. Unlike similar organizations affiliated with political parties in the West, the Neo-Destour Youth has no autonomy and passes no resolutions. It used to be extremely important as a device for political education and anti-colonialist agitation, and created a legion of loyal militants who after independence were able to constitute the body of the new Tunisian police force and National Guard. Today it theoretically has 80,000 members but has lost considerable dynamism,[27] because

[26] The party decided in early 1960 to create a corps of "animators" to stimulate the 150,000 unemployed unskilled workers whom the government hires at subsistence wages (including supplies of American wheat given to Tunisia) on public works projects. Unlike government foremen, the animators listen to workers' grievances, try to clear up administrative bottlenecks, and try to inculcate on the workers the idealistic notion that they are working for the good of the nation in the struggle against underdevelopment.

[27] The Tunisian government's *Monthly Statistics Bulletin* reported in November 1960 that only 2,383 youths had been directly involved in specific Neo-Destour programs

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it can provide neither the excitement of a continuous independence struggle nor jobs for all the boys. The service for social revival has as its main tasks the general supervision of cell projects, the work of the party animators, and the mobilization of the masses when their cooperation is needed for the success of government projects. The party's orientation service explains national policies and the frequent speeches that Bourguiba gives. It also ensures that every public appearance of the President and other leading figures of the regime takes on the character of a mass plebiscite. In the late summer of 1961 literally thousands of meetings were organized at all levels of the party apparatus in all areas of the country to discuss the sensitive problems raised by the July Bizerte crisis and the new policy of state planning and "Neo-Destour socialism." Possibly the highly efficient apparatus of mass propaganda saved the regime after the shock of the Bizerte massacre, when Bourguiba's infallibility was disproved for many Tunisians. Certainly the apparatus strongly contributed to the widespread—if not total—acceptance of Neo-Destour socialism.

The line between administration and policy is necessarily vague. But the structure of the Neo-Destour in practice accentuates this vagueness, by allowing the more powerful members of the Political Bureau great latitude. What is perhaps more disturbing for prospects of democracy in Tunisia is the apparent absence within the ranks of the Neo-Destour of articulate doubts about its procedures at higher levels, for everyone agrees without trying to define their terms that a strong central power is needed in Tunisia today. The strongly concentrated power is moderately exercised to conciliate the various economic interests of the otherwise homogeneous elite, but anyone in the party who publicly asks basic questions about this strong central power and its possible dangers apparently runs the risk of being purged from the party.[28]

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during 1959. It was perhaps these statistics that impelled Bourguiba on March 30, 1961, to devote a whole speech to the problems of youth organizations, in which he found the level of participation to be abysmal. In the summer of 1961, however, roughly 10,000 Neo-Destour youths participated as "volunteers" in the party's catastrophic campaign to force the evacuation of the French bases at Bizerte. It was said that some 3,000 were killed or wounded in the one-sided four-day battle.

[28] The October 7, 1961, issue of *Afrique-Action*, a weekly paper run by Neo-Destour sympathizers, carried an editorial about personal power. It was universally attributed to Mohamed Masmoudi, the newspaper's political patron, who though a member of the Political Bureau had just been dismissed by Bourguiba from his government job as Secretary of Information. Though speaking in general terms of the type of regime headed by leaders like Bourguiba, de Gaulle, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Fidel Castro, and Houphouet Boigny, the article was interpreted by the Neo-Destour as a personal attack against Bourguiba and the Tunisian system rather than an exercise in political science. On November 17, after being attacked in the Neo-Destour press and

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THE CONGRESS

The National Congress, composed of cell committee delegates, is in theory the supreme authority of the party. Since 1959 it is supposed to meet every three rather than every two years, but in fact the Neo-Destour has held only four real congresses in twenty-seven years: in 1934, 1937, 1955, and 1959. The two other ostensible congresses of 1948 and 1952 met clandestinely. Before each National Congress the cells are given at least a month in which to study the reports that the Political Bureau plans to deliver to the Congress, so that in theory basic policy issues can be intelligently discussed by Congress delegates.

In practice, the Congress is a demonstration of national solidarity rather than a forum for the articulation and structuring of differences that may divide the party. Voting is usually unanimous on resolutions. The procedure for electing the Political Bureau not only emphasizes the prestige of the Leader, who is elected separately, but mitigates divisions within the party by obliging candidates to present themselves individually on the same list rather than on separate lists. Only the popularity of diverse shifting cliques within the party can be calculated, on the basis of the number of votes received by each candidate. However, Congresses are democratic in two senses. The number of candidates for the Political Bureau exceeds the number of seats, so that elections are not entirely predictable. Secondly, both in Congress Commissions and in plenary, debate is apt to be extremely lively. The Congress stresses a solidarity of equals; the lowliest delegate may grill a minister with embarrassing questions and criticisms, for all are equal in their role as militants; only Bourguiba is the untouchable Father at these grand family reunions.

Decision-making in the party is not democratic, but Congresses have an undeniably democratic atmosphere. In 1959 the Congress Commissions played a less important role than in 1955. On the other hand, the six-hour report delivered by the Secretary-General to the Congress in 1959 was greeted with discussion and criticism that lasted into the night and continued during the following morning and afternoon sessions, before the report was unanimously accepted by the Congress. During the full day of debate, six ministerial members of the Political Bureau

in cadres' conferences, Masmoudi was expelled from the Political Bureau and from the party. Bourguiba explained the action of the Political Bureau to the Tunisian public on the following day. He argued that Masmoudi should have expressed his opinions frankly within party organs rather than in public. Interpreting Masmoudi's article personally, Bourguiba, the other members of the Political Bureau, and many party cadres believed that Masmoudi was guilty of breaking party discipline.

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answered batteries of questions from the delegates. Debate covered all important government policies and many specific problems. The Congress afterward more rapidly acquiesced to the Director's report, which explained the reasons for the reorganization of the party that the Political Bureau had already executed. But on the following day the new internal statutes reflecting these changes were passed only after "laborious" discussion.[29]

Like the congresses of most mass parties with ostensibly democratic structures, the congresses of the Neo-Destour are in theory its supreme authority but in practice exert little effective power. Within limits that only the future can reveal, Neo-Destour delegates seem willing to pass any resolution that is actively supported by leaders known to have Bourguiba's blessing. But the Neo-Destour's emphasis on national solidarity, and even the automatic cheers of any assembly of party members in response to the mere mention of Bourguiba's name, should not blind the observer to the democratic traditions engrained in the party. Unlike those of Communist congresses, debates and votes are not artificial displays; surprises occur,[30] though Bourguiba himself is criticized only indirectly through attacks on his ministers or close collaborators. The Neo-Destour Congress, though it may meet only four or five days every three or four years, gives party directives their legitimacy in the eyes of many militants. The give and take of plenary debate sets the tone of political behavior when the Congress is not in session. Despite its brevity, the National Congress is the Neo-Destour's most important focal point of Tunisia's new political traditions of spontaneous debate and criticism of authority.

Some conclusions emerge about the changing structure of the Neo-Destour that are significant for evaluating prospects for democracy in Tunisia. They may also help to elucidate the nature of the ruling national party, though it is dangerous to generalize from one example.

After six years of independence, the structure of the Neo-Destour has evolved clearly, and not in a liberal democratic direction. Though the cells remain relatively democratic, a handful of party leaders have effectively consolidated their control over the whole party apparatus. The mechanism increasingly has become an instrument for executing orders from above rather than a hierarchy of deliberative bodies for the articulation of representative opinion from below. An authoritarian trend has been reflected also in the increasing political monopoly that the

[29] See *Le Petit Matin*, March 4-5, 1959.

[30] One of Bourguiba's closest younger collaborators, for instance, was not re-elected to the Political Bureau in 1959.

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Neo-Destour acquired after independence, when all political centers independent of party and government were eliminated. But it would be misleading to conclude that the Neo-Destour, which resembled the SFIO on the eve of independence, is being transformed into a totalitarian party.

The Neo-Destour, even if it once formally resembled the SFIO, is clearly not and never was a constitutional mass party. In one important respect it is closer to the SFIO now than before independence. Its cells are no longer semi-clandestine centers of anti-colonial agitation; rather they are openly elected public centers of political education. But internal party democracy is even more of a myth in the Neo-Destour than in the SFIO, despite the fact that internal democracy would more readily correspond to democratic constitutional values in a preponderant party than in a party that from time to time shares governmental power and public responsibility with other parties. Apart from the triennial Congress, the Neo-Destour has no deliberative body that can effectively debate national issues and criticize the Political Bureau. It has no formal or informal structures that can channel the sporadic criticisms heard at cadres' conferences and congresses into competing policy alternatives. All important decisions are instead made by a self-perpetuating oligarchy, checked only by an amenable Congress that rarely meets.

But the Neo-Destour deviates almost equally from the Communist model. Before independence, the goal of liberation served as a substitute for ideology in capturing the minds and entire lives of the many cadres devoted to the liberation struggle. With independence, total personal engagement has withered away. Those who have remained or become devoted to the party have acquired a Bourguibist outlook, which is the negation of undiscriminating total engagement in any doctrine or organization and an acceptance of complexity and diversity, brought out by constant discussion at all party levels. Membership seems more genuinely voluntary than in totalitarian parties. The masses are not forced to join the party, and as dropping membership claims since 1958 suggest, membership is no longer as essential to the common man as in 1956 for the satisfaction of personal needs, such as a job or education for one's children, because the state apparatus, strengthened in 1958 at the expense of the party, tends toward greater impartiality. For the educated elite, too, party membership is no longer as essential even for a successful government career, and, conversely, opportunists in the party are discouraged by the perceptive Commissioners.

Cell activities emphasize personal initiative, not blind obedience. Horizontal contacts between cells are encouraged, not prohibited. The

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Neo-Destour remains a genuinely popular party, and its ideology, unlike a totalitarian one, could not justify systematic repression or vast purges. The party's leadership is open to new ideas and even to new leaders on intermediate levels, for it knows that it does not have the absolute answer to all of Tunisia's problems. If orders and most initiative come from above, the Political Bureau and its Commissioners are constantly attempting to stimulate more initiative from below and to train new cadres. Party meetings are constant experiments and retain their spontaneity, unlike Communist congresses. The Director of the Political Bureau, in charge of party administration, exerts significant power, but it belongs mainly to the older men on the Political Bureau. Intellectually rather embarrassed by its monopoly, the Neo-Destour has not made a cult of single-party dictatorship.

It is perhaps easier to conclude what the Neo-Destour is not than what it is. But some traits of this national party emerge. Maintaining a structure distinct from that of the government, the Neo-Destour is constantly trying to educate the population in the principles of Bourguibism, and to transform people into citizens. It maintains the cohesion of the new nation's elite. It mobilizes the energies of the population in practical projects that party and government decide upon. It acts as the link between the population and the government. It collaborates with the government in decision-making. It encourages cadres in the exercise of their local responsibilities. Despite a paternalistic structure, the Neo-Destour in fact remains representative of the nation, because its leadership strives to maintain the popularity of the party as if a powerful opposition existed.

Though not ideally democratic in structure, the Neo-Destour both in theory and in practice gives its hundreds of thousands of members and militants an effective political education. It is much more than a disseminator of government propaganda because it has a life of its own. Almost any Tunisian citizen can be a Destour militant, and one man out of every four joins the party. Congresses emphasize the equality of all militants and the right of each to criticize and to convince others of his point of view. The habitual conferences of cadres are rehearsals of congresses and teach the same lessons. The cells, tutored by generally dedicated Commissioners, encourage not only local political initiative but the general acceptance of certain democratic procedures for arriving at concrete decisions. A powerful machine that, by persuasion rather than force, is stimulating the general sharing of national purposes, the Neo-Destour also seems a training ground for possible democracy in the future, the outlines of which cannot yet be perceived.

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SOVIET RUSSIA AS A MODEL FOR UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

By W. DONALD BOWLES*

A WAVE of rising expectations has engulfed the underdeveloped areas of the world, and in its wake there remains an intense desire for economic advancement and national recognition. Until recent years the relatively luxurious level of living in the West, particularly in the United States, served as a natural focal point in the search for a pattern of economic life that would lead to growth in these areas. Since World War II, and particularly since about 1955, when the USSR adopted a stepped-up "trade and aid" program among the less-developed areas, increasing attention has been directed to the Soviet pattern of growth and the Soviet answer to "imperialism."

It is now being suggested by some that the USSR is a more appropriate model for underdeveloped areas than is the United States. Several obvious considerations may in part explain this shift. For example, the present rate of growth of Soviet gross national product is somewhere between 6 and 8 per cent per annum, or more than twice that of the United States. Individual levels of consumption in many items are now approaching levels comparable to those of Western Europe. The Soviet citizen can be seen going about his work with relative contentment and with pride in his country. On top of all this, the USSR is assuming a course of political independence that only a powerful nation can pursue fruitfully for long. Briefly, there seems to be ample reason why the Soviet Union might be considered as a model for underdeveloped nations today. However, it is the thesis of the present article that in fact the USSR provides a most unsatisfactory model for nations interested in rapid economic development.

In one sense it is surprising that the question of the Soviet model should even be raised. By 1913, Russia was a nation with a substantial industrial sector and a respectable rate of overall growth. It was a major trading nation and had already received relatively large amounts of foreign capital. Moreover, the area abounded in natural resources. In short, the country taken over by the new Bolshevik regime simply was not in the same economic class as the countries we today label "underdeveloped."

* I am indebted to Lynn Turgeon for helpful comments on the manuscript. Responsibility for the views expressed below, of course, rests with me alone.

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This qualification aside, in examining the relevance of the Soviet model we shall focus on four of the more important problems that typically emerge today as an underdeveloped country attempts to accumulate capital and begins to move forward economically: the problems associated with population size or increase, inflation, balance-of-payments difficulties, and social and economic dislocations associated with institutional changes. Our appeal here is neither to Russian area specialists nor to economists concentrating on questions of growth (to whom much of the material presented will be familiar, although further mutual understanding may be hoped for). Rather, the article is directed to that larger group of non-specialists in fields peripheral to these disciplines. For this reason, the use of technical jargon is minimized, long elliptical footnotes are generally avoided, and specific source references, except in special cases, are not indicated.

I. Population Problems

Since Malthus, students the world around have compared the "arithmetic" growth of food supply with the more rapid "geometric" increase of population. The relationship cast in this crude mold has been abandoned by most modern demographers and economists. Yet, when this hoary proposition is criticized, a caveat is frequently uttered: perhaps Malthus really had something to say in relation to the underdeveloped areas of today. Ignoring possible traces of the concept of the "white man's burden" in this position, one can admit the existence of a phenomenon of fearful potential. For several reasons, there is a likelihood of substantial population increases in the foreseeable future in the very areas now attempting rapid economic growth. The tragic possibility exists in many such countries that the two conditions—rapid population increase and economic growth—may be mutually exclusive.

Two varieties of the "population problem" can be found in what are here characterized as the less-developed areas. Some countries, like Venezuela and Mexico (with an annual growth of about 3 per cent), do not presently have large populations in relation to resources, but these populations are growing rapidly. In others, like India and China, rates of growth are less of a problem than the already existing density of population. In either case, population pressures are a constant threat to the success of any attempt to carry out a development program. The essential nature of the difficulty may be illustrated by a simple arithmetic example. If the so-called incremental capital-output ratio may be assumed to approximate 4:1 (i.e., four dollars spent on new capital yielding one dollar of additional output), then a 1 per cent increase in

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per capita output requires a rate of saving of 4 per cent *if* the population remains stable. However, if the population is growing at, say, a rate of 2 per cent annually, a rate of saving of 12 per cent is required to achieve a 1 per cent annual increase in per capita output.

While this formulation is useful primarily to indicate the nature of the question raised rather than precise magnitudes, it does suggest two possibilities. The effort needed in the typical underdeveloped country to achieve an annual rate of saving sufficient to expand the capital on hand for further production is exceedingly burdensome and in many cases impossible to achieve. Similarly, there is the additional disturbing probability that a successfully initiated development program will soon encounter a rising rate of population increase (resulting primarily from a drop in the death rate), so that the rate of saving must be stepped up even more to retain the level of saving achieved initially. In brief, in countries with high rates of population growth, the rate of savings must be very high. In countries suffering from high density of population, while the rate of saving required to increase per capita levels of income may be somewhat less, it is all the more difficult to set aside *any* current income for capital accumulation.

The Soviet experience with the population issue is interesting on both counts. Officially in the USSR there can never be a "population problem," since this is considered to be a manifestation of capitalist infirmity.[1] Fortunately, the uselessness of this dogma for understanding Soviet reality is compensated for by the known facts regarding Soviet population. By 1928, the year in which the First Five-Year Plan was begun, production levels had recovered from the shambles of "war communism" (the period of civil war and foreign intervention) and climbed back to their prewar heights, stimulated in large measure by the adoption of the "New Economic Policy" in the early 1920's. In that decade, population increased by about 1.8 per cent annually, a rate that had characterized tsarist Russia from the turn of the century to 1914. With the initiation of rapid industrialization, collectivization, and the widespread and important institutional changes of the late 1920's and the 1930's, the birth rate decreased and the death rate rose, at least in several individual years. Over the period 1928-1939, the average annual rate of increase was only about 1.2 per cent. Following World War II, the rate of increase rose sharply, today averaging 1.6 per cent annually.

[1] According to the official Soviet textbook on political economy, "The misanthropic Malthusian 'theory' was created for the purpose of justifying the social order in which the parasitism and extravagance of the exploitative classes thrive on the inordinate labor and the growing privation of broad masses of workers." *Politicheskaia ekonomiia* (Political economy), Moscow, 1954, p. 299.

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The rate of economic growth since 1928 compares favorably with increases in population since that year, and presently it is about 6-8 per cent. A particularly large share of the production pie is taken over for non-consumption purposes in the Soviet Union, but, even so, neither population size nor its rate of increase has ever become a "threat" to economic growth. By the late 1930's, the share of gross national product allocated to household consumption had been reduced rather sharply, although per capita consumption suffered less because total production was increasing rapidly. Preparation for war and the vast economic dislocations occurring during the war led to a general decline, so that by 1953 individual levels of consumption apparently were again comparable to those existing in the late 1920's. Since the war, the level of living has improved continuously; over the period 1951-1955, for example, consumption by civilian households increased almost four times in excess of the rate of population increase.

In brief, the level of Soviet production increased at a sufficiently rapid pace to permit consumption levels to hold up fairly well (ignoring the war period), simultaneously with a relatively high rate of capital accumulation (the ratio of investment to gross product). Presently the rate of gross investment is 25-30 per cent (no allowance being made for replacement of capital). If defense is included, then the "rate of non-consumption" approximates 35-40 per cent of national income.

The crucial importance of these facts is clear. The typical underdeveloped area possesses an economy dominated by crude methods of agricultural production and a limited resource base. As a consequence, low levels of per capita production exist. In turn, it is impossible to allocate sufficient quantities of current production to the creation of capital goods by which to raise productivity and income in future years. Even in some of the less-developed areas possessing important raw materials that find acceptance in world markets, the sheer number of persons to be fed, clothed, and housed virtually exhausts gross national product. In contrast, once the Soviet economy had regained the levels of tsarist production by 1938, the regime was able actually to *reduce* the share of total output allocated to consumption, and to maintain the resulting higher rates of expenditures for investment and defense.

Any country that is able to set aside a third of its production each year for non-consumption purposes is a relatively wealthy country in terms of per capita levels of production. The implication is that such a country is not overpopulated in terms of its resource and technological potential, and that annual production increases are significantly well ahead of annual increases in population. Had World War II not intervened,

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Soviet population would today approach 300 million rather than the present figure of 216 million. Under that circumstance, it is conceivable that "population pressure" would have been felt by the regime and a different official attitude toward population problems would have evolved. As it turned out, however, the Soviet Union was (and is) in a class apart, in this sense, from the typical underdeveloped country.

II. Inflation

"Pure inflation" is a term used to define a situation in which levels of production remain unchanged as prices rise. The more prevalent pattern, however, is a price rise associated with *some* production increase. Inflation is a characteristic of most underdeveloped areas as they attempt accelerated economic growth. While economists enjoy some agreement on desirable principles of monetary and fiscal policy under these circumstances (managing the money supply, taxing and spending, and changing the public debt), suggestions as to specific policy applications amount to about one per economist. A recent study indicates, however, that the difficulties encountered in this regard in less-developed areas are not centered about small, technical differences of professional opinion. Rather, they generally arise from the crude fact that a given government attempts to spend at a level too far above its income. In many years in the postwar period, the deficits in such countries often represented from 10 to 20 per cent of total expenditures. Thus, these governments, in the absence of a suitable taxing and borrowing policy, have tried to bid resources away from the private sector for developmental and other purposes. The following results of such a policy invariably occur: wages and the prices of other factors rise, and consumer goods' prices increase as the increased incomes (resulting from higher wages) are used to purchase a constant or possibly contracted supply of consumption goods.

The problem, phrased in this manner, implies its own solutions: either (1) lower government expenditures, thus probably reducing the rate of capital accumulation and growth; (2) raise taxes; or (3) achieve a rise in voluntary saving. The first solution lies outside the major premise that there *will* be accelerated economic growth. The other two solutions beg the question. Per capita annual income in 1954-1956, according to a U.N. study, approximated $50 in Burma, $65 in India, and $120 in Peru, to select some underdeveloped areas at random, while in the United States it was almost $2,000. Obtaining a significant amount of voluntary saving from such low income levels is a difficult practical matter, to put it conservatively. By the same token, but for

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other reasons also, increased taxes are often not possible. Thus governments, in their anxiety to move forward, allow their revenues to lag behind their expenditures and the inevitable result, ignoring the possibility of price control and rationing ("repressed inflation"), is inflation.

What is there in the Soviet experience that may provide guidance to the underdeveloped regions in this matter? Initially, it must be noted once again that Soviet experience is not strictly comparable to that of most underdeveloped countries. From the beginning of the Soviet planning era, per capita income was sufficiently high to afford at least the physical possibility of increasing the rate of investment and maintaining the higher rate. Despite the low propensity to save that characterizes Soviet citizens, the government has possessed several well-known sources of revenue that are available only to a totalitarian regime. Broadly speaking, such revenues fall into two groups: forced saving and forced taxes (forced in the sense of not having been levied by a democratic representative government). In the first instance, government bonds have been purchased largely on an obligatory basis, the payments in some cases being automatically deducted from the worker's wage. Although revenue from bond sales was less than 10 per cent of total budget revenue, in individual cases the value of the bonds purchased sometimes amounted to about a month's wage per year. In 1957, bond sales, which might more appropriately be labeled taxes, were abolished for the most part, and simultaneously a moratorium was declared on the payment of outstanding principal and interest.[2] In addition to forced bond sales, the Soviet Union has levied an income tax. This, too, has been a minor source of revenue. In his farewell speech in the United States in 1959, Premier Khrushchev stated, "In the near future we are going to abolish—and I mean abolish—all taxation of the people—and I think you will appreciate the significance of this step." What this amounts to, of course, is that the Soviet government will no longer toy with such minor sources of revenue as the income tax and bond sales, but will instead concentrate on bigger game—namely, the turnover (excise) tax and deductions from "profits" of state enterprises.

In the underdeveloped areas the complex problem remains of finding methods to transfer an increasing share of total national output from the consumer to the government without running afoul of inflation. Although control over the price level has been achieved since the late 1940's, it seems clear that the Soviet Union is perhaps one of the world's

[2] Actually, until the late postwar period the price level was rising so rapidly that the effective rate of interest was negative.

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least instructive examples of how to achieve rapid economic development without inflation. To be sure, this is not to say that such development actually can or cannot be achieved without inflation, but merely to emphasize that the Soviet Union has not done so.[3]

Although there is yet much to learn on the subject, the broad pattern of Soviet inflation is relatively clear. With the onset of planning in 1928, high production goals were established, based on planned increases in the labor force and in labor productivity. The latter, in turn, were to result from making increased and improved plant and equipment available to the workers. As it turned out, many of the key production targets were not met, and productivity gains failed to materialize as planned. In the face of these facts, the individual enterprise managers, in their struggle to meet production targets, began to bid up wages in the hope of attracting a sharply increased supply of workers. If it seems surprising that in a "planned economy" managers should have excess funds for such purposes, the answer lies in the inadequate control possessed by central banking authorities over the wage funds in their charge. In many cases, the inflated supply of such funds made it possible for managers to bid against each other, so that wages rose considerably, perhaps by as much as a 1000 per cent over the period 1928-1953.

Until the late 1930's an "open market" in labor was maintained, which meant that individuals sought out their own jobs and employers found workers by offering them favorable material inducements, primarily wages. ("Forced labor" obviously is not included in this group.) A good case can be made for the position that the central authorities tolerated—indeed, condoned—illegal wage payments even if they resulted in a rapidly rising price level. After all, the increases served to create the illusion of improving levels of living, in the face of sharp rises in living costs—thus keeping established industrial workers contented and attracting new workers from the countryside. Also, such wage increases had some propaganda value abroad in the absence of published statistics on price levels. In addition to wage increases, a second factor explaining the rise in prices was the increase in the rate of non-consumption expenditures by the state during most of the 1930's

[3] This is an important qualification. In many underdeveloped areas, an investment program cannot be achieved except through government channels. This means that the government must find a way to mobilize a significant share of national income. Conceptually, the upper limit of the share is what the people can or are willing to do without. Some years ago, Colin Clark expounded the thesis that any country with a tax load of more than 25 per cent of its national income would suffer from inflation. His thesis, while provocative, yet awaits proof.

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(investment, social security, military expenditures), which created purchasing power without concurrent creation of purchasable consumer goods.

The factors noted thus far are, of course, familiar components of a "demand-pull" inflation in which, in the classic formulation, too much money chases too few goods. There was one additional feature of the Soviet scene, however, that contributed to the sharp rise in prices—namely, the system of taxation employed to generate savings, given the precondition that an open market for consumer goods was to prevail after 1935. Maintenance of an open market requires that the prices established must just clear the market. With purchasing power expanding rapidly, and not siphoned off to the state treasury through a direct income tax, prices were forced up on the limited supply of consumer goods. The major source of revenue was (and is) the turnover tax, which is levied at a primary phase of production or procurement (today, mainly on consumer goods). Prior to 1935, and again in the late 1930's, this tax as a percentage of consumer goods' prices rose rapidly on the average, indicating that the difference between consumer purchasing power and the value of consumer goods' production at cost was being absorbed through increased taxes. Inasmuch as the tax is included as part of the price, prices similarly rose. However, from the late 1930's until 1949, the year of the first and major postwar wholesale price reform, rising wage costs and stepped-up rates of non-consumption expenditures played a relatively more important role in the process of inflation.[4]

Now, for countries seeking a method of growth that will permit relatively stable price levels, the Soviet experience represents only a chaotic, apparently unplanned development which, in fact, was accompanied by severe inflation. It might be asked at this point: does this really matter? High growth rates were actually achieved, and the economy simply accommodated the inflation. At present, price levels are relatively constant or falling, which itself seems to indicate that there was, after all, always the possibility of bringing inflation under control when the central authorities believed it had served its purpose. It is impossible, of course, to give a clear-cut answer to this contention.

[4] Primary reference here is to prices of consumer goods sold in state stores, most of which originated in the non-industrial sector of the economy. The demand by Soviet enterprises for producer goods was controlled more directly by the state. Thus, the more than doubling of producer goods' prices in the prewar period was attributable to wage increases that outpaced the rise in industrial labor poductivity. To some extent, the price line was held through the use of grants directly from the budget (subsidies) to make up the difference between cost and planned price.

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At the same time, it should be noted that central authorities in most underdeveloped areas today cannot tolerate inflation of the Soviet type even for a year, and certainly not for the length of time permissible in the USSR.

The reasons are simple but fundamental. Inflation exacerbates many of the problems that need to be overcome if a low income level is to be raised over time. Saving, of course, is the heart of growth, and inflation reduces the level of voluntary saving, inasmuch as people are reluctant to see the value of their money claims depressed as prices soar. Because of the limited taxing and borrowing capacity of governments in the less-developed areas, the elimination of all voluntary saving would spell disaster for many development plans. Moreover, even if some voluntary savings persist, they tend to flow in the direction of assets that are resistant to value erosion (e.g., hoards of precious metals, land, materials, stocks, etc.), rather than into plant and equipment in search of high returns related to high productivity.

If these were the only difficulties encountered in the process of inflation—and they are not—then perhaps it might seem to leaders of underdeveloped areas that, while inflation is awkward, it is perhaps possible to muddle through, and that growth will still be possible. Regrettably, such is not the case. The Soviet economy could tolerate inflation because of the existence of a strong central government that could force the necessary rate of saving to a relatively high level. At the same time, dependence on the world economy was greatly reduced, owing to the potentialities for development found within the domestic economy. Neither of these situations exists in most of the economically backward areas today. Strong central governments are typically absent. Also, for better or worse, the underdeveloped areas are presently wedded to the rest of the world through economic necessity—the need for new capital, essential manufactured consumer goods, raw materials and, in some cases, food. Such ties—certainly such ties with the West—would disintegrate under the conditions of inflation described above, and along with them any hopes for significant economic advancement. Inflation caused no external problems for the Soviet Union, because early in its history a policy of economic isolation was adopted, a matter to which we now turn.

III. Balance-of-Payments Problems

To understand the crucial and reciprocal influence of the balance of payments on the internal economic life of a country, it is useful to concentrate on the intimate relationship of the level of national income,

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the foreign trade balance, and the rate of exchange. These factors may be thought of as three marbles in a bowl—the movement of one will have an immediate effect on the position of the other two. Let us assume initially that a certain underdeveloped country embarks on a development program. Further, assume that the program is initiated by a grant from abroad, to be spent partly on domestic labor used in the construction of "social overhead capital," and partly on the importation of material and skills essential to these projects that are not obtainable locally. As domestic wage payments increase, total spending on locally produced goods rises. The supply of such purchasable goods, however, has increased only slightly,[5] with the result that prices are bid up. As prices increase, there is heightened impetus to import from countries abroad, since foreign prices become more attractive in direct proportion to the degree of local inflation. Similarly, but for reasons not related simply to price changes, as domestic incomes rise, imports tend to follow along, illustrating what the economist calls their functional relationship to domestic income.

Local inflationary pressure is thus transmitted to the balance of payments. Possibly a light industry established under the development program might produce for export and thus provide a source of foreign exchange with which to purchase additional imports or repay the loan. Its effectiveness for this purpose may be partially or entirely offset by price rises that render the exports non-competitive in world markets. Under these conditions, local demand for foreign currency will exceed the supply, and pressure will begin to build up on the rate of exchange, resulting in a fall in the price of local currency in terms of other currencies. If the country has large foreign debts that must be serviced each year in foreign currency—and this is typically the case in underdeveloped areas—the depreciation means in effect that a larger quantity of real goods and services must be exported each year to facilitate the unchanged annual money payment. Another adverse effect of the depreciation is that it dries up new sources of foreign capital at the very moment when they are most needed—i.e., when imports are running high and exports are lagging.[6]

In an effort to control inflation and the associated balance-of-pay-

[5] Construction of hospitals, water supplies, schools, etc., creates purchasing power, but the services thus available are provided free or at nominal cost.

[6] Long-term foreign capital, unless there are strong incentives to the contrary, is discouraged by the lack of profit predictability under such conditions. Short-term capital actually moves out of the country under inconvertible currency standards as local speculators sell their own currency, which further increases pressure on the exchange rate, as long as it is believed that the rate will continue to fall.

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ments difficulties, it has been the practice of most trading countries of the world since the 1930's to impose direct controls over external economic affairs—namely, import restrictions, export subsidies, and exchange controls. The effects of the first two actions are, respectively, to reduce the local demand for foreign currency and to increase the local supply of foreign currency. The imposition of exchange control takes a different form in each country, but generally a central authority "mobilizes" all foreign exchange accruing to its citizens and "rations" it out to those who wish to import. The economic isolation permitted a country by virtue of its adoption of exchange control has the general effect of excluding or reducing the importation of commodities considered unessential to the development program (French perfume, for example), and of simultaneously encouraging exports to regions that provide badly needed quantities of foreign exchange.

Exchange control is a basic fact of life in the international economy today. At the same time, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) contains provisions that encourage the elimination of such controls at the earliest possible date in all circumstances, for the reason, long recognized by Western economists, that world production is maximized by an international division of labor on the principle of comparative advantage. One of the exceptions permitted in the GATT regulation, however, is the case where such controls may be justified because of an economic development program in progress. This bow in the direction of reality by the framers of the provision is an indication that no magic formulas exist to exorcise these balance-of-payments difficulties; rather, they must be removed by what is typically a painful and protracted operation. In this light we may evaluate Soviet experience as a guide for the underdeveloped areas.

The period following the Russian Revolution was characterized by chaos and destruction, and over the years this situation was reflected in a heavy net import balance. During the period 1918-1922, imports exceeded exports by about six times. This deficit was financed by gold and the remaining foreign-exchange assets of the previous regime, and by relief from abroad. A catch phrase of the time was "mobilization of savings." In the international sphere this was carried out in several ways. A major step was the repudiation by the new regime of both external and internal debts, as well as the nationalization of large-scale enterprises, foreign-owned and domestic. Also, travel abroad by Soviet citizens was limited except for official purposes, and this was looked upon as a great step forward in husbanding precious supplies of foreign exchange. Similarly, so-called "luxury imports" were eliminated.

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It was in this early period, allegedly, that Soviet leaders evolved the concept that economic development could derive solely from internal resources. Disregarding the inconsistency between this concept and the nationalization of foreign property and repudiation of foreign debts, it would seem that the powers of the Soviet economy to develop from internal resources were discovered only gradually and empirically, so to speak. Lenin, for example, believed that the Soviet Union might not even be able to recover, let alone expand, without foreign help. To this end he apparently took the lead in considering an expansion of foreign concessions in the USSR in the early 1920's. Also, many economists of the period felt that the financial requirements of economic development would be so great as to compel the use of foreign capital.[7] By the 1930's, however, the official position had crystallized about the concept of self-sufficiency, and economists were criticized for their earlier attitude.

During the second half of the 1920's, the Soviet Union again faced a balance-of-payments problem and an attempt was made to expand exports while simultaneously stabilizing imports at approximately their 1925 level. Writers of the subsequent decade give the impression that 1925 was an important turning point in Soviet external relations. From that time, greater selectivity was applied to imports, so that by 1928 the slogan "metals and machines" was said to characterize the import structure. Interestingly, the term "self-sufficiency" never has been much used in Soviet literature to describe the limitation and selectivity that were applied to imports. Rather, the honorific phrase "technico-economic independence" forms the basis of the rationalization of a policy which, when practiced by Nazi Germany, Soviet writers scornfully labeled "autarky."

[7] The international negotiations conducted by the Soviet Union in the 1920's indicate that foreign capital was welcome. After Lenin's overtures in regard to foreign concessions, the Soviet government in October 1921 expressed its readiness to open discussions on the tsarist foreign debt as a prelude to the receipt of new direct investment in the form of concessions. (Interestingly, the Soviet attitude at that time was different from that of underdeveloped countries today, which generally favor loans rather than direct investment so as to minimize "foreign control." One may speculate that the Soviet position was conditioned by the tactical consideration that foreign venture capital might be attracted in the direct form even while unconditional repudiation of the tsarist debt remained.) In 1922 at the Genoa Conference, and later at the Hague, Soviet delegates offered what they apparently thought were strong incentives for credit relations. For many reasons, delegates of the Allies did not accept Soviet terms, and the Soviet Union entered a period of what has been called the "credit blockage." Despite the breakdown of credit negotiations, foreign concessions became fairly numerous, although such enterprises never produced a significant share of national income. At the same time, from 1923 on, short-term commercial credits were extended to the USSR. Although no foreign government provided funds, after 1926 several governments established programs guaranteeing commercial credits extended to the Soviet Union.

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In the First Five-Year Plan, foreign trade was assigned a rather ambiguous role. On the one hand, imports were to remain highly selective and limited, so that there would be a net export balance and the limited imports would provide the greatest possible stimulant to growth. In the same plan, curiously, there was provision for net receipt of foreign capital. The obvious inconsistency between the net receipt of foreign capital and a net export balance apparently was not immediately evident to Soviet planners.[8] Or, perhaps the political requirements of this period impelled writers and planners to prepare for the best of both possible worlds.

Plans to the contrary, substantial foreign credits did not materialize, and a stable net export surplus was not achieved until 1933. Herein lies the oft-told tale of the difficulty experienced by the Soviet Union in connection with short-term commercial debts, which totaled 1.4 billion gold rubles by the end of 1931. In the Soviet view, the heart of the difficulty was the "capitalist instability" that led to the collapse of the international economy in the 1930's, with its particularly disastrous effect on the prices of primary products—that is, on precisely those products that weighed heavily in the Soviet export balance. Apparently, the central planners had not considered world market prices in their foreign trade plan, and the planned supply of Soviet exports was initially rather inelastic. In the face of declining world demand, the terms of trade turned sharply against the USSR. By 1932 a unit of exports on the average would purchase in the world market only about three-fourths of what it would buy in 1929. Subsequent to 1932, Soviet terms of trade improved.[9] Lacking the possibility of short-term extensions or additional receipts of short-term credit, and to avoid defaulting, the Soviet Union took the only step possible—namely, it began to curtail imports and eventually, to avoid continued selling in a depressed world market, to curtail exports as well. After 1931, both exports and imports declined, but imports fell more than exports, with the result that a net export balance was finally achieved in 1933. By 1934 the physical volume of Soviet exports was 3 per cent above the 1929 level, whereas the volume of imports was about one-half that of 1929.

The restoration of the Soviet balance-of-payments equilibrium was achieved in this fashion—by curtailing imports, by the sale of gold

[8] A net export balance in effect means that the rest of the world is incurring a debt to the exporting country, i.e., that the exporting country is granting, not receiving, credit abroad.

[9] The greatly reduced prices of Soviet exports at this time led many Western observers to label Soviet shipments abroad as "dumping," although sufficient evidence never existed to support such a charge technically.

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abroad until as late as 1935, and by maintaining exports until the crisis had passed. The adjustment process was much less painful than it might have been for two main reasons. First, although it is statistically difficult to make accurate estimates, at the peak of foreign trade participation in 1930 Soviet exports accounted for less than 5 per cent of gross production. The Soviet Union was, in a word, lightly involved in world trade, whereas many underdeveloped countries regularly export far more than 5 per cent of their total production. Second, the adjustment process was greatly facilitated by sheer good fortune. The Soviet trade pattern in this period was essentially that inherited from the tsarist era, and luckily the traditional Soviet export surplus was with countries that did not resort to foreign trade controls, or that did so very late (e.g., England). In contrast, the large Soviet import surplus was with Germany, the first to resort to severe limitations of convertibility. The result of this distribution of the trade balance was that the Soviet Union was able to apply net earnings on current account to meeting its German commitments. If its net current-account earnings had occurred in countries with exchange controls, it would have been hard pressed to meet commitments arising elsewhere.[10]

In summary, the Soviet answer to the difficulties encountered in finding both capital and markets abroad was to withdraw from the world economy. Obviously, industrialization has proceeded briskly in the Soviet Union. This does not mean, however, that self-sufficiency was the best policy, inasmuch as the economic costs of such a policy were high. If one ignores official "Marxist" explanations, the Soviet policy of autarky can be understood simply as one imperative that followed from the decision of the regime to industrialize quickly at all costs. For many reasons, some of which we shall explore in the following section, the task was so large and the changes required so massive that it could be carried out only in a closed society, one whose entire range of foreign contacts—economic, political, cultural—was controlled by the regime. In this light, Soviet foreign economic policy is seen to have developed from a set of values that casts the individual in the role of a servant of the state, curiously reminiscent of early mercantilism.

The luxury of following an independent political course and severing one's ties with the world is scarcely conceivable for underdeveloped areas today. Low incomes prevent significant capital accumulation. The primi-

[10] While a 1936 regulation prohibited exports to countries whose currencies were controlled, the pattern of Soviet trade reflected at this time the inherent features of the world economy, so that the regulation perhaps may be best viewed as a bargaining device.

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tive nature of technology and the typically limited resource base interact with the lack of capital to cause low incomes to persist. The institutional structure frequently is such that the innovation required to compensate for the lack of capital and a weakly developed technology is impeded. Given these circumstances, *and* the unwillingness of the leadership in the underdeveloped areas to live with the poverty of the past, recourse must be had to aid from abroad. The particular form this assistance takes will vary from country to country, but aid there must be, as well as two-way trade. The Soviet Union, in terms of production, resources, and technology, was wealthy by current standards in many of the less-developed areas and hence could "afford," for whatever reason, to adopt a policy of self-sufficiency. In this light, the practical significance of the Soviet Union as a model in this respect becomes exceedingly remote.

IV. Institutional Change

Between man and his physical environment in any society there is a set of institutions, a pattern of regularized ways of thinking about things and of acting, in accordance with which man provides for his wants. Along with such obvious factors as resources and technology, institutions in large measure determine how well a given society will take advantage of the surroundings in which it finds itself. While traditional economic theory ordinarily treats institutions as one of the "other things being equal," there is nevertheless growing awareness of their importance in the matter of economic development. One textbook on economic growth, for example, lists the following changes (fostered by the Soviet regime) in the institutional pattern of Russian life. These changes, the author suggests, are perhaps more important than the actual material goods produced since the Revolution: ". . . the spreading of education and the very idea that education is desirable (even though it may be warped by wrong economic and world-political ideas); the overthrow of the superstitious element in Russian religion and education; the animation of the population to mobility, social and territorial; the sponsoring of the idea of careers open to talent; the inflaming of economic acquisitiveness; and the adoption of the principle of pay graded to production."[11] Although one may argue about the necessity or desirability of individual items on this list, there seems little doubt that many of these changes are "permanent and essential ingredients of economic development."

One might suppose that the Soviet Union is therefore, at least in this

[11] Herman Finer, "The Role of Government," in H. F. Williamson and J. A. Buttrick, eds., *Economic Development: Principles and Patterns*, New York, 1955, p. 416.

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respect, a suitable model for underdeveloped areas to emulate in their quest for a formula by which to achieve rapid economic growth. The evidence again, however, discourages such a conclusion. It is useful to consider institutional change—change in the way people think, act, and interrelate—in terms of the costs incurred in the process of change, and in terms of alternative ways in which necessary institutional change might be stimulated and guided. In viewing the USSR in this respect, the alterations associated with the very early moves toward industrialization will be discussed. While institutional changes obviously have continued down to the present time, these more recent innovations seem relatively minor when compared with the societal convulsions experienced in the 1930's.

In 1921, the sown area in the Soviet Union was roughly one-third below the pre-revolutionary level, and the grain harvest was about 40 per cent below. Also, livestock levels were generally below prewar levels. Under the New Economic Policy there was a general recovery, and by 1927 the total area sown to grain, the mainstay of the Soviet diet, was about the same as before the Revolution, and livestock levels were generally above the pre-revolutionary mark. These developments would appear to be auspicious for the initiation of an industrialization drive, but in fact this was not the case.

The recovery in agriculture was based on peasant farming. While the government had nationalized land at the time of the Revolution, the peasants in fact operated the land pretty much as if it were their own, and the government recognized their right to the produce of the land. By 1928, only about 2 per cent of all farms were collectivized, and it was the resulting private nature of farming that was to cause difficulty. For one thing, the leaders suspected that the peasants were the last remaining stronghold of capitalist sentiment in the economy, and that they had an adverse political and ideological effect on the country. While these peasant households remained outside the planned sector of the economy, there was also a serious question as to the very success of planning itself. At this time, for example, the Russians used a planning year beginning on October 1—i.e., a harvest year—which in effect meant that it was necessary to plan on what the peasants were *expected* to do, not on what they could be counted upon to do.

But the more serious aspect of the situation was the fact that, in 1926-1927, grain marketings were only at about one-half their prewar level. Several factors account for this decline in the marketed share. The grain harvest did not fully recover its prewar level, so that out of a reduced production the quantity the farmer kept for himself amounted

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to a larger percentage of total production. Inasmuch as the total sown area was about the same as that of the prewar period, the conclusion follows that the decline in production was due primarily to a decline in yields. This, in turn, was perhaps greatly conditioned by the agricultural reorganization through which land previously owned and managed as relatively efficient large estates was broken up into many small, relatively inefficient farms.

The most important reason for the decline in the marketed share was the dominance of the middle and small peasants in agriculture by the late 1920's. Prior to World War I, this group accounted for about one-half of total grain production and marketed about 15 per cent of its output. By 1926-1927, however, it produced about 85 per cent of total output and its marketed share was only 11 per cent. In contrast, the so-called "landlords" (who disappeared following the Revolution) and the "kulaks" (rich peasants) together produced about half of total output in the prewar period, while the remaining kulaks in the late 1920's produced only about 13 per cent. In the earlier period the landlords and kulaks together accounted for about three-fourths of all marketings, whereas the kulaks by the late 1920's produced only one-fifth of total marketings. Interestingly, the small number of collective farms in existence on the eve of industrialization marketed about one-half of their total output, approximately the same share of the harvest as the wealthy landowners had marketed prior to World War I.

In the context of peasant dominance of agriculture, the so-called "scissors crisis" was instrumental in reducing the marketed share. Agricultural prices in 1927-1928 were about 50 per cent above their level in 1913, while prices of manufactured consumer goods were almost double those of 1913. In effect, in the 1920's the terms of trade turned against the peasant, with the most adverse terms experienced in 1924. This problem was discussed openly in the Soviet press at the time, and Party statements alleged that it endangered the "union" between worker and peasant thought to be so necessary to the success of the Revolution. The important result of the shift in the terms of trade was that the peasant now chose to market less grain in the face of his deteriorating "parity" situation.[12]

[12] An interesting question exists on this point. The typical American farmer, in the face of declining prices for his agricultural produce and rising prices for the products he must buy, is thought to expand his production to compensate for this price squeeze. Had the Soviet regime felt that the peasant supply of produce would have been equally responsive to such price changes, conceivably the collectivization drive need not have occurred at that time, if ever. In fact, at least two factors account for the response of the Soviet farmer to the "scissors crisis." First, the peasant by 1928 was paying very small taxes in relation to previous levels, perhaps only one-third as much as before

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In brief, this was the problem of the marketed share of grain. Marketings represented supplies made available for cities and for export, and, presumably, stockpiles and industrial uses. Because the landlords and kulaks had been replaced by people who were both producing and marketing less, the regime was confronted with a situation that was intolerable on the eve of a high-tempo industrialization drive. Faced with peasant reluctance to part with their produce, the Politburo appears to have had several alternative courses of action. A do-nothing policy in agriculture—i.e., relying on the forces already operating—was out of the question, of course. Similarly, giving the peasantry greater incentives to increase both production and the marketed share would have meant, in effect, diverting consumer goods away from the cities or stepping up the development of light industry. The first alternative would have been politically embarrassing, while the second would have retarded the development of heavy industry and industrialization, the original intent of the program.

In this light, gentle persuasion is seen as precluded by the goals and nature of the regime; thus, the question resolves itself into one of selecting the most effective form of compulsion. In principle, increased agricultural taxes might be considered here inasmuch as such taxes would have meant forcing about 80 per cent of the population to act against their will, as evidenced by their decision *not* to market a significant share of output. The form of compulsion adopted was rapid and widespread collectivization of agriculture, through which the peasant farms lost their identity and the farmers became members of a *kolkhoz* under the leadership of a representative of the regime (though such a leadership was nominally elected by the farm membership). The main effect of the transformation was that, although production remained relatively unchanged, the quantity of marketings increased significantly. Doubtless, the ideological preference of the regime for this "socialist" form of agriculture played a role in the decision. Also, it was felt that collectivization would make for efficiency and raise yields. But the strategic consideration in the collectivization drive was something quite apart. By this policy the government abandoned indirect methods and substituted direct controls over agricultural activity, including particularly the marketed share of agricultural production.

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the war, and rent payments as such were virtually non-existent. As a result, the peasant did not need the cash that previously had been derived from marketings. Second, a change in the price structure within the agricultural sector itself made it more profitable over time to use grain for livestock feed. While the amount of grain used for feed was about the same in 1927-1928 as in the prewar period, in percentage terms this meant an increase because total output was less.

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The Soviet Union in this fashion eliminated one of the chief impediments to rapid industrialization—that institutional pattern of life which gave the peasant private property rights to the produce of his farm. Naturally, the peasantry as a group did not instinctively grasp the beneficial significance of this change. On the contrary, to many the Man from Moscow or Kiev with the briefcase, roaming about rural Russia, represented the enemy and he was frequently treated accordingly. Resistance to collectivization took many forms, including the killing and eating of approximately one-half the livestock herds, the burning and destruction of farm buildings and implements, and the consumption of existing grain and other produce. The regime fought back with the secret police, the militia, and the army. Estimates of the number of people killed, starved, or deported in this period run into the millions.

The point illustrated in this brief description of agriculture in the first years of the USSR is a simple one. Soviet leaders at an early date committed themselves to rapid industrialization and then eliminated or transformed those institutions that stood in their way. Similar examples from other spheres of Soviet life abound: the suppression of labor unions, as that term is understood in the West; the use of "convict" labor in areas where workers were otherwise unavailable; the harassment of the Church, and so on. In agriculture, the change was so massive and so rapid that the associated social and psychological costs, which increase in a kind of exponential relationship to the rate of change, were enormous. Whatever motives may have guided Soviet leaders in their collectivization decision, the actual operation was achieved by the clumsy hand of force.

The immediate problem of the time was solved. The peoples of the underdeveloped areas might well ask, however, if the Soviet model minimizes the cost of the changes that may be required. The extended family system, a nomadic economy, and paternalism all inhibit the introduction of institutions judged important to the development of a highly interdependent, complex, productive economy. These and other dominant institutional patterns of life abound in various forms in most of the less-developed areas. Whatever their intrinsic worth in terms of human, non-material values, it is recognized even by the leaders of such areas that the institutions must be seriously modified, if not eliminated, if the fruits of modern technology are to be shared by their people.

In the light of these required institutional changes, which include changes in social and moral values as treated here, the Soviet model appears to be largely irrelevant. First, only through a highly centralized,

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terroristic campaign was the Soviet regime able to maintain the important institutional changes carried out in the Russian economy after 1928. In the case of agriculture, the rapid abolition of the collective farm system in the Ukraine in the wake of the German occupation during World War II testified to the shallowness of peasant acceptance of this institution. The point is that most underdeveloped countries today lack precisely the type of strong government necessary to make such drastic changes stick.

Second, for many reasons the moral climate of the world today inhibits the cruel excesses of the early phases of the Soviet industrialization, just as British methods of industrialization in the early nineteenth century are now judged harshly. While an ambiguous standard is applied (e.g., the death of a political enemy on a battlefield is approved, the domestic execution of a political prisoner is disapproved), in a world of great interdependence such a moral climate is important to each country. Thus, as leaders in the less-developed areas begin to wrestle with institutional problems in the course of economic development, they must seek a model in which a relatively humanistic, largely persuasive (not coercive) leadership guides the economy, while at the same time avoiding the appalling human costs that characterized many past economic transformations. The experience of the USSR gives no clue to such a model.

V. Concluding Statement

In terms of the values that have evolved in Western civilization since the times of the Greeks and Romans, the Soviet pattern of economic growth must be rejected as a suitable model for underdeveloped areas to emulate in the twentieth century. In terms of the Aristotelian syllogism: unless human life is conserved in the process of economic development, that process must be judged unacceptable; the Soviet industrialization pattern did not conserve human life; therefore, the Soviet pattern must be judged unacceptable. While the reader might insist with Plato that we define our terms, the gist of this syllogism at least does not jar Western sensibilities.

At the same time, this logic would be judged by Soviet theoreticians as both inane and vicious. To understand why this is so is to understand what is perhaps the most important aspect of the Soviet appeal to the underdeveloped areas today. Stated briefly, it may be that the areas of the world in which attempts at development are occurring are precisely those areas in which Aristotle, the liberal culture and, in effect, the whole complex of the Western value system are of little or merely aca-

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demic interest. In some countries the effort to hold on to life is such a difficult chore that the liberal tradition—that is, the tradition of free men—has never achieved root. In others, where many of the important citizens may have received a Western education, the ruling group may attach much importance to the way of life we are here terming free. Even in this instance, however, the press of circumstances—the passion not just for growth but for rapid growth, and the insistence upon national recognition and prestige—often force the hand of the government so that steps are taken away from a liberal society.

Under such pressures, Marxism, or the Russian brand thereof, conceivably can have great attraction. If all values are sacrificed to nationalism and economic growth, a totalitarian regime that serves these ends might find approval. The Soviet experience may indeed appear to offer some guidance in the matter of techniques vital to the establishment of a police state controlled by an "elite" or even a "vanguard of the working people." In the absence of democracy in many underdeveloped areas—democracy in the sense of possession of civil liberties by an articulate and informed electorate—a Soviet-type regime might not be criticized for taking from the people what they never possessed. Similarly, it might be held that the Soviet Union has shown the way for a reordering of social values deemed essential to accelerated economic growth. Finally, if abject poverty, pestilence, and death have dominated the lives of persons in a certain area for centuries, many of the moral values to which we in the West attach importance may be ignored in the desperate scramble for material improvement.

In a particularly lucid way, Professor Adam Ulam has outlined one possible view of this type of appeal. He argues that, as it evolved, the body of thought called Marxism incorporated, unlike any other school of thought, two characteristics of the period. As a result, it contains today a "passion for material improvement and fanaticism in the service of industrialization." At the same time, Marxism displays an "insight into the psychology of large masses of the population in a society that undergoes the process of transition from a traditional, pre-industrial phase to industrialization."[13] Given these two characteristics, Marxism is seen as alluring to a people who place development and national power above other values.

Although Professor Ulam indicates that the time span during which these countries remain susceptible to Marxism may be relatively brief, to persons of a liberal persuasion the brevity of such a period seems small compensation for the human costs that may be incurred. The Soviet

[13] Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, New York, 1960, pp. 285 and 284.

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experience, with all its technical shortcomings, hardly appears to be a model of perfection. Nevertheless, it is there to be followed if a country so chooses. Indeed, if economic growth were the only goal, it would be difficult to "prove" via the syllogism or any other figure of logic the natural superiority of the Western system as a pattern for the underdeveloped areas.

The crucial point is, however, that economic growth has never been and probably never will be a nation's one and only goal. One need merely recall such names as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton to conjure up a picture of a growing nation struggling to conquer the material forces of production while simultaneously taking steps to ensure the enhancement of what we in the West have traditionally called the "dignity of man." It is in this simultaneous achievement of material comfort and a free society that the uniqueness of the West lies. There is little evidence to indicate that the Soviet pattern of industrialization or, more accurately, the Soviet political and economic institutional structure offers any hope of this dual accomplishment. The underdeveloped areas of the world in their search for methods to increase their material level of living ignore this fact at their own peril.

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CEMA'S INFLUENCE ON SOVIET POLICIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

By ROBERT S. JASTER

THE Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) was established by the USSR in 1949 to co-ordinate the economic activities of its newly acquired empire in Eastern Europe. CEMA's true role in intra-Bloc relations has undergone significant changes since the death of Stalin. These changes, and their implications for Soviet foreign and domestic policies, are the subject of speculation in this article.

I. The Soviet Concept of an Administrative Structure

In Soviet society every administrative organ serves as a transmission belt through which control by the central authorities is exercised, either directly or indirectly. In no area of official activity is a major decision reached below the level of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Hence, in Rostow's words, the regime "has sought to install a system which separates authority from administrative responsibility, [thus violating] the natural two-way workings of an administrative structure in a complex society."[1]

In addition to making decisions the exclusive domain of the top leadership, the Soviet concept further violates Western administrative theory by denying organs of administration any scope for self-sustained activity or the development of a tradition of permanence. A legitimate and major objective of every Western organizational apparatus is to ensure its own continuity. In doing this it assumes a certain momentum of its own, concentrating its energies on building a more effective organization and often devising a succession of functions and activities other than those for which it was originally organized.[2] Soviet society denies its administrative organs any such right to an independent life. Soviet organizations are merged or divided, abolished or reinstituted, emasculated or reinvigorated, according to the immediate requirements of the USSR's rulers.

The history of major cabinet functions in the Soviet Union is typified by that of the national stockpiling system which, in the course of eight years, became successively the responsibility of one central administration, two national ministries, one ministry, two main administrations

[1] W. W. Rostow, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, New York, 1954, p. 183.
[2] Peter Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*, New York, 1956, ch. 5.

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and, most recently, one main administration.[3] That local governments suffer a similar lack of continuity was indicated in the election of a regional soviet that found itself without a job one month later when the region was abolished by the central authorities.

This manifest disdain or, more accurately, purposeful hostility toward a tradition of administrative authority has been carried into Soviet international relations. Philip Mosely, relating his experiences with Soviet diplomats at Potsdam and other major conferences, describes the Soviet negotiator as "a mechanical mouthpiece for views and demands formulated in Moscow" who is "in mortal terror of violating any part, minor or major," of his instructions. Moreover, for him to recommend to Moscow "even slight changes in his instructions exposes him to serious risks."[4] Commenting particularly on the organs through which Soviet-satellite relations are conducted, Rostow writes: "The joint, distributed administration of power which flows so naturally from Western political ideas and methods, and which is incorporated in a multitude of operating international organizations, is incompatible with the peculiar techniques of administration which the Soviet regime has developed in consequence of its power priority."[5]

This power priority is evident in the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, which was provided with an extremely loose organizational structure in order to assure its administrative impotence. The contrast between CEMA's charter and that of its West European counterpart, the European Economic Community (EEC), is particularly marked.[6] In the Common Market treaty the decision-making process, the relation of member states to the organization, and the responsibilities and procedures of each organ are set forth in 248 articles. The fifty articles in CEMA's charter add up to little more than a general statement of principles and purposes. Vital questions of how decisions are to be reached, and under what conditions CEMA decisions are binding on member countries, are dealt with in the most ambiguous terms.

The charter states, for example, that a CEMA decision is binding

[3] A main administration is one notch below ministerial level; hence it enjoys no direct representation on the Council of Ministers.

[4] *Negotiating with the Russians*, ed. by Raymond Dennett, Boston, 1951, pp. 272 and 292.

[5] Rostow, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

[6] CEMA's charter, which entered into force in April 1960, appears in *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* (Foreign Trade), No. 9 (1960), and in translation in *The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Charter and Convention*, JPRS 3393, Library of Congress, June 13, 1960. The OEEC statute is contained in *A Study of European Economic Regionalism*, House Report No. 1226, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study Mission to Europe, Part II, U.S. 86th Congress, January 25, 1960.

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on a member only when ratified by its government; moreover, under the unanimity principle set forth in Article IV, if a member country expresses no interest in discussing a given question before CEMA, then any subsequent CEMA recommendation or resolution on the question is not binding on that country. What if a member country has agreed to discuss a given problem, but feels that the final CEMA decision is inimical to its best interests? Or, suppose a member country's CEMA delegates involve their country deeply in a CEMA-sponsored program, only to have their home government fail to ratify the agreement? On these points the CEMA statute offers no guidance. A clue is provided, however, by a Soviet international lawyer who points out that, while a CEMA decision has no legal force until ratified by the individual member governments, it does "impose a moral-political obligation on these countries."[7]

Similarly, functions and interrelationships are only generally indicated. In contrast to the detailed procedures outlined for each of the EEC's major organs, each CEMA body "shall establish its own rules of procedure." While the method for appointing a staff for the EEC Commission is clearly set forth in the EEC treaty, there is no provision for appointments to its proximate CEMA counterpart, the Secretariat.

CEMA thus appears to have all the attributes of a typical Soviet administrative organization, in which authority, procedures, and functions are purposely left undefined. The advantage of such an organization is manifest: it can be made the vehicle for carrying out whatever policies and functions the Party leadership elects to invest it with at any given time. Because the CPSU is still the "leading party" and the patron of Party leaders in the satellite nations, CEMA's identity would seem to rest ultimately with the highest Party leaders of the Soviet Union.[8] If this is true, then CEMA is, indeed, no more than a convenient channel for transmitting Soviet directives to the European satellites.

If, however, it can be shown that CEMA has departed from this model, that it has been able to sever its umbilical tie to the Kremlin and has an independent heartbeat of its own, however faint, then a study of CEMA could yield significant insights into the future of intra-Bloc rela-

[7] V. I. Morozov, in *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Soviet State and Law), No. 10 (1961), p. 150.

[8] The "vanguard" role of the CPSU, although reaffirmed by the 81 Communist parties in their Statement of December 6, 1960, has since become a confused issue within the Bloc. Particularly after the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress in late 1961, a wide divergence of opinion appeared among satellite leaders. While the Czechs, for example, reasserted the CPSU's "leading role," Hungary's Kadar was reported to have said that there is no leading party in the Communist movement and no need for one. See *Washington Post*, December 3, 1961, p. A22.

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tions. In order to judge whether CEMA has, in fact, departed from the model Soviet organization outlined above, it is necessary to trace the metamorphosis of CEMA in the light of changing Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

II. CEMA and the Changing Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe

In terms of Soviet policy toward the satellites, three periods between 1949 and early 1962 can be discerned. The first, from 1949 until Stalin's death in 1953, was a period of plunder, when the satellite countries were looked upon chiefly as a treasure trove for the immediate enrichment of the Soviet economy. From 1953 through early 1956 Soviet policy underwent a gradual change, as the new leadership began to see Eastern Europe as a vital part of the Soviet empire, imposing obligations as well as conferring rights on the USSR. During 1956 this new Soviet attitude was crystallized into a clear, practicable policy, in which economic rationality and mutual interest were combined in a program to achieve the eventual economic integration of Eastern Europe.

In the early period the overriding Soviet objective was the restoration and expansion of the Soviet economy. To this end Soviet officials devised a variety of means, few of which were subtle, for the rapid exploitation of satellite resources. War reparations, which totaled an estimated $10 billion, were flowing heavily from East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania. The infamous joint companies, effective Soviet control of which assured priority production and delivery of essential materials to the USSR, were active during this period in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, East Germany, and Yugoslavia. Through amazingly one-sided financial agreements, the existence of which was disclosed only in 1956, the USSR paid token sums for goods and services provided by Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. The reverse flow of Soviet economic aid to Eastern Europe averaged less than $100 million a year from 1945 through 1952.

In this atmosphere the establishment of CEMA in 1949 can have served only two purposes. First, as suggested by the crude and precipitous birth of CEMA within a few months after the OEEC had become operative in Western Europe, Stalin badly needed a Soviet counter to the Marshall Plan. This was particularly true after he had thwarted the intention of some satellite countries to join the OEEC. Second, CEMA's ostensibly international character would make the unpopular economic policies being forced on Eastern Europe appear to have at least the formal agreement of the governments concerned.

The economic integration and co-operation that CEMA was supposed to promote received little attention during Stalin's life. Only three

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plenary meetings of the Council, CEMA's executive organ, were held in its first five years of existence. It is significant, too, that CEMA functioned eleven years before it was provided with a basic organizational statute. During this early period, inter-satellite co-operation was actually discouraged by Stalin, who fostered a pattern of unilateral dependence of each satellite nation on the USSR.

With Stalin's death and the general relaxation of terror in 1953, new forces came to bear on the Soviet-satellite relationship. The new Soviet leaders, despite the evident bitter protests of the Stalinist old guard,[9] loosened the tight control that Stalin had maintained over the internal economic life of the satellites. Soviet holdings in most, if not all, satellite industrial enterprises were relinquished,[10] and three of the satellites were relieved of paying a burdensome $1 billion in debts claimed by the USSR. The Berlin riots of June 1953, to which the Soviet leaders naturally ascribed a primary economic motive, undoubtedly played a large part in these decisions. Meeting a year after Stalin's death, the fourth CEMA plenary session initiated the co-ordination of national economic plans and established provisional commissions—later expanded and made permanent—to implement the long-heralded plan to integrate Eastern Europe.

The new policy continued to develop during 1956. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 gave much emphasis to the need for greater economic co-operation and integration within the Bloc, to be achieved through the co-ordination of national economic plans, the joint development of resources, specialization of production, and the exchange of technical processes. The change in Soviet policy was further elaborated as a result of the Polish and Hungarian revolts in October 1956. Probably the most significant pronouncement issued during this period was the Soviet "Declaration of 30 October,"[11] still cited by Soviet and satellite officials as the turning point in their mutual relations. In this revealing statement, published in *Pravda* at the height of the Hungarian revolt, the Soviet leaders admitted past violations of

[9] According to *Pravda* of December 5, 1961, Molotov did not support the Party's policy of showing "tact and respect for the sovereignty of all nations" but, "juggling with Stalinist formulae," he "devised a theory which deprived proletarian internationalism of one of its most important elements: the love of each people for their homeland." This charge was evidently more than a mere fabrication to discredit Molotov further, because identical charges—though less specific—were raised almost three years earlier against the entire Anti-Party group.

[10] In *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Problems of Economics), No. 5 (1961), it is stated that the companies have been transferred to the full ownership of the countries where they are located.

[11] *Pravda*, October 31, 1956.

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satellite sovereignty, and pledged themselves to respect the independence and equality of all members of the European socialist camp in the future. They further offered to review with each their mutual relations so as to strengthen economic ties and remove any remaining sources of inequality and exploitation. In a series of conferences with satellite leaders over the ensuing three months, the Kremlin's leadership made its pledges explicit in formal agreements.

The policy that crystallized in 1956 has not been changed materially since then. Its goals are three: first, Eastern Europe is to be made a viable, interdependent economic region, able to compete with the West in the era of competitive coexistence; second, the satellites are to have a vested interest in remaining in the Bloc and in furthering the interests of the Bloc as a whole; third, Stalin's concept of Eastern Europe as a subject territory to be ruled directly from the Kremlin is replaced by the concept of the "socialist commonwealth"—a euphemism that nevertheless implies certain general commitments of each member to the others. There was probably some understanding, tacit or otherwise, concerning the position of the CPSU as the vanguard of the Communist movement. It remains now to see how CEMA has been affected by the new policy and in what ways it has diverged from the model Soviet administrative organization.

III. CEMA's Growing Authority in Economic Affairs Within the Bloc

Since Stalin's death and particularly since 1956, the activities of CEMA have increased substantially in both scope and importance.[12] Infused with new life by the post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union, CEMA has assumed the leading role in co-ordinating Bloc trade, aid, and economic planning. Conferences of Bloc experts held under CEMA auspices have discussed a wide range of mutual problems in national accounting, banking procedures, economic planning, agriculture, price formation, and other fields. CEMA recommendations regarding exchange rates, multilateral clearing, production specialization, and the standardization of Bloc foreign trade procedures have been put into effect. The importance attached to CEMA was further suggested by the calling together of Bloc Party leaders in Moscow in May 1958 "to consider ways for enhancing the role of CEMA" in Bloc economic affairs.

[12] The new role of CEMA is defined in *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, No. 11 (1959), p. 8. Some of CEMA's more recent activities are discussed in *ibid.*, No. 7 (1961), pp. 11ff., and in *Vestnik Statistiki* (Journal of Statistics), No. 1 (1960), p. 89. The intra-Bloc multilateral clearing system is described in *Pravda*, June 25, 1957.

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Largely inactive under Stalin, CEMA's executive organ, the Council, has held eleven plenary sessions since 1954 and now meets twice a year, more or less regularly, in successive Bloc capitals.[13] The Council is composed of the chairmen of member countries' economic planning commissions. It is empowered by the 1960 CEMA charter "to determine the basic directions of other CEMA organs" and "to establish such organs as it considers necessary" to carry out its functions.

In the field of trade, CEMA has promoted a more rational pattern of intra-Bloc exchanges and has encouraged co-operation among Bloc trade partners. Within the Bloc, it is claimed, reciprocal delivery commitments are made several years in advance for most commodities, thereby lending greater predictability to the export-import plans of each member country. The expansion of trade with Free World underdeveloped countries has been facilitated by intra-Bloc co-operation in the extension of credits, presumably under the aegis of CEMA. There has been at least one case in which a Free World country was permitted to obtain goods from satellite countries under a credit extended by the USSR.[14]

Trade plans through 1965 call for a greater concentration of commerce within the Bloc. Increased trade with the industrial West is also envisaged, in contrast to the Stalin years when anything beyond an extremely modest exchange between the satellites and the West was regarded by the Soviet leader as an unfriendly act.

The question of intra-Bloc credits was raised at the 1958 plenary session of CEMA, held in Prague. The Rumanian delegate proposed the creation of a mutual investment fund for the CEMA countries, to be earmarked for constructing projects of common interest.[15] This proposal for sharing the burden of intra-Bloc developmental aid must have met with the approval of the USSR, which had extended over $2.5 billion in credits to the satellites between 1954 and 1958. The proposal was nevertheless defeated, probably reflecting reluctance on the part of the better developed satellite countries to finance the industrial growth of their poorer socialist relations.

[13] The interval of over nine months that separated the fourteenth and fifteenth CEMA plenary sessions probably reflected a decision to settle the Albanian question at an intra-Bloc political conference before CEMA would again convene to discuss intra-Bloc economic matters. Hence the fifteenth plenum met in December 1961 within a few days after the end of the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress.

[14] *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, No. 9 (1959), p. 34, and *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, Washington, D.C., U. S. State Department, Publication No. 6632, May 1958, p. 19.

[15] *Medunarodni Problemi* (Belgrade), No. 4 (1959), p. 109. The little progress so far made in this direction is outlined in *Planovoye Khozaistvo* (Planned Economy), No. 8 (1960), p. 46.

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However, the Soviet leadership continued to urge that the cost of developing the more backward Bloc economies be shared by the rest of the Bloc. This became especially critical after the announcement of Khrushchev's thesis, at the CPSU Twenty-First Congress in early 1959, that there would be a "more or less simultaneous transition" of all Bloc countries to communism—a thesis that was clearly predicated on an intensified program of assistance to raise the economic level of the less-developed members of the Bloc. A Soviet economist asserted pointedly, "The most essential element in relations between socialist states is mutual aid and, of first priority, aid from the most economically advanced countries to the countries which were formerly backward in their economic development."[16]

So far there has been little response from the more advanced satellites, and CEMA has largely failed to implement the Soviet program. As Gomulka complained to the PZPR Fifth Plenum in 1960, "Mutual cooperation practically does not exist in such an important field as investment. . . . the maxim 'Everybody for himself' still prevails."[17] By far the largest share of intra-Bloc aid continues to come from the USSR, which has in effect been forced to underwrite the economic stability of Eastern Europe.

That CEMA has become something other than a branch of the Soviet foreign office is revealed still more clearly in the much-publicized program of intra-Bloc specialization. The promotion of production specialization within the satellite area—an explicit function of CEMA—has been actively pushed by the USSR since 1955. Soviet leaders see clearly that a more rational division of labor among the satellites, the elimination of the least efficient producers from each Bloc industry, and the expansion of the Bloc market for those remaining will strengthen the economic capacity of the Bloc as a whole. Moreover, a more efficient and better integrated satellite economic region would require less Soviet economic assistance—a consideration that must have carried some weight with Khrushchev's opposition inside the Soviet leadership.

Although satellite leaders, too, recognize the need for economic integration, they view the program in a somewhat different perspective. While the Soviet planner can look on production specialization with some equanimity, secure in the powerful, highly diversified Soviet economy with its vast internal market, this is not true of his satellite counterpart. Inasmuch as other Bloc countries are counted on to absorb the bulk, and sometimes all, of the output of major satellite industrial com-

[16] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 3 (1960), p. 33.
[17] *Tribyuna Lyudu* (Warsaw), June 22, 1960.

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plexes, satellite planners see a serious threat to their national industries implied in the program's objective of "allocating the production of one or another type of equipment to one country."[18]

Here, then, a Soviet-sponsored program has clashed violently with the vested interests of satellite leaders in developing, maintaining, and utilizing their own national production capacities. CEMA has become the battleground.

Without its former chief weapon—naked force—the USSR has been at a tremendous disadvantage. The CEMA charter, evidently reflecting the practice of the past several years, provides that "all recommendations and decisions of the Council shall be made only with the concurrence of those member countries concerned." Bloc officials have often reiterated that CEMA decisions are binding on a member only when ratified by the member's government. In a Soviet legal journal it is asserted that the provisions of the charter guarantee each member country that, "without taking account of its opinion, and without its wish and consent, not a single resolution can be adopted by the CEMA Plenary."[19]

There is no doubt that the satellites have made good use of this and other means to avoid committing their economies to CEMA-sponsored agreements on production specialization.[20] Instances have been reported of open satellite rejection of Soviet proposals for CEMA production assignments.[21] The domestic implications of this issue for the satellites are suggested in an East German news article reporting the incorrect views of local Party members toward production changes in the Dresden aircraft works. If they believe, it is stated, that relations among the socialist world system are not so very valuable, then clearly they have not understood that such relations are based "on the principle of socialist division of labor for the greatest economic benefits of the entire socialist camp."[22]

[18] *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, No. 12 (1960), p. 11.

[19] *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 10 (1961), p. 149.

[20] A Soviet writer, complaining about the circumvention of CEMA proposals for specialization, has charged that "Sometimes a significant number of countries 'specializes' in the output of the same identical product . . . [sometimes] the existing state of production is fixed . . . in other cases analogous equipment is produced by several countries, but is made to appear different through excessively detailed nomenclature." See *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, No. 12 (1960), p. 12, and the Polachek interview in *Promyshlenno-Ekonomicheskaya Gazetta* (Industrial-Economic Gazette), February 7, 1958.

[21] *New York Times*, January 19, 1958. Also, in 1957 Poland reduced coal exports to the GDR while maintaining those to the West, counter to the intra-Bloc delivery schedules that had been worked out in CEMA. According to recent charges of the Soviet leadership, Albania "ignored the work of CEMA," suggesting that Hoxha balked at plans that were directed essentially at making Albania the vintner to the Bloc.

[22] *Sächsisches Tageblatt* (Dresden), June 11, 1961.

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As a result of effective stalling by the satellites, intra-Bloc division of labor has made little progress. So far, it is claimed, some 1,500 *individual* products have been agreed upon for specialization. The principles upon which specialization assignments are to be made were approved only at the Fifteenth Plenary Session, which convened in mid-December 1961.

It is significant that such limited progress as CEMA has made in the field of specialization has been accomplished, not in the high-level plenary sessions, but in the fourteen permanent commissions, representing every major Bloc economic activity. Here technical experts rather than political authorities are the chief participants. The significance of their work is disclosed in the statement of a Soviet official: "The overwhelming majority of questions reviewed in the plenary sessions and in the Conference of CEMA representatives is prepared by the permanent commissions."[23] Although the major function of each country's representatives is undoubtedly to protect and advance the interests of the home industry, discussions are conducted on a technical level.

Illustrative of the importance of the commissions in Bloc specialization schemes are the agenda of several of their meetings. Recent discussions in the CEMA Commissions for Agriculture, for Transport, and for Engineering dealt with standardization of products for the Bloc as a whole. In one case comparable machines produced in each member country were to be tested for performance, presumably as a first step in deciding which models should be adopted for the Bloc-wide market.

Precisely because the permanent commissions have tended to reflect the vital interests of the participating countries, the proposals worked out by the commissions have met with somewhat greater acceptance by the countries concerned. The process, involving as it does considerable bargaining and a necessary spirit of compromise, is inevitably a slow one. Soviet authorities must occasionally recall with nostalgia the good old days, when their programs for Eastern Europe could be quickly put into motion by a phone call from the Kremlin.

In contrast to the modest success achieved in industrial specialization, the co-ordination of national economic plans under CEMA authority has apparently made considerable progress since 1956. Starting with limited short-range co-ordination, subsequent CEMA meetings were charged with co-ordinating plans through 1965. The permanent commissions were assigned the task of drafting long-range plans for developing individual industries on a Bloc-wide scale. The commissions were also put in charge of assigning intra-Bloc delivery quotas for major

[23] *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 10 (1961), p. 154.

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products traded. In 1962 CEMA organs are to take up the task of co-ordinating national economic plans through 1980, although present political uncertainties, both within and without the Bloc, should render such co-ordination tenuous at best.

Notable gains have also been made in joint resource development—the so-called *kooperirovaniye*—within the Bloc. A number of major industrial complexes within the satellites, like Rumania's large cellulose plant, were made possible by the joint efforts of several CEMA countries.[24]

Such co-ordination of Bloc economic activity within the CEMA framework contains certain risks and obligations for the USSR. The growing multilateral ties among the satellites afford them opportunities to act in concert against specific Soviet actions. Such temporary alliances may, in time, become so institutionalized as to pose a significant threat to Soviet hegemony over its Eastern European Bloc.

In urging co-operation in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet leaders have also imposed obligations on the Soviet economy that may well interfere with particular domestic planning targets. For example, in 1956 the USSR, acting in accord with CEMA plans for increasing ferrous metals production in the satellites, agreed to supply Eastern Europe in 1960 with twice the volume of its 1956 deliveries of high-grade iron ore. Prior to the trauma induced by the 1956 revolts, Soviet leaders felt no compulsion to assume such obligations.[25]

A further problem for the Soviet leadership is the manifest fear among satellite peoples that plan co-ordination will ultimately result in a supranational plan, binding on all Bloc members. Soviet spokesmen have been tireless in their efforts to assuage these fears, pointing out that "the world socialist system will for a long time develop as a commonwealth of independent, sovereign states . . . based on complete voluntarism."[26]

From other Soviet pronouncements, however, it is clear that a common economic plan for the entire Bloc and the eventual political consolidation of the Bloc are, indeed, the long-range goals of the Kremlin's leaders. Only the national sensitivities of the satellites—sensitivities which it is in the USSR's interest to treat with respect—hinder progress toward this goal.[27]

[24] *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), No. 3 (1961), p. 18.

[25] For example, the late premier of Hungary, Imre Nagy, charged Soviet leaders with agreeing to supply only 36 per cent of the goods that Hungary wanted to import from the USSR in 1954. See *Imre Nagy on Communism*, New York, 1957, p. 190.

[26] See, for instance, *Partiinaya Zhizn* (Party Life), No. 20 (1957), p. 74.

[27] In his Leipzig speech of March 7, 1959, Khrushchev said: "The economic barriers which divided our [socialist] countries under capitalism will be broken down, one by

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IV. CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies: Conclusions

In the foregoing pages it has been suggested that CEMA began as a more or less typical Soviet administrative organ, with no clear authority, status, or continuing functions of its own. The CEMA charter is so vague in describing crucial matters of organization, procedures, and functions that it appears almost purposely designed to allow the USSR to dominate every CEMA activity. The question posed was whether CEMA has been able to avoid the sterile fate of the model Soviet administrative organ and to assume an independent identity. CEMA's development was reviewed within the context of changing Soviet policies toward the satellites, and it was shown that under the post-Stalin posture of the Soviet leadership, CEMA has become the primary agent for undertaking the economic integration of Eastern Europe. In the preceding section CEMA's growing authority in intra-Bloc affairs was traced in order to disclose the extent to which CEMA has, in fact, achieved an identity and momentum of its own.

This course of development is by no means entirely inimical to long-run Soviet interests. Enjoying a somewhat greater voice in both internal and external matters, the satellites will undoubtedly seek to use CEMA for carrying out programs in which they have a vital interest. Regional economic integration—a goal that all of the satellites see as of potential benefit to themselves—should therefore proceed most rapidly in those directions and by those stages that are acceptable to the individual satellite governments.

Such a process of integration, while more gradual than one imposed by Soviet fiat, can be expected to have greater support from member states and, hence, should proceed more smoothly. Furthermore, to the extent that satellite experts are better able than Soviet bureaucrats to assess the needs and capabilities of their own economies, fewer disproportions should occur in the integration process. The eventual result should be a more unified and economically stable Eastern Europe—a major goal of Soviet policy.

The actual and potential risks that the USSR faces in the emergence of the new CEMA are several. First, as patron of Eastern Europe and as the promoter of economic co-operation through CEMA, the USSR has assumed a heavy responsibility for the economic well-being of

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one. The common economic base of world socialism, which ultimately makes frontiers pointless, will be reinforced." See *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1959, p. 47. Other Soviet officials have spoken of the need for a "common economic plan" for the entire socialist camp. See *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3 (1961), p. 25.

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CEMA's weaker members. In recent years, unemployment in Bulgarian and GDR industry, unanticipated shortages of raw materials throughout the satellites, and harvest failures in Rumania, Poland, and Albania have all resulted in calls for Soviet assistance to which the USSR has responded. The dissension that this policy has caused within the Soviet leadership is indicated by Maxim Saburov's statement, in the original bill of charges against the Anti-Party group, that Molotov and the rest of his group opposed the Central Committee's policy on "the need to develop our economic ties with these [satellite] countries and to extend them aid."[28]

By far the greatest potential danger posed to the USSR by CEMA lies in the new identity that CEMA has assumed. Its independent authority, both formal and actual, clearly exceeds that permitted the typical Soviet administrative organ. The effective right of members to oppose CEMA recommendations lends it a procedural frame of reference that differs sharply from the Soviet model.

Moreover, the bodies meeting under CEMA auspices in the past several years have developed a tradition of debating, frankly and openly, major problems coming within CEMA's purview. Through its permanent commissions CEMA may acquire many of the attributes of a Western-style bureaucracy, including an atmosphere of permanence. It seems unlikely that a group of technicians can have long and continuing mutual contacts without developing a close community of interests and understanding.

The potential effects of these developments on the Soviet Union are evident. The USSR may find it increasingly difficult to secure unanimous support for its proposals in CEMA. The satellites may form temporary alliances or blocs within CEMA—there is evidence that this has already occurred—to defeat certain proposals or gain support for others. Furthermore, the greater the degree to which CEMA serves the national interests of its members, the greater will be their insistence on maintaining and extending its authority. Through concerted action in CEMA the satellites should be able increasingly to assert their independence of Soviet domination—an objective that none of them is strong enough to attempt individually.

Although the Soviet leadership may well view these developments with misgiving, it has little choice but to acquiesce. The emasculation or abolition of CEMA is conceivable only under a complete reversion to the self-centered, autarkic policies of Stalin. It seems unlikely that

[28] *Current Soviet Policies*, III, New York, 1960, p. 182.

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such a reversion would now be given serious consideration, even by the apparent internal opposition to Khrushchev.

When viewed in the larger political context the marked changes in the character and identity of CEMA cease to appear as isolated phenomena. They appear, instead, to be a small but consistent part of a much more far-reaching development: the fragmentation of authority in the international Communist movement.

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Review Articles

THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

By LEON GORDENKER

Perspectives on Peace, 1910-1960, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960, 202 pp. $3.00.

Benjamin V. Cohen, *The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, 106 pp. $2.75.

Sydney D. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, 337 pp. $5.00.

J. David Singer, *Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, 185 pp. 14.50 guilders.

Walter R. Sharp, *Field Administration in the United Nations System*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961, 570 pp. $12.00.

Joseph P. Lash, *Dag Hammarskjold: Custodian of the Brushfire Peace*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961, 304 pp. $4.50.

Richard I. Miller, *Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy*, New York, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961, 344 pp. $6.00.

THE familiar and suggestive, but loose, comparison of international organizations with national governments serves nicely as a context for examining seven recent books. Like national government, international organization attracts comments with varied intellectual standards from assorted sources. The founding father of a new state and the elder statesmen associated with him have their counterparts in the elaborate network of international organizations that has grown up since the end of the Second World War. Writers on international organizations, like those on national government, include administrators, journalists, lawyers, scholars, and statesmen. Their approaches range from the determinedly serious to the unconsciously funny. They have not yet managed to produce musical comedies about the United Nations, but this lacuna surely results less from lack of suggestion than of risk capital.

I

The ideas of the elder statesmen have been set down in *Perspectives on Peace, 1910-1960*, a handsomely produced *Festschrift* for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[1] The fifty years of the Endowment

[1] The Carnegie Endowment deserves honor from those interested in studying inter-

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neatly cover the blossoming of international organization as well as man's most terrible wars. So do the careers of James T. Shotwell, whose essay appropriately opens the collection, Sir Norman Angell, who closes the volume, and a few of their colleagues. Other essayists belong to a younger generation and many of them have spent long years in official positions connected with international organizations. As one would expect from such a group, their personal retrospects, taken together, have an uneven and sometimes unfocused quality. But this diffusion should disturb only the pedant, for a chance to compare and contrast the views of such experienced men as Messrs. Nicolson, Madariaga, Hammarskjöld, Spaak, Monnet, Lleras Camargo, Pearson, Inönü, Huber, and Henri Bonnet seems worth taking advantage of.

Although the experiences of these writers and the subjects of their comments are spaced at various distances from the center of the United Nations, none of them has overlooked the international organization as a fact of international life. Nor do they view that life as essentially sweet joy, temporarily perturbed by the accidental intrusion of rude persons. On the whole, these writers—and most of the others whose books will be discussed in this article—show willingness to weigh, analyze, and criticize, sometimes in the pungent phrases of the practiced politician in the person of Spaak, sometimes in the polished lines of such an accomplished essayist as Sir Harold Nicolson.

The dozen essays here can be divided into four groups. Those by Shotwell, Nicolson, Madariaga, and Hammarskjöld regard efforts to keep the peace through international organization as a long experiment. Spaak's article, which is concerned with the ideal of collective security as translated into the United Nations system and revised in the Atlantic Alliance, provides a bridge to Monnet's discussion of economic integration and Lleras Camargo's piece on regionalism. This is followed by essays by Pearson and Inönü on diplomacy and negotiation. Finally, essays by Huber, Bonnet, and Angell employ more functional approaches in commenting on international law, intellectual co-operation, and mass education.

What might impress the scholar in these essays is not so much their specific content, although one ought to regard seriously Spaak's description of the General Assembly as an arena of "unbridled nationalism and demagogy" (p. 85) or Pearson's candid recognition of the changes in the style of diplomacy, which Nicolson as usual deplores, as an op-

national organization, for its publications have been consistently valuable. In addition to *Perspectives*, the Bailey and Sharp books were published under Carnegie Endowment auspices.

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portunity for statesmanship. Rather, the broad gauge of the minds of these pioneers and elder statesmen, some of whom have already been removed by death, is impressive. These men have on the whole had the creative political imaginations from which were drawn the ideas and energy needed for the formation of the present elaborate collection of international organizations. In this volume, they continue to furnish points of departure for speculation, as Madariaga does with his suggestion of an international police force put together under an "Additional Charter" paralleling the United Nations Charter. They are frequently more practical, as is Monnet with his insistence that efforts to unify political entities must be regarded as dynamic and not static. At the same time, the essays by Bonnet and Angell underline the need for a world of intellect within a world of peace, although the sum of their comments points up the difficulties and obstacles rather more than any really firm success.

This book then does furnish perspectives, even if they are mixed in form and not always clearly enough drawn to suit the searcher for elegant solutions to the problems of peace. "The organization of peace," writes Shotwell, "is not complete; indeed it never will be. For peace is a dynamic and continuous process for the achievement of freedom, justice, and security on a world-wide scale" (p. 30). The other eleven elder statesmen represented in this book would no doubt agree with him. Scholars could do worse than to join in trying to understand the process of keeping the peace within such a perspective.

Benjamin V. Cohen could claim a place among the elder statesmen of international organization in view of his long association with the United Nations. But his connection differs from the authors of the Carnegie Foundation collection in that he has primarily concentrated on the relation of American policy to international organization. Furthermore, his approach has been that of the lawyer, unlike most of the essayists in *Perspectives on Peace*. His short book, made up of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures delivered at Harvard during April 1961, is that of a constitutional commentator and counselor on policy. *The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities* fits into the context of comparing national and international institutions with its direct likening of the development of the United Nations Charter to that of the American Constitution. (The possibility of such a comparison, incidentally, is one to which Dag Hammarskjöld alludes in his contribution to the Carnegie volume.) It resembles the essays of the other elder statesmen in *Perspectives on Peace* in its close atten-

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tion to international organizations as a fact of life and in its emphasis on the dynamic quality of the United Nations.

As a politically experienced lawyer, Cohen reasonably concludes that the United Nations Charter, like the American Constitution, established an organism that could grow. Despite the backing and filling of member states, he says, "generally speaking, charter interpretations that would seriously retard the organic growth and development of the Charter have not prevailed" (p. 7). As evidence, he cites the practice of the organization on abstentions in the Security Council, the adaptation of the General Assembly for use in maintaining peace, the flexible interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction reservation in the Charter, and the effect of such *ad hoc* agreements as the Italian peace treaties.

Turning to the responsibilities of members, Cohen points out that "if the United Nations is to live and grow, Member States must not only observe their obligations under the Charter, but exercise their rights under the Charter wisely and prudently. The future of the United Nations may be compromised by the non-use or the unwise use by Member States of their charter powers" (p. 32). In discussing the Charter provisions relating to the unilateral use of force, he emphasizes that debating the limits of self-redress is much less important than recognizing the "constitutional responsibility of the United Nations organs to prescribe a minimal redress of grievances when they intervene to preserve the peace" (p. 41). This precept he ably applies to the Suez affair and to the American treatment of Chinese representation. A glance at the Congo crisis permits him to observe rightly that if the other organs of the United Nations had functioned properly, the Secretary-General would not have been called upon to shoulder a burden of policy-making so great that, without suitable limits laid down by deliberative bodies, it became unbearable.

When Cohen brings legal analysis to the problem of future national policies to further the growth and authority of the United Nations, he endorses with careful and subtle generalization suggestions made elsewhere. The awareness that war threatens man's survival, he believes, might become the basis for a consensus among all nations, especially the Great Powers, that force must not be used to settle differences; the threat provides a basis for a greater feeling of community that might lead to a consensus on the control of armaments and on the essential rules and conditions of peaceful coexistence. His plea for agreements in these areas represents more than a declaration of ideals, for he realistically points out obstacles in such forms as ideological competition and the behavior of Communist China. He argues rather that explorations

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seeking the common interest, which he assumes exists in the terror of destruction, might produce a healthy growth in the United Nations "that contemporary statesmanship cannot foresee and dare not predict" (p. 92).

In many respects, Cohen agrees with remarks made by the twelve elder statesmen in *Perspectives on Peace*. His emphasis on the diplomatic possibilities of the United Nations accords with the views of Pearson and Hammarskjöld. He does not neglect international law as a useful guide to policy, although unlike Max Huber he does not explicitly commend the highly formal procedures of third-party settlement. With Madariaga, he believes that the United Nations has a need for certain kinds of force, although in other respects their views diverge sharply. Cohen shares Inönü's interest in personal encounters among statesmen but in the defined setting of the United Nations.

Because Cohen did not set out in his brief book to deal with the entire great range of functions performed by the United Nations, it would be unfair to tax him with failure to look at the work of international organizations in the field of the general welfare. Yet here surely the United Nations has stretched such concepts as domestic jurisdiction and intervention beyond the previously known limits and begun what might well be the basis for whole new headings in international law. The United Nations and other international organizations, for example, are deeply involved in the management of the economy and administration of the Republic of the Congo. They have had important shares in providing assistance for other former colonies to a degree that once would have been considered intolerable. Furthermore, they operate world-wide technical assistance and allied human welfare programs. While such programs may or may not have some bearing on the eternal problem of keeping the peace, their unparalleled scope suggests that they may be sheltering a growing body of administrative law that in a rudimentary way resembles the development of such rules along with national social welfare programs.

II

The center from which the expansion of functions of the United Nations has taken place is the General Assembly, the "legislature" in which all members of the United Nations are represented and to which the elder statesmen have assigned such varied attributes. Sydney Bailey's *The General Assembly*, a fine and serious book, is pitched quite differently from the work of the elders. This is a scholarly work, in the sense that it is based on careful and enterprising study of original ma-

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terials, especially the voluminous and rewarding official records, and is not the summing up of a single participant's memories. Yet it retains a personal flavor and unashamedly displays personal views, such as this comment on what Bailey thinks is a dangerous tendency in the far-ranging General Assembly discussions: "What I am concerned about is the temptation to deal with one's own problems by moralizing about other people's" (p. 255). The book is not, however, based either on a novel method or on concepts of social science that have lent themselves to national legislative studies.

The framework of Bailey's book is the legislative body itself, and within this framework Bailey studies the "legislative process," calling attention to the political background, the procedures, the climaxes of decision-making, and the internal alliances among members. He also includes a detailed case study of the complaint of unprovoked aggression in Tibet and its fate in the General Assembly process.

The parliamentary process in the General Assembly, as Bailey accurately describes it, can be set off from national practice without difficulty, for this is diplomacy. Bailey does not, however, accept the Nicolson genre of criticism, pointing out Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's insistence that parliamentary diplomacy should include private talks. The working methods of the General Assembly, diplomatic organ that it is, nevertheless begin to resemble national legislative practice when Bailey discusses coalitions, groups, and blocs. Aware of this resemblance, he also points out how different working associations of sovereign nations are from political parties in democratic legislatures. When Bailey wrote two years ago, there were a mere 82 members in the United Nations, which now includes 104. He anticipated then that the procedures which he analyzes and discusses would take on greater importance and that increased use of the three Councils, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice would give real advantages. He advocates more careful selection of the agenda, a hope that seems rather utopian as new members with new pet projects come into the organization. As for limiting the apparently interminable debate, Bailey sees little hope of doing so through the rules of procedure but thinks that more attention to harmonizing views and less to voting might help.

Although confining himself to the procedures of the General Assembly, Bailey does not lose his awareness of the political nature of the General Assembly. On the contrary, his study aims at understanding how the procedures influence, restrict, and facilitate the political process. The rules and practices of the General Assembly that he discusses conform closely to the political exigencies of the members, giving them ample

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time and opportunity for explanation of their views, for consultation among themselves and with their governments, for consideration of the content of resolutions, and for making propaganda gestures aimed at their own or other citizens. Because of his sensitivity to the political underpinnings of all procedural rules and practices in the General Assembly, it is rather surprising that he does not make more of the unusual procedural privileges accorded the Secretary-General. This international official, whom—in the person of Hammarskjöld—Bailey quotes on the nature of parliamentary diplomacy and whom he recognizes as having powers of political initiative, may at any time speak to the Assembly or present any written communication on any question before it.[2] In practice, he always is recognized by the President of the Assembly or any of its committees whenever he wants to speak. This gives the Secretary-General the privilege of timing his interventions for the greatest impact. Among other occasions, Hammarskjöld used this privilege fully during his duel in 1961 with Khrushchev, and Trygve Lie employed it for his resignation speech.

As useful as Bailey's book is, it represents only one aspect of the work of the General Assembly, which in its massiveness and seven-committee performances can both serve to mirror world politics, as Cohen suggests, and demonstrate an international political process of unequaled vigor.

Singer's *Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process* might have been conceived as an additional case study for Bailey's volume, for it shows how the General Assembly handles the purse strings of the organization. Unlike Bailey's own case study of the question of Tibet, Singer's monograph covers a number of years of consideration of the budget by the General Assembly, especially the period 1946-1953. It makes clear the varied sources of ideas and pressures bearing on the budget process. These include the Secretariat, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the zealots in some national delegations, the general eagerness to expand the work of the organization, the equal anxiety to escape from bearing the expense, and the elaborate safeguards that compel the Secretary-General to spend the appropriations as directed. These are the pressures that the rules and practices studied by Bailey contain, rationalize, and direct toward a consensus.

This monograph represents a service to scholars interested in international organization. Singer rightly declares that it is the only study of its kind. This is startling in view of the suggestive analogy of

[2] Rule 72, *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly*, UN Document A/3660.

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studies of the national budgetary process, which are as abundant as those relating to international organizations are scarce. In the course of his painstaking dissection of the budgetary process, based on study of the official records and interviews, Singer discloses a number of possibilities for further study. Voting on budgetary questions might well involve the formation of the kinds of association to which Bailey calls attention; Singer notes the homogeneous attitudes of Soviet bloc representatives on budgetary questions and the records of debates suggest that an economy bloc exists. During his discussion of the Fifth Committee, Singer calls attention to the leading critical role assumed in the early days of the organization by Roland Lebeau of Belgium. It would be worth knowing what sort of instructions a leading critic had and why his government was interested in pressing such an attack. The embattled position to which the Secretary-General is forced by the budgetary process is explained, but there is less information on the means available to the Secretariat to fight back.[3] In most instances, the Secretary-General seems to have done remarkably well in preserving the main lines and significant details of his programs. For that matter, his closest critics in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions have not damaged his programs significantly. Nor has their criticism evolved into the control exercised by the Supervisory Commission of the League of Nations.

The completion of Singer's study antedated the current financial crisis in the United Nations. Therefore, his chapter on revenues now seems thin.[4] In particular, it does not take up the legal and political consequences of the lagging contributions from the membership. And by design it does not deal with the proliferation of special-purpose funds to which contributions are voluntary. However, since these include the funds for the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, care for Palestine refugees, UNEF, and the Congo (at least at present), they represent major operating programs. At the same time, they are proving more and more difficult to finance sufficiently even to satisfy the minimum demands made on them. Furthermore, money for operating programs involves the annual pledging conferences, where a little-known bargaining process that deserves scholarly study takes place. This bargaining session, indeed, might reflect more accurately than the remarks

[3] For some details, see my article, "Policy-Making and Secretariat Influence in the U.N. General Assembly: The Case of Public Information," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (June 1960), pp. 359-73.

[4] A recent article helps to provide insights into this problem. See John G. Stoessinger, "Financing the United Nations," *International Conciliation*, No. 535 (November 1961), pp. 3-72.

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in the Fifth Committee the limits of financial involvement with the United Nations that various governments place on themselves.

III

If the two volumes from the elder statesmen can be compared with those of the founders of national governments and those by Bailey and Singer with studies of national legislatures, Walter Sharp's *Field Administration in the United Nations System* can easily be placed with works on public administration. Like Singer's book, this one is a pioneering effort, and like those of the elder statesmen, it comes from an experienced hand in international organization.

It differs in focus from the works by Cohen, Bailey, and Singer in two important respects. In the first place, it concentrates on field operations and not on the policy-forming function, although some references to that function have a place in the book. Secondly, it ranges beyond the institutional confines of the United Nations into the house of the Specialized Agencies and touches on direct governmental and private programs. But like the elder statesmen and the students of the legislative process, Sharp deals with a process, not a static arrangement of rules or lines of authority.

Sharp's study is factual, massive, profound within its limits, and alive to the complexities of working within the international organization context. It is, moreover, unique in its willingness to deal in detail with field work by the entire gamut of international organizations in economic, social, and technical functions. The author emphasizes that this is a limited study, confined to the description and classification of field organization forms; identification of the assumptions and forces underlying expansion of field machinery and trends toward "decentralization"; assessment of field staffing problems; examination of communication and logistics; analysis of the programming process; and suggestion of improvements. These limits have helped him to become extremely well-informed on the world of the international civil servant, and especially on that part of it where the official has the greatest freedom to act on the basis of professional standards and technical knowledge. This study has many controversial aspects. But it keeps in the background the process by which substantive policy is determined, for this is a study of program-making and execution.

Yet in this world of the international civil servant, the policy process looms large. Many of the institutional complexities and administrative patterns described by Sharp owe their existence to manifold consensuses and decisions in the deliberative organs that direct work in the welfare

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field. They depend on national action as much as the United Nations does in its political and security functions. Furthermore, the international civil servant deals mainly with his opposite numbers in national administrations, not with the ordinary citizens of the state to which he is posted. He thus has access to the higher levels of government and more often than not counsels a governmental service as to improvements or may even help to form it. In this work, the international civil servant cannot avoid influencing substantive policy and thus becoming, willy-nilly, a part of a local political situation. Furthermore his advice, especially if he serves as a Resident Technical Assistance Representative (whose work Sharp describes in detail unobtainable elsewhere), may furnish the basis for requests for further international assistance or altered programs. This in turn could call for new decisions by the Technical Assistance Board, staffed by international civil servants, or by the governmental representatives on the Technical Assistance Committee, the Economic and Social Council, and even the General Assembly or the deliberative bodies of another agency.

The content of the international civil servant's advice may be modulated by his own institutional loyalties to his international organization. Sharp shows how the differing administrative patterns of the international organizations and their particularism have had to be overcome in order to administer the really meager field programs with improving efficiency. As if this were not enough, the officials involved frequently live and work in utterly strange cultural environments that require special adjustments.

Sharp's conclusion that "the UN nexus of organizations has demonstrated administrative capacity to plan and carry out world-wide field programmes with relatively high standards of performance" (p. 551) renders homage to human adaptability and talent for improvisation. His detailed suggestions fall within two main recommendations. On the one hand, he urges greater integration at the center of the machinery for administering the programs shared by the intergovernmental agencies. He makes the controversial suggestion that the Technical Assistance Board be merged with the Special Fund. At the same time, the Specialized Agencies would retain their identities and full control over their own individual programs. On the other hand, he recommends that the Resident Technical Assistance Representative, who should be a career official, be assigned to integrate functions in the field for the greater convenience of the national governments in dealing with the many United Nations agencies and to facilitate informal contact among the now often isolated technical assistance personnel.

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The consideration of such suggestions, as Sharp recognizes, would involve political organs and political overtones that he largely excludes from the content of his study. It thus stops short of an examination of what happens to administrative suggestions in the political bodies.

At this point, Sharp's work connects tangentially with that of Bailey and Singer. It also suggests that study of the political process of the Economic and Social Council and the Technical Assistance Committee might yield most interesting results.

IV

Politics devoid of personalities would be unimaginable. Even the civil servants who move through Sharp's study with their precise identities sheltered by anonymity bring their personal views and whims to bear on the work they do. Personalities bulk large in the other works discussed here. But none of them fits into that familiar form of political comment, the biography. The political figure who is the most natural subject, or target, of a biography is the one with a representative as well as technical role: a president, a king, a head of government, a founding father. In the United Nations context, this representative official is the Secretary-General, who has responsibility for the entire administration and an important role in forming some policies of the organization. When the Secretary-General cuts such a broad swath in public affairs as the late Dag Hammarskjöld did, he inevitably attracts biographers.

The two earliest biographies of the second Secretary-General—Richard Miller's *Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy* and Joseph P. Lash's *Dag Hammarskjold*—are neither scholarly nor critical books. Both have an inevitable incompleteness in content and maturity, for they were written before their subject's untimely death. Miller, who is an official of the National Education Association, only too accurately sums up his handicap when he says that "a better study of Dag Hammarskjold and multilateral diplomacy will be possible in five or ten years."

Of the two books, the structure of Miller's, which hinges on the series of political actions from the time of Hammarskjöld's negotiations with the Peking government to his leadership in the Congo, seems at first glance the more attractive to the political analyst. Within the chapters, however, a chronological method is followed and there is little attempt to trace persistent operating procedures or to apply analytical concepts. The book is far less a political study than the compilation of a narrative from published sources, principally (as copious notes indicate) from

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newspapers and the published record. Since the book obviously was written close to events, the author has had little time to reflect on the record he sets down and the bare facts remain unilluminated by imaginative inferences.

Lash, a New York newspaperman, concentrates on the brilliant personage of Hammarskjöld and rarely lets himself be diverted into a mere narrative of events. He clearly was closer to Hammarskjöld himself than was Miller. His book has benefited from interviews with the late Secretary-General and what I take to be numerous confidences from his associates. It sets out Hammarskjöld's career before his appointment to the United Nations post with illuminating detail and clarity, showing how the development of the man as a national civil servant shaped and enriched the later Secretary-General. This biography is smoothly and imaginatively written, but it contains no notes. Many descriptions of negotiations remain altogether unattributed. Yet because of its insights into the mind and method of the gifted Swedish diplomat who so greatly expanded the office of Secretary-General, and for its fresh pieces of information, Lash's book should have value to the scholar.

A great deal remains for scholars to do in assessing the place of the Secretary-General in the political process of the United Nations and in making clear how he takes the initiative and how his influence is extended and limited. By his imaginative actions and his willingness to take on responsibility, Dag Hammarskjöld constantly tested these limits. With his assistance and often under his leadership, the United Nations marked out new paths and showed unsuspected possibilities. His term of office therefore has a special significance in the study of international organization. Scholars have every reason to regret that in this undertaking they will not have the assistance of the second Secretary-General, whose own analytical powers and scholarly bent shone through his thoughtful speeches, such as the one that he contributed to *Perspectives on Peace*. But they can have the aid of Hammarskjöld's associates and friends and the press corps that observed him so closely. They ought to welcome further contributions from these sources.

VI

The seven books discussed here have been strung like beads on a cord spun from the most elementary institutional analysis of national government. They fit together surprisingly well. Together they represent views or parts of a process by which policy alternatives are chosen. But to speak of international organization or of the internal workings of an international organization as a process by now has little novelty.

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Yet within this primitive framework can be found three studies—those by Bailey, Singer, and Sharp—that present new information or elucidate relationships which have had little scholarly attention. When it is realized that these studies deal with subjects as elementary in national governmental research as the procedure of a legislature, the budget-making of a governmental institution, and the dynamics of a far-flung administrative network, the analogy of international organizations with national governments has some significance. It can perhaps guide future scholarly efforts to obvious gaps in knowledge and to tested tools for filling them in. At the same time, these studies suggest further matters worth attention.

If one prediction were to win the approbation of every writer represented in these seven books, it would be that international organizations will become more active, more important, and more useful in any world that is spared nuclear warfare. And possibly the existing international organizations will have something to do with producing a world that will live on. This provides an overarching reason for study of international organization and for research into its many unexplored phenomena.

Many signs indicate that the pace of research on international organization has recently stepped up. The seven volumes reviewed here and a considerable number of others—some of them dealing with regional organizations, some with various kinds of technical co-operation, some with national policy—may be taken as evidence of this new pace. But so long as one can find promising research subjects in international organization by the quickest lateral glance, the work of giants remains to be done.

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THE POLITICS OF "CULTURAL DIPLOMACY"

By GEORGE LISKA

Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, 353 pp. $7.50.
Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, *Communist Propaganda Methods: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960, 287 pp. $6.00.

I

ONE of the tasks of statecraft in any conflict is to infer the adversary's objectives from his observable tactics and strategies, deciding in the process how much energy to expend in divining such objectives and how much in shaping them in keeping with one's own capabilities and goals.

Frederick C. Barghoorn identifies the immediate objectives of the "cultural diplomacy" of East and West, and specifically of the Soviet Union and the United States, as being of two kinds: to gain knowledge of the adversary, and to influence the adversary's perception of oneself—in other words, to gather information, and to substitute favorable images for unfavorable stereotypes. The West is mainly curious about the inner working of the Soviet socio-political system; the East about the capitalist system's output of material goods. Gaining information about the adversary is always useful when it increases one's capability to deal with him; but image-creating or stereotype-destroying is meaningful only in relation to the ultimate objectives—or unintended long-term effect—of cultural exchanges.

Without attempting to explore and relate these different aspects systematically, Barghoorn has no illusions about the intent of Soviet cultural diplomacy. It aims to distract and morally disarm the United States and subvert the less-developed countries away from their connections with the West. He feels that the "curse of political exploitation" may vanish from Soviet cultural diplomacy (and, presumably, from its American counterpart, insofar as it has a similar tendency) only if less power-oriented elites rise to authority, perhaps partly as a consequence of cultural exchanges. If less guardedly than Barghoorn, like-minded Western analysts of diplomacy through economic aid have voiced similar strictures and hopes in regard to that other form of humane activity with variable political content.

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The book describes at length the processes of East-West cultural exchanges and the techniques of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Barghoorn shows how the Soviets employ traditional Russian elements of aesthetic culture as well as novel scientific-technological elements. The former are "socialist" by adoption, the latter by achievement; both are supposed to testify to the vitality of the Soviet brand of social system. Soviet political culture and institutions, the remaining components of a civilization, are kept in the background for purposes of cultural diplomacy. As described, the techniques vary somewhat with the target. Being themselves familiar with the inferiority complex, the Soviets flatter the less-developed countries by displaying respect for the local cultures; they flaunt their cultural riches and accomplishments in the West, although more mutedly in Paris than in Pittsburgh. The object is sometimes to reassure, always to impress and to establish some basis for mutuality of interests, mainly against a historically meaningful imperialism: Western in the less-developed countries, American in Western Europe, and German in Central Eastern Europe. Both literally and figuratively, the Soviets try to speak the language of the target countries in order to make themselves strong enough to make others learn to speak Russian . . . and act Soviet.

II

Barghoorn's descriptions and all too rare interpretive passages are interesting. To assess the prospects of both the imputed objectives and the unintended effects, one must place cultural diplomacy in a perspective and within a context. The perspective is that of more fully completed, comparable experience; the context is that of parallel and comparatively more independent strategies.

In the perspective of historical experience, Soviet cultural diplomacy is one more instance of the "barbarian" first conquering a civilization, then being partly conquered by it himself, and finally employing the adopted culture to facilitate further conquests. Like Macedon and Rome with regard to Hellenism, Prussia had to conquer Weimar, and the Nazis, Prussia, for German power twice to employ German *Kultur* for political ends. The Bolsheviks, long after they had seized power over Russia's peoples in the first, "imperialistic," world war, had to mobilize Russia's cultural heritage in order to win the people over in the second, "patriotic," one. Only then could the Soviet regime try the technique on the outside world—beginning with the captive countries within the bloc.

Vladimir Reisky helps us with that part of the perspective. In his

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valuable treatise on Communist propaganda methods, he analyzes and interprets the employment of the aesthetic and scientific-technological elements of culture in Czechoslovakia, at a late and potentially ultimate stage of conquest. The object is now not merely to distract and disarm an adversary morally but, as Reisky calls it, mentally to subjugate and sovietize the physically disarmed victim. Stalinist terror has been relegated to the background as self-defeating; it is certain to be long remembered and easily reapplied in more subtly adjusted forms. At the same time, the display of Soviet technological achievements can now partly substitute for terror as evidence of power. Next to selected shreds of traditional local culture and folk art, the sputniks and spaceships are serviceable as vehicles for indoctrination, notably of the masses. As for the intellectuals, they are subjected to persuasion that promotion of culture and advances in science, in which they are supposed to participate creatively, somehow "prove" the scientific character and moral superiority of the socialist system.

Seen in perspective, the Communists' totalitarian indoctrination and their total diplomacy have a common denominator. Both combine "terror"—the one, latent police terror; the other, threats of nuclear and/or social-revolutionary terror—with "culture" designed to humanize the terrorist's image and facilitate submission to different degrees or stages of conquest. The would-be conqueror's prospects are best when two attitudes converge: one is a ruthless will-to-power, the other a will-to-believe in the irresistible power-holder's potential for using power humanely if he is not resisted. The demonstration of capability for exerting ultimate power instills fear; interruptions in the demonstration allow hope to prevent fear from turning into dull despair or unreasoning defiance. And receptivity to both power and hope can be increased by artfully manipulating the beautiful, the beneficial, or the merely familiar to appeal to different groups and levels of sophistication.

Regarding levels of sophistication, Barghoorn distinguishes the elites of Western Europe from those of the United States, and both groups from elites of the less developed countries. Reisky differentiates between the intellectual elites and the masses and, less sharply, between the scientists and the humanists. Communist cultural diplomacy and ideological indoctrination alike aim at clearly separating the groups and winning them over in turn to active commitment to communism or, provisionally, inducing political indifference or apathy. Reisky describes how indoctrination of the scientific-technological intelligentsia through the media of its own specialties, for instance, narrows the group's horizons while expanding its material rewards; the technician's outlook

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shifts toward that of the mass, and he moves away from the politically more self-conscious sections of the intelligentsia. But neither group is immune to political apathy. Such apathy may manifest itself outwardly as a form of acceptance; it is not therefore the mask of opportunism. Nor is political apathy necessarily the product of political obtuseness; it can just as well express superior political acumen, drawing intellectually correct conclusions from past experience and present prospects of active resistance in the face of changing power relationships in the world at large. The "free world" resembles a captive society in that it encompasses the full range of attitudes disposed to resistance, acceptance, or active adoption of an apparently triumphant system; the difference lies in the resources that the free nations and a captive society can bring to bear on the balance.

Soviet cultural diplomacy and ideological indoctrination cannot but concentrate on the intelligentsia. As a group, intellectuals rarely sway the mass to political action, but they commonly define the terms of resistance—most recently, to Western domination in the colonial countries, to Soviet domination in the captive countries, and to Communist techniques of expansion and intimidation in the non-Communist world at large and in the West in particular. But the independent-mindedness of the targets tends to make the strategy itself dependent on factors external to it. The typical, or genuine, intellectual is apolitical in his attitude toward culture; this makes him averse to crediting a particular political system with cultural or scientific attainments. And, as long as he is merely impressed by power's potential for good or evil, rather than by the capacity of an existing authority to harm or benefit him personally, the intellectual is essentially idealistic in his attitude toward politics. This makes him critical of any existing regime as he measures it either against the ideal form of the regime, if he basically identifies with it, or against an ideal alternative, if he does not. Soviet cultural diplomacy would thus seem to be defeated in advance among the intellectuals of Western Europe—*the* principal target, according to Barghoorn—no less than indoctrination has been thwarted, by and large, in Central Eastern Europe. In captive countries the defeat has assumed the form of an unholy alliance, for purposes of opposition only, between anti-Communist intelligentsia and anti-regime Communist intellectuals. And in less-developed countries Soviet cultural diplomacy would seem to be self-defeating as well as defeated in advance, to the extent that it contributes to more varied sophistication of local intellectuals.

In actuality, however, all this does not so much rule out the success of cultural diplomacy as make its effect altogether dependent on other,

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essentially unrelated, conditions and strategies. A pattern emerges from the two treatises under review. There is no intrinsic unity between culture and the ideology of a socio-political system. The two cannot be convincingly equated in an attempt to "prove" the system's rightness and validity through its respect for, and development of, culture; and neither can they be effectively combined in an attempt to inculcate belief in such unity. In order to make minds receptive to ideology, they must be prepared by "culture"; but once the ideological ingredient is added, the euphoria is shattered. The impossibility of a synthetic fusion forces the user to fall back on mere association in the minds of the targets—association of their culture and aspirations with Russian culture and "socialist" science and of both with the Soviet system. The association itself, however, has a chance of occurring only in special circumstances; a favorable conjunction of extraneous factors and essentially opportunistic considerations must have quickened receptivity to cultural diplomacy or indoctrination. The political system *qua* power then vindicates culture rather than culture vindicating the system.

According to Barghoorn, Soviet cultural diplomacy was most successful in India in the mid-1950's. The Soviets were plying the Indians with massive and preferential attentions; but more important was the conjunction of Soviet cultural activities and Soviet support for India's claims to Kashmir, opposition to Western regional alliances, and drive for economic development. By contrast, Soviet cultural diplomacy was altogether unsuccessful in neighboring Finland, despite a saturation treatment. In Czechoslovakia, according to Reisky, receptivity to tokens of Russian "fraternity" and Pan-Slav "solidarity" declined after the coup of 1948; in the late 1950's indoctrination recouped some of its failure by becoming associated with Soviet technological feats, manifestly translatable into military power, and by the fairly effective association of Czech and Slovak trade and aid specialists with Soviet compeers outside the bloc. And pro-Soviet propaganda's impact has been greatest in areas most vulnerable to a revival of "German imperialism"—the frontier regions once inhabited by the Sudeten Germans.

The limitations of "culture" as a political weapon seemingly strengthen the case for its autonomy. But for cultural exchanges to have effects unintended by at least one governmental party to them, they would have to take place over a long period of time in fully stabilized conditions. Out of a total deadlock of all instruments of conflict and coercion, culture might then emerge as the decisive influence in politics; reciprocal attempts at persuasion might produce mutual understanding. To allow for this possibility, we may concede that a negative community of

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fear of nuclear weapons might neutralize the frictions which commonly attend too close contacts between culturally disparate collectivities.

A key question, which Barghoorn raises only in passing, is whether such a "stalemate" exists. It does not over the full range of techniques; and, perversely, the more stability is approximated on the nuclear plane, the more imbued with political significance is any means or activity that might affect the crucial balance of wills. Nuclear stability has intensified the tendency in the West to speculate about the dilemmas of mutual deterrence and massive (or other) retaliation (not to speak of those who would take refuge in unilateral disarmament); and it has encouraged the expansionist Soviets to experiment with nuclear blackmail. Blackmail entails a lapse of time between its formulation and the moment when the demand matures (or is withdrawn, in the event the blackmail has failed). The time-span alone increases the strain on the nerve of the decision-making elite, while the challenger's capability and the respective peoples' morale and allegiance are not, or not yet, put to a real test. In the critical phase, the blackmailer may hope, the previously nurtured image of him as a humane promotor of cultural values will further enhance by way of contrast the forbidding image of nuclear war and thus induce acceptance.

As long as the vital balance of weapons and wills holds between East and West, the outcome of the *bona fide* cultural diplomatists' race with time is intimately linked with the rate and record of the concurrent race in economic growth and other achievements—on this planet and in outer space. Cultural and scientific exchanges are directly related to the achievement contest insofar as they help to gather data about the adversary's achievements and advertise one's own. As provisional substitutes for military conflict, cultural offensives differ from economic warfare through trade and aid: the latter can theoretically assure final victory for one side; the former may contribute to making a threat of war do the work of successful war. But an apparent or actual superior capability to win a shooting war—however one may define "victory" or stress the "peaceful" uses of one's capability—is still the most important prerequisite of success in cultural diplomacy, even more than in economic diplomacy.

Well aware of such elementary links, overall Soviet strategy has been quite adept at blending or alternating soft loans for development with a "hard sell" of images and harsh reminders of the price of resistance to power. In the Khrushchev era, cultural assets of the Soviets have been mobilized to make up for the eclipse of Marxist-Leninist ideology and for the comparative failure of the strategy of ideological conversion

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in both the West and the non-Communist East. Culture as a substitute for ideology is no less of a tool in the strategy of subversion; and subversion remains subversion even when it is promoted primarily by sweeping nuclear blackmail, "conventional" techniques of infiltration having been blocked in the reconstructed West and absorbed in the political quicksands of the less-developed countries of the world for the time being.

III

Culture in a broad sense may be said to encompass the arts of diplomacy; when the two are distinguished, the nature and limits of their role in international politics still have much in common. It is, therefore, more accurate to speak of "cultural diplomacy" than to glorify (or abuse) the activity by giving it the label of "cultural imperialism"—as has commonly been done in the case of France or as some would implausibly do today in the case of the United States.

A nation's culture can be used to prepare a way for conquest by other means and to consolidate a conquest or conserve some of its fruits when effective opposition in kind has been aroused. Such was the experience of the French with the impact of their culture in Revolutionary, Napoleonic, and colonial wars and empires. More reliably still, culture can consolidate an alliance as long as power relations remain propitious—as the properly named *Alliance française* showed in Central Eastern Europe in the interwar period. But culture alone cannot create conditions that would do the job of conquest or alliance—as the French discovered in Egypt, for instance, despite considerable cultural and economic investment, in the period before, during, and following the British occupation. Nor will the most sophisticated employment of culture resolve basic power conflicts, such as the Franco-German one, or inhibit the use of force by the stronger rival, as demonstrated even by the Francophiles among the Germans in the course of three wars. And, lastly, the cultural diplomacy of both the French and the British (whom Barghoorn regards as the art's most successful practitioners, in contrast to the "ethnocentric" French) has failed to prevent an unavoidable development. The desire to imitate the personal and adopt the impersonal elements of the culture of these two Western European nations is by no means extinct; but it has visibly declined with their national power and political influence, not only in the world at large but, some contrary short-term trends notwithstanding, in their former dependencies as well.

The similarity of cultural and conventional political diplomacy is not exhausted in shared dependence on power; it bears also on the two

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diplomacies' intrinsic function, on the way they have been linked in the course of the cold war, and on the ways in which they are or ought to be linked in the future.

The *bon mot* notwithstanding, the Congress of Vienna had to dance before it could progress ever so little beyond the deadlock of forces and interests. A vaster entertainment is in order when both the publics to be absorbed and the potentially hostile forces to be glossed over are of a more massive character. But the functional unity of cultural and conventional diplomacy goes beyond the utility of cultural amenities as a stock-in-trade of diplomacy. Successful diplomacy of any kind consists in persuading parties to avoid outright coercion—the need for it, its consequences, or its continuation. A politic diplomacy achieves this by disguising unavoidable concessions as compromise, and by lending coercion the appearance of consent—one-sided or reciprocal. The identity of function—in the guise of persuasion to minimize the need for coercion *and* resistance to coercion—accords with the similarity of agents and techniques. Like conventional diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is implemented through an exchange of emissaries. The emissaries of a civilization, like those of a sovereign, are sent out to uphold the prestige and represent the merits of the sender before the receiving party, and to collect information about that party in the process.

In the cold war, cultural diplomacy has been part of the "diplomatic process," although not always in ways conformable with the canons of classical diplomacy. As Barghoorn notes, the first peak in East-West cultural exchanges was reached in 1955. This was the year of the Geneva spirit, but also the year when the West may have been passing through the last days of its nuclear superiority and the Soviets could look forward to the dawn of theirs. Such transitions in the balance of power are notoriously explosive; to weather their "last" danger period, the Soviets had good reason to add to their blandishments at the summit any pressures they could mobilize from people at large. The two forms of diplomacy—conversational summit diplomacy and cultural diplomacy—had in common an explicit downgrading of secretive "classic" diplomacy and an overrating of the need for face-to-face and people-to-people "human" understanding.

Once the Soviets reached nuclear parity, cultural diplomacy had to coexist with blackmail diplomacy, more or less peacefully. The uneasy coexistence highlighted two key questions of conventional diplomacy: whether relations should be permanent despite interludes of hostility and whether they need be made contingent on reciprocity. Diplomatic relations through conventional agents do not express good will so much

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as elementary necessity; but even they are commonly and properly pared down to the irreducible minimum of scope and cordiality during a political crisis. The threat or danger of their being broken off completely may be a potent weapon in resolving such a crisis. Had cultural diplomacy been an expression of mutual good will, the Soviets themselves would have had to suspend it whenever they were applying pressure or outright terror in the West. Instead, as Barghoorn notes, cultural exchanges actually increased at the time of the first Berlin crisis in 1959; and it was up to the West to do the slowing down or interrupting—either temporarily, as in the aftermath of the Hungarian crisis, or in isolated instances, as when the French called off appearances by the Bolshoi Ballet to mark the crisis over Dienbienphu and by Major Gagarin in the case of the second one over Berlin.

One's view regarding the compatibility of cultural exchanges with politico-military crises is a touchstone of one's concept of cultural diplomacy—as a tool or as a potentially autonomous force; so is one's attitude regarding "reciprocity" in such exchanges. The pros and cons cannot be debated outside a larger framework of views and assumptions regarding the cold war itself and the waging of it in ways conforming more or less to "old-fashioned" diplomacy. Barghoorn would substitute "equivalence" for tit-for-tat reciprocity in number, facilities, access, and exposure. But asymmetries in the structure and situation of East and West hardly permit such equivalence to be meaningfully defined and computed; the same asymmetries reduce reciprocity to no more than a leverage for asserting strictly formal equality.

One basic asymmetry bears on popular authority and attitudes in the key countries. Having in any case much less actual or potential influence on foreign-policy making than their Western counterparts, Soviet citizens were probably less surprised and affected than were many Americans by the rediscovery of the other side's common human-ness —a fact whose celebrations during World War II have not always redounded to the West's political advantage. The other asymmetry concerns the impact of cultural diplomacy on areas and peoples other than America and Soviet Russia proper. The greatest success of Soviet cultural diplomacy proper was probably registered not in India, but within the Communist world itself and within the captive countries in particular. As Reisky points out, attending as they did Communist successes in military technology and politico-economic warfare, cultural exchanges with the "free world" have brought home to the bloc the growing prestige and acceptance of even a hostile and expansionist Soviet system. It is hard to see how the freest cultural exchanges be-

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tween the West and the captive countries—keyed so as to match the exchanges between the Soviets and countries more closely associated with the West—could do more than satisfy formal reciprocity and be equivalent in character and result. Possible gains from communication between the West and the captive intelligentsia are likely to be outweighed by the political liability of the exchanges taking place under the auspices and with the toleration of the satellite regimes.

IV

It may or may not be a source of comfort to the West that the struggle for the minds of men is not decided by brain-washing or by brainstorming—by indoctrination or by cultural diplomacy. The way the West handles the "German issue," alongside the overall Soviet politico-military challenge, will really decide whether the commitment to the West in Central Eastern Europe can and will endure. The same is true of commitments in the less-developed countries, once the specific issue has been changed to fit local preoccupations. The juxtaposition of regionally dominant issues with the overriding global problem points up the difficulty of gaining advantage in one without incurring a greater liability in pursuing the other; the difficulty is increased when an effective response is lost in a guessing game regarding both the opponent's momentary and his long-range designs. And even such a compounded difficulty is nothing compared with the near-impossibility of devising and implementing an effective strategy—cultural, economic, political, or military—once the impression is allowed to arise that the overall balance is shifting in favor of the other side. If history teaches anything, it is that a power or group of powers apparently on the decline can do nothing right, while the apparently or really rising power can do nothing wrong, however much wrong it may be inflicting in the process of rising. The winner takes all, including the right to adopt or suppress elements of the defeated party's culture. Only despair can put faith in the possibility that the victor himself will be transformed in the process.

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MASS REVOLUTION AND TOTALITARIANISM

By ANDREW C. JANOS

Ferenc A. Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, 590 pp. $9.75.
Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1961, 178 pp. $4.75.

I

THE first of the two books reviewed, Professor Váli's, is—despite some of the criticism that will follow—the best and most comprehensive historical study of the Hungarian revolution so far available. *Rift and Revolt in Hungary* leads us through a whole period of Hungarian history, from the establishment of the Stalinist dictatorship in 1949 to the postrevolutionary consolidation of the regime in 1957-1958. The narrative takes place in the broader contexts of "satellitism" and Soviet policies toward East-Central Europe. The trauma of the Rákosi terror (1949-1953), the first experiment with the "New Course" (1953-1955), the serious division of Party ranks (1955-1956), and finally the explosion of 1956 unfold through the description of the simultaneous crisis of the Soviet Empire. The title itself reflects the dual pattern of events: the rift within the Communist leadership, and the revolt of the masses that in the end overthrew the Communist regime.

Professor Váli's analysis leans heavily on ethnic, religious, and cultural factors. The subtitle of the volume is *Nationalism versus Communism* and, indeed, the struggle between two ideologies occupies a central position in the book. Accordingly, "the case study [of Hungary] begins a thousand years ago" (p. 19). Váli sees the dynamics of the Hungarian revolution in national aspirations that were frustrated by Great Russian nationalism and an alien political form, the two factors reciprocally enhancing each other's momentum (p. 494). The test of the proposition is a comparison of Hungary's experience with that of the other European satellite countries, from which the hypothesis emerges that resistance to communism tends to be highest where religion, pro-Slav national affinities, or national phobias other than anti-Russian (e.g., anti-German) do least to mitigate frustrations produced by Russian domination. Hungary was the satellite most prone to revolt against communism because, by traditional, ethnic, and religious factors

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as well as by an absence of deeply rooted anti-German sentiment, she "was and is, more than any other satellite country, conditioned for the development of acute anti-Soviet feeling" (p. 17).

While it is easy to agree with the proposition that nationalism was an overriding force behind the *popular* revolt, it is somewhat difficult to accept the argument found throughout the study that "the most powerful motivation leading to a rift *within the Communist Party* of Hungary was a conscious or unconscious national sentiment" (p. 493; italics added), or that the same national resentment was manifest in the mass movement as in the deviationist interpretations of Communist doctrine by a faction of the top leadership. One may quote Imre Nagy's ardently nationalist testimony: "I do not deny my Hungarian nationality and ardently love my Hungarian homeland and my Hungarian people. . . . This distinguishes and separates me, even today, from the cosmopolites and the 'leftist' extremists who are foreign to the Hungarian people and to their ambitions" (p. 198). But until the outbreak of the revolution Nagy had been a "lonely man at the helm," isolated by his nationalism from the rest of the leaders of the Communist Party. The fact is that "national" communism was more feeble in Hungary than either in Yugoslavia or in Poland, which was one of the main reasons why the Party opposition was unable to absorb the shock of the popular rebellion. Nor was nationalism strong among the rebellious writers and the "rehabilitated" old guard who started the avalanche of criticism after the 20th Party Congress. For these people the main question was how to recapture the original purity of the movement. Among the writers, the nationalists had been silenced long before 1956 and remained silent until after the outbreak of the revolution. The major *dramatis personae* of the revolt of the intellectuals—Háy, Lukács, Déry, Gimes, Zelk, Benjamin, or Kuczka—could be best described as disappointed idealists who sought to redeem the movement from the perversions of Stalinism by returning to the classic tenets of enlightened internationalism.

Váli's theory of revolution (Chapter 31) is a synthesis of socio-cultural predispositional factors with the psychological sequence of frustration and aggression. In his conclusion to the volume, Váli states that "reactions . . . differ according to the intensity of frustration, that is, in proportion to the pressures and pains inflicted on the nation in question" (p. 494). Relying on certain group theories of aggression, Váli holds that "frustration equals aggression," and that "there is a 'cultural threshold of frustration' for groups, as there is for individual personalities. This threshold is determined by stimulating and restraining factors,

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historic, ethnic, cultural, and religious. In Hungary the threshold was passed when some additional impact closed the circuit that set off the explosion" (pp. 494-95).

Since Váli's method is essentially historical and the theoretical synthesis is more or less an appendix to the narrative, criticism on grounds of social theory should not weigh heavily against the overall value of the book. Yet, in connection with the concluding chapter one cannot fail to point out some of the fallacies inherent in the application of the frustration-aggression hypothesis in a broad social context. Even if we agree that aggression (violence) is causally connected with frustration (as is implied in all major interpretations of revolution), and use the hypothesis as a nucleus around which socially relevant propositions can be built, we cannot accept the statement that "it is generally agreed that 'frustration equals aggression' " (p. 494). For one thing, frustration (resentment against a political regime) is an attitude, and aggression (revolution) a type of mass behavior. The relation between the two is by no means direct and immediate. To be more explicit, the absence of frustrations may explain the absence of revolution, but the presence of frustrations, however intensive, is no satisfactory explanation for the incidence of a political explosion of the Hungarian type. Social frustrations had been high since 1949, but the outbreak occurred in 1956—not during the "hardest years" of 1951-1952. The salience of frustrations, or the "threshold" of aggression, depends on the balance of culturally determined frustrations and more immediate inhibiting factors. This, incidentally, seems to be the proper explanation why, as Váli himself observes, "revolts are more likely to occur at a time of relative relaxation than in the heyday of terror" (p. 508).

II

While Professor Váli's study is more in the nature of conventional historical analysis focusing on cultural factors and the reactions of Hungarian society as a whole to communism and foreign domination, Paul Kecskemeti's volume, *The Unexpected Revolution*, deals with "the genesis of a revolutionary situation in Hungary" (p. v) and attempts to explain the "social forces" behind the uprising.

In many ways the two studies are complementary. Kecskemeti's major concern is with the social and psychological factors that connect the attitude of frustration with the incidence of large-scale political rebellion. In his analysis, combative impulses resulted "from a combination of two factors, namely, bitterness and frustration on the one hand, and a feeling of strength on the other" (p. 117). This element of strength

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was in direct proportion to the perceived weaknesses of the regime, and frustrations turned into violent action only after the security police had lost their self-confidence, after it had become obvious that Moscow banned unrestricted recourse to terror, and after the intra-Party opposition had acquired a legitimate foothold within the political system.

Popular discontent had been boiling hot since the establishment of the regime. But how did frustrations that were to act as the catalysts of rebellion develop within the Communist elite? In this respect, the rebellion of the intellectuals is particularly revealing. In 1953, the Party, for reasons of momentary expediency, abandoned a course that "the intellectuals had been defending as the only historically correct one" (p. 61). Conformism to an exclusive ideological line was destroyed from above, which made their position absurd. When Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 condemned the perversions of the system in terms of "proletarian" and "Marxist" criteria, "the last defenses of orthodoxy crumbled" (p. 69). The only way by which the intellectuals could restore their integrity and inner balance was through a desperate attempt to restore the "purity of the movement," even at the cost of attacking its very foundations.

Kecskemeti, like Váli, views the progression of events through the dual framework of elite and mass rebellion, but in Kecskemeti's analysis the dichotomy becomes more pronounced. The frame of reference he develops in the course of the discussion is a highly imaginative synthesis of classic theories of revolution. In terms of this framework, the revolution was a joint product of an "elite" and a "mass" process, which "would not have culminated in open insurrection if it had not been for the cumulative effect of the elite process steadily undermining the stability of the regime" (p. 2). As Kecskemeti points out, popular discontent had been widespread in every satellite country, but large-scale revolutionary movements with some degree of success occurred only where the Communist elite had been divided.

While Kecskemeti demonstrates great insight and understanding in dealing with the operation of competing and converging social forces on the elite and mass levels, his attempt to describe social attitudes in empirical detail prior to the revolution is somewhat less successful. To be sure, he is severely handicapped by the absence of comprehensive and reliable research data. The few studies on social attitudes available (such as the 101 interviews of the Columbia Research Project on Hungary, or the Radio Free Europe Audience Analysis) are based on small and unrepresentative samples, and it is hard to agree with some of their basic findings.

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Such are the data on the excessive "atomization"[1] of the working class and of the category of "office workers," in contradistinction to the low "atomization" of intellectuals (a group that is rather vaguely defined). To this reviewer it seems that workers had, throughout the entire period, been extremely conscious of the existence of group frustrations (high production quotas, bad housing, high food prices, factory controls). Even if they failed to articulate them in clear-cut political terms (for which they did not have skills comparable to those of the educated classes), these grievances assumed political dimensions by the very nature of the system. It is not correct to assume that the working class had been politically apathetic (p. 85). The fact that workers did not respond to the call of the intra-Party opposition is no evidence to this effect. Rather, this lack of response indicates that by the summer of 1956 the workers were completely alienated from even a reformed version of communism.

Reliance on such evidence is even more open to criticism because, as they stand, the data are somewhat incidental to the main line of argument. According to the interview data, both workers and "office workers" (an unhappily chosen category) show high degrees of "atomization," yet during the revolution the first was the most, the second the least active of all social groups. "Intellectuals" at the same time showed a low degree of prerevolutionary "atomization" and a corresponding high degree of participation. Data concerning peasant attitudes were not available, owing to the extremely small number of peasants who left the country in 1956, but we know that their revolutionary participation was relatively limited. Thus neither psychic distance from the regime (as Kecskemeti himself points out) nor the degree of "atomization" seems to have accounted for the pattern of revolutionary behavior. The study would have greatly profited if the author had tried to explore some of the structural conditions that bear on group behavior in revolutionary situations. For instance, if we take into account the "natural" organizational framework inherent in factory and university environments (the intellectuals had their legitimate organizations), it is easier to explain the high involvement of workers, students, and intellectuals, and the "striking" inactivity of office workers (p. 110), or the limited participation of the highly alienated peasantry.

III

The most important general conclusion implicit in both studies is that the Hungarian uprising of 1956 followed closely the "classic"

[1] Defined by Kecskemeti as "the extent to which people refrain from expressing their true feelings about political matters" (p. 84).

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model of revolutions, as formulated by Marx, Lenin, Edwards, Sorokin, and Brinton. It was an unprepared, spontaneous, and popular revolt preceded by such well-known symptoms as the "desertion of the intellectuals" and the demoralization, social isolation, and internal division of the ruling elites. As such, contrary to Communist doctrine and widely held opinion in the West, it proved that totalitarian societies are not immune from the consequences of massive popular alienation.

But while they agree that revolutions may again occur in Communist countries, both authors caution against drawing undue inferences from the Hungarian events. Váli thinks the satellite area will continue to be a major source of instability until the extinction of national identities, but that revolutions will not occur unless in times of acute external crisis. Extrapolating from the Hungarian experience, Kecskemeti suggests that popular rebellions are successful only if they take place in the center of a political system. Within the confines of national society the Hungarian revolution was all-encompassing and successful. Since, however, the national societies within the Soviet bloc are only subsystems of a larger unit, the popular movements of the Communist world will be of consequence only if they take place in the Russian core area rather than on the satellite periphery.

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THE POTENTIAL OF CASE STUDY IN ANALYZING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

By HAROLD GUETZKOW

Jacques Freymond, *The Saar Conflict, 1945-1955*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960, 395 pp. $10.00.*

THE *Saar Conflict* is the propitious beginning of a series of five case studies of international conflict being developed under the auspices of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, directed by John Goormaghtigh. Subsequent volumes are to deal with the Franco-Moroccan conflict, Trieste, Cyprus, and the Anglo-Iranian crisis. These important studies will culminate in a book by Goormaghtigh, "drawing observations and conclusions of general application from the comparative analysis of various particular international conflicts . . ." (p. xiii). This review addresses itself to the question, to what extent has Professor Jacques Freymond developed his case findings so that they may be incorporated into a reliable and more generally applicable body of knowledge?

If one asks that a case study contain raw materials from which more general knowledge may be abstracted, this volume clearly meets the requirement. The richness of the sources—documentary and secondary, complemented by personal manuscripts and interviews with many of the participants in this most recent episode in the century-old conflict over the Saar—is exploited skillfully by Freymond and his collaborators. The final text was prepared by M. Freymond, Director of Geneva's Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, who is not a national of any of the states party to the conflict. His collaborators, on the other hand, are Saar, German, and French scholars, whose access to informed persons and primary sources was exceptional, save for those papers impounded under the fifty-year rule of European diplomatic archives.[1] Despite the fact that over one hundred and fifty important

* This book is also available in British, French, and German editions.

[1] Memo to the President of the Carnegie Endowment of 2005 A.D.: How important is archival material? Your Carnegie study of *The Saar Conflict*, using much off-the-record material from private manuscripts and confidential interviews with actual participants, was completed without access to the diplomatic archives of the period from 1945 to 1955. To what extent will "research undertaken when the German and French archives become available" (p. xx) change the conclusions reached by Freymond and his collaborators? May I submit that this important methodological problem is worthy of a place in your tickler file of research projects for 2005 A.D.?

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historical studies on the Saar had already appeared in books, monographs, and journals (cf. the bibliography, "Studies," pp. 373-81), these researchers were able to make important factual contributions in executing the central mission of the volume, which was "not so much to range facts in chronological order . . . as to restore in their actuality the flow of related events, which mutually interact" (p. xix). This objective portrayal of events provides a base for the development of more general knowledge about international conflict.

If one asks that a case study do more than present a "reconstruction of the flow of history" (p. xv), Freymond's device of dividing his volume into a Historical Study (Part One, pp. 1-202) and an Analytical Study (Part Two, pp. 203-321) certainly has potential advantage. At the outset, he rejected concentration on "the 'turning points' of the conflict, on periods of crisis and of major decisions," since this would have demanded "beforehand an over-all view of the succession of events" (p. xiv). But in the process of selecting the events that he narrates and interprets in the Historical Study, he is already molding the topics with which he concerns himself more explicitly in the Analytical Study. Thus, the peripheral nature of the Saar problem for both the Germans and the French is referred to in Part One, Chapter 2, detailing "The Start of the Conflict"; and then in Part Two this marginality of issue provides a central core for the analysis in Chapter 14 on "International Influences." Recurrent reference to public mood constitutes an important narrative device in Chapter 3, indicating how "The French Position Is Shaken, March, 1950-December, 1951"; later this topic is considered in full detail in Chapter 13 on "Public Opinion." And it is not surprising that Freymond found it essential to handle "The Battle over the 1952 Elections" in Chapter 4 in terms of "Group Influences," to which two later chapters (11 and 12) are devoted in Part Two. References to these topics are scattered and repeated in the Historical Study; in the Analytical Study the topics are focused, with frequent recourse to the facts set forth in the Historical Study and with generous addition of new ones. As the work proceeds, choices of the basic variables—decision-makers, public opinion, interest groups (both public and private), and international context—emerge without justification or explicit rationale. In keeping with the Analytical Study as a topical rearrangement of the historical reconstruction, the "Conclusions" presented in Chapter 15 constitute a brilliant, detailed summary of those "forces whose interaction constitutes the warp of the conflict" (p. 207). Freymond's case study is considerably more than a historical chronology. Its topical development of underlying factors will provide Goormagh-

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tigh—as well as the writers of the four subsequent studies—with a check-list of variables to consider as they analyze other international conflicts.

It seems to this reviewer that Freymond and his collaborators hindered realization of the potential contribution of their case study to more universal knowledge by their failure to exploit the developing literature in the social sciences on the very topics with which their Analytical Study was concerned. For example, in the thirty-three pages of "Studies," the one page devoted to a more general bibliography (p. 373) includes but three references to the extensive literature on social conflict. In "Group Influences in France and Germany" and "Group Influences in the Saar" (Chapters 11 and 12), no effort is made to utilize the exemplary formulations of political party processes by Duverger. Because Freymond did not tie his observations into the developing body of thought about the very processes that he explicates, students of international conflict may fail to assess the broader implications of his work. The shocking contrast between the penetrating historical scholarship and the superficial social science of this volume highlights the missed opportunity to give this case study immediate significance for the more general understanding of international conflict.[2] The work of developing its implications for the literature of decision-making, conflict, public opinion, group theory, and international relations theory is left almost entirely to Goormaghtigh.

It is regrettable also that the many rich insights that Freymond ad-

[2] A curious double standard with respect to the validity of evidence is applied by Freymond in the Analytical as contrasted with the Historical Study. Although Freymond's collaborators have amassed a substantial amount of evidence, which is then treated in rigorous, quantitative fashion in their studies of survey polls, newspapers, and parliamentary debates and votes for both French and German opinion on the Saar (pp. 272-83), Freymond intersperses his presentation of this data in his Analytical Study with comments almost derogatory of its validity: "The conclusions drawn from this analysis are, we admit, very tenuous . . ." (pp. 274-75); "These few quantitative analyses have no value as proof . . ." (p. 277); and "One must therefore be cautious about drawing conclusions . . ." (p. 283). Yet, without any display of the underlying data, in his Historical Study Freymond sometimes is willing to draw conclusions with abandon, as when he asserts: "The banning of the D.P.S. [*Demokratische Partei Saar*] had not crippled the opposition as the government had hoped. Neither had the efforts to undermine the prestige of its leaders met with success. Quite the contrary, as often happens with repressive measures, they had rather enabled those at whom they were aimed to increase their importance in the eyes of a public more likely to be swayed by sentiment than by reason" (p. 102). After describing the revision of the Conventions governing Franco-Saar economic relations in Chapter 5 on "The Saar Settlement as a Prerequisite, January, 1953-September, 1954," Freymond without apology extravagantly claims, "The signing of the Conventions also had repercussions in Germany, as was inevitable" (p. 139). Why is a scholar willing to work forward with but shreds of evidence in the more traditional historical field, but then, when he is dealing with a new and strange quantitative methodology, inadvertently apply a more rigorous standard of acceptability?

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vances throughout the volume about the mechanisms of conflict processes in international politics are not developed more formally for inclusion in Goormaghtigh's *Concluding Analysis and Summary*. As a Professor of International History, Freymond argues against an orientation of his work by hypotheses or questions formulated *a priori*, even though these would then constitute "a common infra-structure of the various studies, making comparability possible, or at least less difficult" (p. xiii). But since he permitted the historical materials to evolve topically for his Analytical Study in Part Two, why did he not harvest his *a posteriori* hypotheses, once the historical reconstruction had been made? One intriguing hypothesis underlying what Freymond designates as a "phenomenon of auto-aggravation and acceleration"—that of the circular causal mechanisms—is developed twice in only a casual way. In Chapter 10 on "The Men and Their Actions," Freymond notes: "The few Saarlanders who resisted their fellow countrymen were used by Germans as evidence of an opposition in the Saar that should be supported. In the same way the Saar opposition used, in the Saar, the attitude of their German friends as conclusive proof of the German desire to win back the Saar. From these exchanges across the frontiers, increasing as time went by, there developed a dense and intricate network of relationships that contributed decisively to moulding public opinion in Germany and in the Saar, to upsetting the calculations of governments, and to playing havoc with their agreements" (p. 222). Later Freymond illustrates the same mechanism in another context: "The contradictions in French policy, caught between European co-operation and the defence of national interests, highlighted by the launching of the Schuman Plan, were aggravated both by the change in the international climate, which left France out of step, and by the reversal in the relative material and moral strength of France and Germany, a reversal which lent weight to the German claims. This very change in relative strength encouraged opposition in the Saar and by so doing indirectly stimulated the 'nationalist' reaction in France and the mistrust towards European organizations as well as toward the Saar partner, thus serving to underline and aggravate the initial contradictions in French policy" (p. 320). To this reviewer, it seems that our understanding of the nature of conflict in international politics would be greatly increased if historians of Professor Freymond's outstanding ability were to direct their efforts to the explication of such mechanisms of the conflict process.

As will probably every historian who reads the volume, this reviewer grew impatient with the time (1945-1955) and parties-to-controversy limits that M. Freymond so valiantly maintained to keep his study

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within the bounds of his resources. These proper restrictions suggest a second major way in which the Carnegie Endowment will find these case studies of value, in addition to their providing foundations on which Goormaghtigh may construct a "model" for further theoretical work about international conflicts. Again and again, Freymond points out that the Saar conflict was resolved because "At no time did the French and Germans give the impression that the absence of a satisfactory agreement could have a serious effect on relations between the two states. Never for a moment did the idea of recourse to arms appear to occur to them. There was no suggestion of a move towards armed resistance. No one seems to have thought of a break in diplomatic relations" (p. 297). Has not one of the important functions of the study, then, been to point out a most critical characteristic of the larger political environment in which the particular conflict was resolved? Is it possible that the key to the resolution of small conflicts rests not within these conflicts themselves but rather in an environment that forces their resolution or encourages their exacerbation? In their introductions, Goormaghtigh and Freymond both concern themselves with the potential relevance of "disputes of secondary importance" (pp. viii and xi) for the understanding of international conflicts. Perhaps the prime relevance of the cases will rest in an intimation that it is the international context within which small conflicts are enmeshed that needs study—not the internal mechanics of each contest. Such a conclusion would provide incentive for a new Carnegie series of parallel studies of the state of the international political system in which the five conflicts are embedded.

In sum, it would seem that M. Freymond but partially realized the potentiality in this case study for making a significant contribution to the development of reliable, more generalized knowledge about international conflicts. But my wistfulness is not meant to detract in any way from acknowledgment of the critical importance of this first step in the development of a cumulative series of interdisciplinary cases, so bravely being undertaken by the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment. This work is true venture—and certainly "those who follow will profit from [Freymond's] experience" (p. x).

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THE THEORY AND REALITY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

By IMANUEL WEXLER

Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961, 304 pp. $5.50.

BY its author's own admission, the present volume is designed primarily for economists. Yet the subject with which it deals and the comprehensiveness of its approach commend it to the attention of others as well. The book addresses itself to what has recently become one of the major and most dynamic developments on the international scene —the emergence of economic regionalism. Herein lies its main appeal: it is the first full-length study in which a serious—and fairly successful —attempt is made to interpret the theory of economic integration in the light of its present-day realities. It should therefore prove as interesting to students of international politics as to their counterparts in the field of economics.

I

It would be wrong to assume that the increasing popularity of regional economic blocs is due entirely to economic considerations. Much of the enthusiasm surrounding current integration efforts rests on political and strategic factors.[1] Still, it is *economic* reasoning that provides the core of the argument for the replacement of separate national economic entities by one large market area, throughout which goods and services (and possibly factors of production) can freely move. Hence, a meaningful evaluation of any integration scheme must necessarily include a judgment of its economic implications. Balassa rightly acknowledges this proposition by stating, at the outset, that "discussion of present-day integration projects, in Europe or elsewhere, would bear little fruit without considering the [economic] issues involved" (p. ix).

There are, to be sure, quite a number of issues, not the least of which concerns the very meaning of the term "integration." Briefly stated, the integration of national economies is accomplished through mutual removal of barriers that obstruct economic activities across national frontiers (i.e., tariffs, quotas, exchange controls, restrictions on immi-

[1] This is particularly true in the case of Western Europe, where the movement for economic integration must be judged more in political than in economic terms. See, for example, L. Gordon, "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), pp. 231-53.

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gration, etc.). But which of these obstacles are to be removed, and to what extent, are matters left to the discretion of the participating countries. Their decisions will determine, in each case, how closely the respective economies are brought together. Thus, the oft-heard terms "customs union," "free-trade area," "common market," "economic union," etc., constitute different forms (representing varying degrees) of integration; and by carefully explaining the meaning of each term (pp. 2-3), Balassa adds much clarity to the discussion.

He is mainly interested, however, in presenting a general theory that would encompass *all* forms of economic integration. Such an undertaking calls, first of all, for a distinction between two analytical approaches: static and dynamic. Balassa contends that most contributions to the theory of customs unions[2] have been based on static assumptions. This is quite true. Existing theory has, by and large, ignored the dynamic aspects of integration and, in particular, neglected to consider its possible impact on technological changes and the rate of economic growth.[3] Yet while justifiably deploring this omission, Balassa himself begins by devoting three chapters (chaps. 2, 3, and 4) to what is essentially a static analysis.

Here one finds a comprehensive survey of the customs union issue that includes a critical examination of all the important contributions to the literature. The various effects of integration on trade, production, consumption, movements of productive factors, etc., are thoroughly discussed and assessed.[4] And, as an added feature, a distinction is made between two major forms of integration: customs unions and free-trade areas. Having noted their respective merits and shortcomings, the author concludes that ". . . customs unions are superior to free-trade areas . . . ," mainly because ". . . a free-trade area will lead to a less efficient resource allocation than a customs union, and unproductive expenditures [in the former] will also be higher" (p. 74). This is a highly significant thesis, for it implies that, whatever may be their political virtues, the European Free Trade Association and/or the Latin American Free Trade Associations hold less promising economic prospects than the European Economic Community. Balassa in fact confirms this by asserting, at various points throughout his discussion, that "the European Common Market is more likely to lead to positive . . . effects than either

[2] Of all forms of integration, customs unions have received the greatest attention in the theoretical literature.

[3] See R. G. Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey," *Economic Journal*, LXX (September 1960), p. 496.

[4] It should be remembered, however, that the discussion here is carried out within a static framework.

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the Free Trade Association of the 'Outer Seven'[5] or the Latin American integration projects."[6]

Given comparative data for the existing volume and patterns of intra-area trade, size of the market, economic distances, inter-country cost disparities, etc., Balassa's assertion seems reasonable enough. Yet it is by no means certain that customs unions are, on all grounds, preferable to free-trade associations.[7] And one might even argue that in the case of non-industrialized areas (of which Latin America is an example), the form that integration takes is of little importance in indicating *a priori* the extent of possible gains. What is needed, in these areas, is not a device for reallocation of resources[8] within a given and unchanged economic environment, but rather a stimulus to a faster rate of growth. Thus, any degree of economic regionalism—if it contributes to that end—must be regarded as having beneficial and positive effects.

II

Fully aware of the limitations inherent in static analysis, Balassa turns, in Part II of the book, to what he appropriately terms the "dynamics of economic integration." His discussion of this topic is mainly directed at, and throws much light on, the important but previously neglected question of the possible impact of integration on economic growth. Readers who are not well versed in economic theory need only note that growth is said to depend primarily on two things: the rate of capital formation and technological changes. Balassa correctly regards the latter (he calls it "dynamic efficiency," or improved productivity) as the more important of the two, and accordingly advances the hypothesis that "a wider market will make possible the attainment of higher levels of manufacturing productivity" (p. 116).

This theme underlies the major part of Balassa's dynamic analysis, which itself starts from the premise that a wide market will enable an industry to achieve a large volume of production. Proceeding from there, the author examines the relationship between production and productivity. He makes use of theoretical principles and empirical evi-

[5] Similar views concerning the economic outcome of the EFTA are shared by other writers. For examples, see M. E. Kreinin, "The 'Outer Seven' and European Integration," *American Economic Review*, L (June 1960), pp. 370-86; and, more recently, G. Egerer, "Toward a United States of Western Europe," *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, I (August 1961), pp. 77-85.

[6] This is a summary quotation. It reflects references to specific effects, which may be found on pp. 33-34, 38, 43, 53-54, and 60 of the book.

[7] For one thing, the chances for trade-diversion are greater in a customs union than in a free-trade area.

[8] Efficiency of resource allocation is the major—and often the sole—criterion that static analysis applies in assessing the performance of any integration scheme.

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dence, and concludes that in many industries productivity rises with increasing size of output. This in itself is not a new thesis, for it is well known that economies of scale (meaning here "improved productivity") are associated with higher levels of production. But it leads to a crucial question: Do present-day integration schemes offer any opportunities for reaping the advantages of large-scale economies?

Relying on the conclusions of others, as well as on his own extensive research, Balassa answers by suggesting that "integration will make possible the exploitation of economies of scale for a number of industries in the European Common Market" (p. 136), and, interestingly enough, "the scope for the exploitation of economies of scale is considerably greater in the Latin American integration projects than in Europe" (p. 141). Those who might question the logic of attaching higher hopes to Latin America in this respect can be reassured that Balassa's reasoning is quite valid. One of the major obstacles to increased productivity in an underdeveloped country lies in the limited size of its market; and the Latin American countries are no exception to the rule. Their individual markets are by far smaller than those of European nations and, in most industries, the size of the average plant is small. Hence the potentialities for an increase in plant size and output, once the market is enlarged, are that much greater. Moreover, the greater uniformity in consumers' tastes and the smaller variety of products in Latin America, as compared with Europe, provide better opportunities for large-scale production in the former.

Balassa does not neglect other dynamic forces unleashed by integration that may contribute to an increase in productivity and thereby help to induce growth. He discusses in detail the role of a wide market in providing greater opportunities for investment, making possible a higher degree of specialization, spreading technical and scientific knowledge, and increasing competition. He rightly warns, however, that the beneficial effects of these forces will make themselves felt only to the extent that the prevailing social, psychological, and political conditions in each case will permit. He is, for example, somewhat skeptical of the chances for a much greater competition in Europe, because (1) the Common Market Treaty does not contain a provision for prohibiting concentration, and (2) the very signing of the Treaty has already brought about a movement toward concentration within various industries in some countries (p. 171). As for Latin America, the chances for competition there appear even gloomier than in Europe (p. 172).

Such misgivings should not be interpreted to mean that Balassa views pessimistically the outcome of integration either in Europe or in Latin

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America. Quite the reverse. He is, on the whole, rather optimistic. Yet, as indicated by these and other observations, his optimism is properly seasoned with realism. And what better and more meaningful way is there to forecast long-term economic events?

III

No discussion of the subject could be complete without at least some mention of the policy issues to which integration may give rise. Balassa —be it said to his credit—goes much farther than that. In the last four chapters of the book, he undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the problems involved in co-ordinating national policies in an integrated area. At least four types of policy come readily to mind in this connection: (1) fiscal, (2) monetary, (3) social, and (4) counter-cyclical.[9] The need for concerted action with respect to any one or all of these will naturally vary with the degree of integration itself. Generally speaking, the higher the degree of integration, the greater this need. Yet, even in the case of a customs union or a common market, the co-ordination of *all* economic measures is neither necessary nor particularly desirable. The guiding principle can perhaps be stated in the form of a question: What degree of co-ordination is necessary for the satisfactory operation of the bloc? Or, more specifically: To what extent should inter-country differences in fiscal, social, and monetary measures be reduced (or altogether equalized) in order to (a) ensure economic efficiency, and (b) facilitate adjustments to possible economic imbalances?

Distortions of inter-country cost relations and perverse movements of productive factors are, in Balassa's opinion, the major deterrents to the realization of economic efficiency within an economic bloc. It is not surprising, therefore, that his policy recommendations are designed to prevent these phenomena from occurring. Thus, for example, he regards as unnecessary *and* undesirable any equalization of wages, working hours, and entrepreneur-financed social benefits, because this is likely to ". . . distort competitive cost relationships" (p. 215), and may ". . . give rise to undesirable factor movements" (p. 224). Similarly, he feels that equalizations of rates of general production taxes "would have detrimental rather than beneficial effects" (p. 245). On the other hand, there is, according to Balassa, sound economic basis for the reduction of disparities in direct taxes (especially taxes on corporate profits); and it is also desirable to equalize inter-country differences in the rates of

[9] A fifth type should be mentioned—commercial policy. However, its co-ordination, except in the case of a free-trade area, simply involves the maintenance of a uniform tariff and trade policy against non-union members.

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excise taxes. Although space does not permit greater elaboration, it is safe—in the name of economic efficiency—to agree with Balassa that "differing harmonization measures should be applied to various kinds of taxes in an integrated area" (p. 251).

So much for social and fiscal measures. Different criteria, however, must be applied to the determination of appropriate monetary policies. Here the problem of co-ordination is primarily related to balance-of-payments considerations, and the basic issue concerns the ways and means by which disequilibrium could be remedied.

Needless to say, when a group of countries forms a union, they cannot employ trade and payment controls against each other as a means of keeping their balances of payments in equilibrium. Alternative methods of adjustment must therefore be found to deal with prolonged—or even temporary—external imbalances that might be experienced by one or several of the union's members. Students of the subject are no doubt familiar with existing theories on how best to facilitate the adjustment process. At one extreme are those who argue for nothing short of a common currency and/or a central decision-making authority. At the opposite end of the scale are those who rely on a system of flexible exchange rates to accomplish the task.[10]

Balassa rejects both prescriptions. His reasons become clear once it is realized that *he* places the main burden of adjustment, not on price and income effects, but rather on factor movements, and especially on the movements of short-term and long-term capital (pp. 256-57). To him, a system of fixed exchange rates[11] is preferable to one in which rates are allowed to fluctuate, because the element of uncertainty inherent in the latter "would hinder capital movements and would make it difficult for the firm to prepare long-term investment plans" (p. 267). Nor does he see any need for a central policy-making unit, since "the observation of common rules, mutual consultation, and the cooperation of central banks can permit capital movements to fulfill their equilibrating role without creating a supra-national authority" (p. 261).

All this may be true. Yet the wisdom of almost complete reliance on capital movements as an equilibrating force is open to question. It is doubtful that capital flows alone will be sufficient to correct all types

[10] An interesting combination—a supra-national authority *and* a system of flexible exchange rates—has also been suggested. See J. E. Meade, "The Balance-of-Payments Problems of a European Free-Trade Area," *Economic Journal*, LXVII (September 1957), pp. 379-96.

[11] And if the union-members are committed to maintain fixed exchange rates, and their currencies are freely convertible into each other, there is really no need for a common currency.

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of disequilibria. Other measures may well become necessary, and this will certainly require a greater degree of co-ordination than the arrangement suggested by Balassa. The case against a supra-national authority is further weakened when problems of external balance are viewed as a part of a broader issue—stability and growth. Integration increases the interdependence of the national economies participating in a union. The increased interdependence will have a profound effect on the transmission of cyclical fluctuations from one union-member to another, and thus on the effectiveness of policies pursued by individual countries. Hence, the higher the form of integration, the greater the need for close co-ordination of policies designed to combat recessions, prevent excessive inflation, and stimulate growth. And it is the contention of this reviewer that such co-ordination could not be effectively carried out without a fairly high degree of institutional unification.[12]

On the whole, however, Balassa's effort deserves hearty applause. For although the book does not contain many innovations, it provides a unifying framework within which the theory and practice of economic integration can be brought together in a meaningful way. As such, it constitutes a valuable and timely addition to the literature.

[12] This is not to deny, however, the political difficulties inherent in any attempt aimed at a unification of economic institutions.

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